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ABSTRACT 
 
Ambient Worlds:  
 
Description and the Concept of Environment in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction 
 
 
Rebecca Jayne Hildebrand 
 
My dissertation explores how the descriptive backgrounds of the Victorian novel helped to shape 
the emerging concept of environment in the nineteenth century. Thomas Carlyle introduced 
“environment” into English in 1827, spurring writers, scientists, and social thinkers to forge a 
diverse conceptual lexicon for describing the relationship between organisms and their material 
surroundings. Comte developed the idea of a singular organic “medium” that supports and 
nourishes all living beings, while Darwin imagined the plural “conditions of existence” as a 
chaotic field of competitive struggle. Whereas Zola’s “milieu” exerted destructive pressure on 
the individual, Spencer claimed that “environment” was in fact constitutive of life itself. My 
dissertation argues that novelists turned to vivid description as a means of materializing these 
competing environmental discourses, and exploring their social and affective implications. From 
the noxious fogs of Bleak House, to Mary Mitford’s concern for the sufferings of uprooted 
vegetables, novelists gave detailed attention to the exchanges between individual bodies and the 
physical world. Each of my four chapters examines how a Victorian writer used a distinct type of 
description to explore an environmental concept: Mitford’s botanical detail and natural 
theology’s idea of correspondence between body and world; Eliot’s weather and Comte’s 
organic medium; Hardy’s architecture and Spencer’s theory of environment; and Stevenson’s 
islands and the discourse of circumstance. Whereas recent critical re-evaluations of description 
often prize its detachability from narrative, this dissertation thus argues that description was 
central to the Victorian novel’s ability to represent interactions between individuals and their 
   
surroundings. Through close analysis of the descriptive surrounds of nineteenth-century realist 
fiction (weather, atmosphere, landscape, architecture), this project shows how the novel’s 
described backgrounds shape and participate in plot in surprising ways, functioning not merely 
as static pictorial backgrounds to narrative, but rather as dynamic participants in it. The Victorian 
novel, this dissertation ultimately shows, places interactions between characters and their 
environments at the center, rather than the periphery, of its drama.  
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Introduction 
 
In an 1828 review of Goethe’s collected works in The Foreign Review, Thomas Carlyle 
coined the English term “environment” to describe the relationship between individuals and their 
cultural and natural surroundings. The word first appears in Carlyle’s translation of an excerpt 
from Goethe’s autobiography Wahrheit und Dichtung, in which Goethe defends his novel The 
Sorrows of Young Werther against the charge that it was responsible for a rise in the suicide rate 
across Europe. Instead, Goethe insists, Werther’s popularity is attributable to the fact that the 
German cultural milieu was already pervaded by a widespread melancholy that was traceable to 
the influence English (not German) literature. After describing the melancholy landscapes of 
eighteenth-century English poetry, Goethe (in Carlyle’s translation) concludes,  
In such an element, in such an environment of circumstances, with studies and 
tastes of this sort, harassed by unsatisfied desires, externally nowhere called forth 
to important action; . . . we had recurred, in our disconsolate pride, to the thought 
that life, when it no longer suited one, might be cast aside at pleasure; and had 
helped ourselves hereby, stintedly enough, over the crosses and tediums of the 
time. These sentiments were so universal, that Werter, on this very account, could 
produce the greatest effect; striking in everywhere with the dominant humour, and 
representing the interior of a sickly, youthful heart, in a visible and palpable 
shape. (98) 
 
Carlyle’s unwieldy phrase “environment of circumstances”—which he here uses to translate 
Goethe’s German term Umgebung—is the first instance in English of the use of the singular term 
“environment” to designate the sum total of external factors that exert an influence on an 
individual or organism. The introduction of this concept made it possible, for the first time, to 
describe a singular, abstract entity imagined to comprise within itself all of the physical and 
cultural influences that shape human action and development. Although Carlyle uses the term 
initially to refer to a cultural and literary context, his neologism was taken up in the biological 
writings of Harriet Martineau and Herbert Spencer in the mid-nineteenth-century to describe the 
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aggregate of physical influences that affect living organisms, and “environment” subsequently 
became one of the most foundational ideas in Victorian biological thought. 
My purpose in this dissertation is to illuminate the ways in which Victorian novelists 
turned to the description of physical surroundings as a means of engaging with emerging 
Victorian debates about organism-environment interaction. In so doing, I depart from most 
critical assessments of description in the realist novel, which have tended to imagine it as a 
pictorial delay, pause, or suspension of narrative. Instead, I argue, nineteenth-century novelists 
employed description as a means of dramatizing the interactions between individuals and their 
environments—interactions that, because of scientific work by writers such as Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck, Auguste Comte, G.H. Lewes, and Herbert Spencer, had recently been newly 
conceptualized as dynamic, various, and essential to human and creaturely life. Through close 
analysis of literary and scientific texts of the Victorian period, I demonstrate that nineteenth-
century writers were acutely aware of the human relationship with its physical environment as a 
relationship that could take myriad forms and encompass a wide spectrum of affective 
attachments, attachments that often complicate and interact with plot in surprising ways. By 
linking description to the emergence of environmental thought in the nineteenth century, I 
broaden our critical understanding of both the relationship between description and narrative in 
the Victorian novel, as well as the rich conceptual vocabulary that nineteenth-century writers 
employed for thinking through organism-environment relationships. 
I develop this argument through readings of works by Mary Russell Mitford, George 
Eliot, Thomas Hardy, and Robert Louis Stevenson. I focus on these authors because each one 
explicitly employs a different environmental concept—“correspondence,” “medium,” 
“environment,” and “circumstance,” respectively—in his or her extradiegetic narration, while 
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also employing the descriptive apparatus of their fiction in ways that dramatize, revise, 
interrogate, or elaborate on these environmental concepts. This argument need not have limited 
itself to these four authors; from Emily Bronte’s windswept heaths, to Charles Dickens’s 
miasmic cityscapes, Victorian fiction abounds with extended meditations on the relationship 
between living bodies and the physical worlds they inhabit. I chose Mitford, Eliot, and Hardy as 
the backbone for this project, however, because all three write regional or provincial fiction in a 
realist mode. Regional and provincial fiction offers a particularly fertile object of analysis for my 
argument both because of its strong dependence on description (especially description of local 
landscape and weather), and because its typically rural settings situate human endeavors in close 
proximity to natural phenomena in ways that visibly dramatize biological exchanges between 
human bodies and physical surroundings. Moreover, while the described worlds of a gothic 
novel such as Wuthering Heights tends to solicit a reader’s attention with more dramatic flair 
than does a novel like Middlemarch, my focus in this dissertation is on the way Victorian texts 
represent literal exchanges and interactions between bodies and their material surroundings. In 
the realist narration of texts such as Mitford’s Our Village and Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, 
descriptions of weather, landscape, and atmospherics are not easily reducible to psychological 
projection or pathetic fallacy. The denotative, literal function of ambient description in the texts I 
examine is crucial for my argument because it dramatizes not psychological dynamics, but rather 
literal, material interactions between physical bodies and their surroundings. It is precisely in 
their commitment to the literal that these descriptions are in dialogue with emerging scientific 
debates about the relationships between organisms and environments.   
While this dissertation contributes to the already-robust body of work on the cross-
fertilization between literature and science during the nineteenth century, scholarship in this field 
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has tended to focus primarily on Darwin as the representative figure of the nineteenth-century 
biological sciences. Darwin’s importance and influence during the period is undeniable, but 
focusing exclusively on Darwin and his theory of natural selection occludes much of the 
diversity of biological thought during the nineteenth century, particularly in biological thought 
about environmental influence. My dissertation recovers a persistent and influential strain of 
biological thought that understands the relationship between organism and environment not as 
agonistic struggle, as Darwin imagined it, but rather as a developmental, dynamic, and often 
nourishing relationship in which individuals might adapt to their surroundings (and vice versa) 
over the gradually-unwinding span of an individual lifetime. Espoused by such British scientific 
writers as Herbert Spencer and G.H. Lewes, this adaptive, non-agonistic orientation towards 
environment derived from the biological thought of French writers such as Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck and Auguste Comte rather than from Darwin, and its influence persisted in nineteenth-
century scientific thought long after the publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859.  
While the origins of the concept of organism-environment interaction in the nineteenth-
century biological sciences can be traced back to Lamarck, it was not until the emergence of 
organicist thought in the mid-nineteenth century that the environment concept entered the 
popular imagination as an explanatory rubric for all of human and cultural development. 
Through a complex series of cross-cultural and intellectual exchanges and translations in the 
1840s and 50s, scientific writers including Auguste Comte, Harriet Martineau, G.H. Lewes, and 
Herbert Spencer redefined biological life itself as a phenomenon constituted by the relationship 
of an organism with its environment.1 This marked a significant departure from earlier biological 
thought, which had imagined life as a vital force inhering within organisms, and requiring 
                                                
1 For a detailed breakdown of these exchanges and developments, see Trevor Pearce. 
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protection against the impingements of external (i.e., environmental) forces. Instead of posing a 
threat to the living organism, the environment was now understood to form not only an essential 
support of life, but indeed a constitutive part of it. As Lewes put it in a paraphrase of Martineau’s 
translation of Comte in 1852, “so far from organic bodies being independent of external 
circumstances they are more and more dependent on them as their organization becomes higher, 
so that organism and medium are the two correlative ideas of life” (666). Herbert Spencer 
likewise drew on Comte in defining biological life in his 1855 book Principles of Psychology as 
“the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations” (374, emphasis in 
original). The effect of this redefinition of life as a process of exchange and interaction was both 
to reframe the environment—or, as Lewes called it, the “medium”—as benign and supportive, 
rather than solely deterministic, and to reimagine it as something dynamically involved in all life 
and development, even on the scaled-down level of the individual lifespan. An organism’s 
physical surroundings—whether this was seen to consist of air, water, soil, populations of other 
organisms, or all of these things together—was no mere static “setting” for its action and 
development, but rather a dynamic and inextricable participant in that action and development.2  
In addition to redefining the environment as a constitutive element in biological life, mid-
Victorian scientific writers were also the first to conceptualize an organism’s circumambient 
conditions as an abstraction that could be described in the singular rather than the plural. Before 
the mid-nineteenth century, scientific writers had always referred to an organism’s surroundings 
                                                
2 In this sense, mid-nineteenth-century organicists anticipate new materialist philosophy, 
particularly its insistence that seemingly inanimate material substances possess their own 
agencies and vitalities (see Bennett and Alaimo). However, for thinkers like Comte and Spencer, 
the agency of the material world is only significant insofar as it is understood to be acting in 
partnership with the living organism; the environment is meaningful as an agent to the extent that 
it collaborates with the living organism to sustain and maintain biological life. 
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in the plural. Lamarck used the plural terms milieux and circonstances to refer, respectively, to 
the array of fluids and solid physical elements that surround a living organism, while Charles 
Lyell referred to organisms as being under the influence of “circumstances” or “conditions.” In 
his Cours de philosophie positive, however, Auguste Comte employs the abstract term milieu to 
describe the physical surroundings of an organism, describing it as a “new expression” that he is 
using to refer to “the whole of the surrounding circumstances necessary to the existence of the 
organism” (qtd. in Pearce, 248). Harriet Martineau translated this word variously as 
“environment” and as “medium,” the latter of which remained G.H. Lewes’s preferred 
terminology in his Physiology of Common Life and other biological writings. When Spencer 
published his highly influential Principles of Psychology  in 1855, he adopted Martineau’s 
singular term “environment” (which she had herself taken from Carlyle) as the basis for an entire 
intellectual system in which the growth and development of organisms, cultures, societies, and 
nations could be understood abstractly as a teleological process of exchanges between 
individuals and environment defined, as he put it in characteristically abstract fashion, by “an 
advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure” (39).  
The shift from a plural to a singular conception of environment altered the ways in which 
nineteenth-century writers were able to imagine the relationship between organisms and their 
surroundings. As Pearce notes, the transition from a plural sense of circumstances or conditions, 
to a singular environment, enabled “a progressive concealment of the different elements that 
make up the world outside the organism and the relations between these elements,” thus allowing 
scientists and writers to imagine for the first time an “intellectually portable” dichotomy between 
“two unified, abstract entities, the organism and its environment” (249). It also invited writers to 
contemplate the second half of this dichotomy as a singular entity with assignable characteristics, 
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as something that could be metaphorized or figured in various ways. Was the circumambient 
world that surrounded an organism, individual, or character a warm, protective, womb-like 
enclosure? A cold, deterministic machine or system? It was on these questions that the Victorian 
novelistic imagination seized as it engaged with nineteenth-century debates about organism-
environment interaction.   
While this dissertation thus charts the emergence of environmental thinking in Victorian 
scientific discourse, it also strives to recover the rich conceptual vocabulary that Victorian 
writers employed to describe individuals’ relationships to their material surroundings. The term 
“environment” essentially won the philological war, and remains the dominant term for a 
physical surround in environmentalist and biological discourse to this day. However, for most of 
the Victorian era, the conceptual vocabulary used to describe circumambient conditions 
remained tantalizingly rich and various. From Comte’s “milieu” to Lewes’s “medium,” from 
Lyell’s “circumstances” to Darwin’s “conditions of life” to Spencer’s “environment,” Victorian 
writers had access to an expanded vocabulary for referring to the ambient worlds of nineteenth-
century life. Even after Spencer’s Principles of Psychology popularized the term “environment” 
in the late 1850s, Victorian writers continued to employ other ambient concepts alongside 
“environment” in the second half of the nineteenth century. George Eliot frequently referred to 
the circumambient social world of her characters as a “medium,” as when she tells us in the fifth 
chapter of Middlemarch that “the unfriendly mediums of Tipton and Freshitt had issued in crying 
and red eyelids” for the idealistic Dorothea. In the final decade of the century, Robert Louis 
Stevenson would define romance as “the poetry of circumstance,” identifying the individual’s 
relationship with the physical world as the genre’s defining object of concern (“Gossip” 250). 
Each of these terms emerged from a different scientific and discursive context, and each 
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corresponded to different affective orientations of organisms towards their environments, as well 
as different distributions of agency between individual and environment. When Eliot uses the 
term “medium” in Middlemarch and The Mill on the Floss, she conjures an organic sense of 
physical surroundings different from that evoked by Hardy’s more mechanistic “environment” in 
The Woodlanders or The Return of the Native. Recovering the diverse vocabulary that the 
Victorians used to talk about organism-environment relationships makes visible a wider range of 
orientations towards the non-human world than are permitted by the polarized environment-
organism dyad that contemporary scientific discourse has inherited. Whereas the term 
“environment” in contemporary usage tends to conjure either a sense of physical surroundings as 
deterministic pressure, or else as a vulnerable object requiring protection, the Victorians’ wider 
array of ambient concepts enabled Victorian writers to envision the physical environment as an 
object of desire, as a medium of perception and communication, or as a limiting constraint that 
enabled creativity. 
 What a non-agonistic theory of environment thus gave to Victorian literature, I argue, is a 
sense of environment as something more than a mere winnowing agent or sieve that weeds out 
ill-adapted individuals. As critics such as Gillian Beer and George Levine have noted, Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection posed a representational problem for the novel insofar as it resituated 
human life—and especially the individual life—in the context of a vastly expanded timescale 
that jibed poorly with the realist novel’s scaling to the span of an individual life. In contrast, the 
broader tradition of biological thought explored in this dissertation reveals that the Victorians 
understood evolution and adaptation to occur within the perceptible scale of the individual life 
and perception. For this reason, the novel was more hospitable towards non-Darwinian 
evolutionary theories that emphasized the significance of interactions and on-going exchanges 
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between individual organisms and their physical surroundings. The novel’s formal capabilities 
were already calibrated for the representation of just such interactions and exchanges.  
Yet even if the scientific concept of environment didn’t require a wholesale rescaling of 
the novel’s representational scope, it did require the novel to grapple formally with the newfound 
sense  that physical surroundings were no less significant to the processes of change and 
development that drive narrative than were individual characters themselves. The literary critic 
Edmund Yates registered this shift when he observed, in an 1880 article entitled “Description in 
Novels,” that “the conviction is gaining ground . . . that man is not detachable from his 
surroundings: he is part and parcel of the world he lives in in a more intimate sense than the 
ancients appear to have imagined; and to separate him therefrom . . . would be tantamount to 
depriving him of his best chance of being understood” (607). Eliot expressed a similar conviction 
in an 1868 letter, asserting, “It is the habit of my imagination to strive after as full a vision of the 
medium in which a character moves as of the character itself.” To the advent of a conception of 
environmental phenomena as both in dynamic flux and intimately tied to the life of the 
individual, Victorian novelists responded with a newfound sense that the described backgrounds 
of the novel—phenomena like landscape, weather, and atmosphere—were no less vital to the 
unfolding of narrative than character or psychology. 
 By linking the emergent concept of environment to the formal practice of description, 
then, this dissertation revises and challenges the prevailing critical consensus that description—
especially description of what’s conventionally called “setting”—interrupts, delays, or suspends 
narrative, and as such acts as what Gerard Genette has called “the ever-necessary, ever 
submissive, never-emancipated slave to narrative” (134). Georg Lukacs criticized the tendency 
of description to take precedence over action in realist fiction in his famous essay “Narrate or 
   10 
Describe” in 1936, insisting that the description of surroundings attenuated and interrupted, 
rather than enhanced, the novel’s representation of individuals as historical agents: “the 
description of things no longer has anything to do with the lives of the characters,” he lamented: 
“the characters’ lives merely constitute a loose thread for attaching and grouping a series of 
pictures and objects, pictures which are ends in themselves” (132, 134). Critics since Lukacs 
have largely adopted his conception of the relationship between description and narrative as a 
zero-sum game in which the two formal impulses are understood to be diametrically opposed. 
Cynthia Wall notes at the beginning of her landmark study of eighteenth-century description that 
“description almost by definition interrupts narrative” (1). The most recent critic to advance a 
version of this view is Fredric Jameson, who has recently argued that nineteenth-century realism 
is defined by a tension between narrative movement and an emergent “scenic impulse” that 
“abhors the other temporalities which constitute the force of the tale . . . in the first place” (11). 
The forward thrust of narrative thus continues to be viewed as an impulse in competition with 
description, which in contrast to narrative, is static, pictorial, and “scenic,” to use Jameson’s 
phrase. 
 This prevailing association of novelistic description with stasis arises from novel critics’ 
tendency to frame novelistic description as, first, a primarily visual or pictorial phenomenon, 
and, secondly, as a formal practice that takes things as its primary object. For example, Ruth 
Bernard Yeazell’s recent study of the pictorial impulse in Victorian fiction links realist 
description to nineteenth-century novelists’ fascination with Dutch painting, while Elaine 
Freedgood’s influential book The Ideas in Things directs attention to the cultural and historical 
significance of the oft-ignored everyday commodities—curtains, furniture, tobacco—that adorn 
and circulate through the domestic spaces of the Victorian novel. Both of these studies are 
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invaluable to my project for the way they have shifted the backgrounds of the nineteenth-century 
novel into the foreground of critical conversation. Yet the reduction of the described worlds of 
the Victorian novel to static visual tableaux, on the one hand, or to an assortment of 
manufactured commodities, on the other, occludes the extent to which Victorian novelists 
thought about description as a means for capturing dynamic, multisensory engagements between 
fully embodied characters and an ambient physical world made up of both human-made and non-
human substances. 
 Consider, for example, the opening of Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, which begins with a 
rich description of the landscape surrounding Maggie Tulliver’s home, Dorlcote Mill. While the 
description does include visual elements, the first-person narrator does not describe the 
landscape with the ekphrastic detachment of a viewer describing a painting, but rather evokes a 
sense of multisensory immersion in the physical landscape she describes. The opening sentence 
evokes the intimate encounter and dynamic merging of river and tide, as “the broadening Floss 
hurries on between its green banks to the sea, and the loving tide, rushing to meet it, checks its 
passage with an impetuous embrace” (7). The narrator’s registration of her surroundings is aural 
as much as it is visual, telling her reader that the river “seems to me like a living companion 
while I wander along the bank and listen to its low placid voice, as to the voice of one who is 
deaf and loving” (7). And when she turns her attention to the mill itself, her descriptive attention 
moves from a visual register into a language so tactile that it almost dissolves the boundaries of 
the body itself: “As I look at the full stream, the vivid grass, the delicate bright-green powder 
softening the outline of the great trunks and branches that gleam from under the bare purple 
boughs, I am in love with moistness, and envy the white ducks that are dipping their heads far 
into the water” (7-8). Despite the proliferation of visual description in the narrator’s language, 
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Eliot’s description of the environs of Dorlcote Mill is less a collection of discrete visual details 
than a multisensory evocation of an ambient surround that strains towards a condition of total 
immersion with that surround, a merging of the narrating self with the very “moistness” of a 
surrounding environment. This sense of the individual’s relationship with a described 
environment as a relationship of immediate, sensory immersion is palpable at the conclusion of 
Middlemarch, too, when Dorothea’s epiphanic vision of the landscape outside her window leads 
her to press beyond the visual towards a similarly immersive intimacy with the ambient world: 
“she felt the largeness of the world,” the narrator tells us; “she was a part of that involuntary 
palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her 
eyes in selfish complaining” (788). This immersive quality of a described world was highly 
valued by Victorian critics and readers, who often wrote of it as though environmental 
immediacy were its own aesthetic category. Thus in 1870 Margaret Oliphant compared Mary 
Russell Mitford’s rural sketches in Our Village favorably to Austen’s novels, acknowledging 
Austen’s technical superiority as a writer, but insisting that “the sweetness of the atmosphere” 
around Mitford was “above” Austen’s abilities. When we read Our Village, Oliphant said, “we 
do little more than breathe the fresh air and flowers” (313). Victorian readers valued the 
described backgrounds of the Victorian novel not just as static scenes against which plot unfolds, 
but rather as immersive, dynamic, multi-sensory environments in which both reader and 
character are immersed.  
This multisensory immersiveness, generated by a descriptive apparatus that imagines the 
novel’s action occurring in a totalized physical surround, was a formal innovation of the 
Victorian novel that was not inherited from its eighteenth-century predecessors. Yet to the extent 
that critics have paid attention to the described background of the realist novel, they have tended 
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to approach it from the vantage of “things” and commodity culture, rather than as an aggregated, 
fully visualized physical totality. This is largely because theorists of description have tended to 
focus on eighteenth-century fiction. In her recent landmark study The Prose of Things, for 
example, Cynthia Wall locates in the eighteenth-century novel the earliest efforts to capture what 
we now call “setting,” attributing the development of novelistic description to the rise of 
commodity culture and the emergence of new visual technologies. As Wall notes, eighteenth-
century fiction is unlike its nineteenth-century counterpart in that “instead of presenting us with 
settings, with fully visualized spaces, the early novel describes things” (1). In the Victorian 
novel, by contrast, we see something closer to what might be called “atmosphere”—not just 
individual objects (although the presence of objects in the novel has been much-documented, 
particularly in the context of nineteenth-century commodity culture, by critics such as Andrew 
H. Miller and Elaine Freedgood, among others), but rather a sense that the physical spaces 
between bodies and objects is full rather than empty, suffused with detail and substance rather 
than an airless vacuum. Recent work on the concept of virtuality in nineteenth-century fiction 
has begun to theorize this distinctive yet nebulous formal feature of Victorian realist fiction, 
pointing out the ways in which Victorian writers linked the immersive qualities of fiction to the 
novel’s ability to create a convincing virtual world. Alison Byerly has recently argued that “a 
defining feature of the nineteenth-century novel is its effort to generate an almost physical sense 
of presence within the fictional world,” a sense of presence that she attributes to Victorian 
writers’ ability to create “a multisensory environment, or a visual environment so rich it 
overwhelms the other senses, extending the participant’s own sensory participation so as to 
minimize the sense of boundary between self and environment” (5, 18). Reconceptualizing the 
described background of the Victorian novel as a totalized, enveloping environment understood 
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as a singular entity—rather than a motley collection of circulating commodities or objects—also 
makes visible the ways in which Victorian novelists imagined the physical world in a biological 
register, as well as a cultural one. The ambient worlds of the Victorian novel dramatize not only 
the dynamics of property ownership and commodity culture, as critics attentive to fictional 
object-worlds have argued, but also the relationship between physical life and the material 
fabrics and substances that support and interact with it. One of the arguments of this dissertation, 
then, is that this distinctively Victorian descriptive attention to totalized, multisensory physical 
surrounds (as opposed to individual objects or commodities) is a new literary development that 
was made possible by the historical emergence of the concept of organism-environment 
interaction in the nineteenth-century sciences.  
 In its attention to the relationship between human life and the nonhuman worlds of the 
nineteenth-century, Ambient Worlds thus also participates in the recent turn towards ecocritical 
approaches in nineteenth-century British studies. Environmental approaches to the study of 
literature have arrived quite late to Victorian studies.3 This is largely due to early ecocriticism’s 
interest in so-called “deep ecology” and literary representations of nature and wilderness. In 
recent years, however, this critical investment in the representation of natural phenomena has 
given way to skepticism about the possibility of separating culture from nature, and of 
representing a pure or authentic nature that bears no traces of human activity.4 The 
transformation of British culture and landscape by the industrial revolution and urbanization in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries arguably led British writers to imagine the 
                                                
3 See Bate and Buell for important early works of ecocriticism in the respective fields of 
Romanticism and American studies. 
 
4 For an influential articulation of this skepticism, see Morton. 
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physical world for the first time as something alien and alienable from human life and society, 
even as it was influenced and shaped by human activities and industry more visibly than ever 
before. As Jonathan Bate has argued, “the word ‘environment’ began to be applied to social 
context exactly because of the alienation of city-dwelling. . . [F]rom the late eighteenth century 
onwards, there was an increasing awareness of industry’s tendency to alter the quality of our 
surroundings, even to influence the air we breathe. . . . The word ‘environment’ emerges as a 
sign of that difference” (551). The earliest discussions of the Anthropocene in the late 1990s 
dated its beginning to James Watt’s invention of the self-acting steam engine in 1784, marking 
the Victorian era as the historical period in which the effects of human activity—specifically 
industrial activity—first began to be visible as having transformative effects on the global 
biosphere.5 As the historical moment when fossil fuels began to be consumed at a rapid rate, 
when urbanization transformed social life and rural areas, and when the enclosure of lands that 
had previously been held in common alienated rural populations from natural landscapes, the 
early nineteenth century stands out as a moment when the social experience of what the 
romantics had called “nature” required a new language for conceptualizing the human 
relationship with its increasingly malleable—and increasingly alien—physical surroundings.6 
Recent work in Victorian ecocriticism has thus turned towards analyses of the ways in 
which so-called natural phenomena are inextricably bound up in, and influenced by, industrial 
processes of resource extraction, consumption, and waste. Jesse Oak Taylor’s recent The Sky of 
Our Manufacture (2016), for example, explores the ways in which Victorian representations of 
the London fogs in novels such as Bleak House and Daniel Deronda function as early literary 
                                                
5 See Crutzen and Stoermer, 17-18. 
 
6 On the nineteenth-century consumption of fossil fuels, see Malm; on urbanization and 
enclosure, see Raymond Williams. 
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responses to anthropogenic climate change, while Elizabeth Carolyn Miller’s recent work on 
extraction capitalism in Victorian literature tracks the nineteenth-century literary imagination’s 
engagement with the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels.7 Taylor coins the term 
“abnatural” to “capture the [Victorian] experience of dwelling in a manufactured environment” 
in which nature “exists in a perpetual state of withdrawal” (5). Critical studies such as Taylor’s 
and Miller’s anchor their ecocritical approaches to Victorian literature in the ecological and 
social realities of the nineteenth century, reading literary texts as an archival register of shifting 
relationships between human life and a not-quite-natural world that increasingly bears the 
indelible imprint of industrial modernity.  
While this body of work forms an important historical context for Ambient Worlds, my 
methodology in this study aims to approach ecological concerns in the nineteenth century from 
the vantage-point of the history of science and the history of ideas. In her recent book Chaos and 
Cosmos, Heidi C.M. Scott argues that nineteenth-century literature anticipates twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century methods of ecological analysis, locating in texts such as Keats’s sonnets and 
Mary Shelley’s The Last Man the “roots” and “precedents” of modern ecological conceptual 
frameworks, particularly the duelling ideas of the natural world as a balanced microcosm, vs. a 
chaotic state of disequilibrium (3). Allen Macduffie has recently taken a similar, though more 
clear-cut historicist, angle of approach to nineteenth-century ecological ideas by tracing the ways 
in which Victorian literary texts drew on and responded to nineteenth-century theories of energy 
and thermodynamics. Ambient Worlds follows Macduffie and Scott in turning to the history of 
science in order to make visible how nineteenth-century literature’s imaginative engagements 
                                                
7 See in particular Miller’s recent articles in Victorian Studies, ““Dendrography and Ecological 
Realism” (2016) and “William Morris, Extraction Capitalism, and the Aesthetics of Surface” 
(2015).  
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with contemporary scientific discourses reveal that the very concept of an environment-organism 
relationship—the foundational relationship of all present-day ecological study—is itself a 
Victorian invention. Whereas Victorian ecocritics like Macduffie, Scott, and Taylor often 
establish an intentionally anachronistic relationship between their Victorian objects of study and 
present-day ecological questions (a method the V21 Collective has recently dubbed “strategic 
presentism”), Ambient Worlds adheres to a more traditionally historicist framework in the way it 
positions literary texts in relation to intellectual history.8 The historical relationship I trace 
between contemporary ecology and nineteenth-century theorizations of environment is thus 
genealogical rather than wilfully anachronistic. In gathering the array of environmental concepts 
around which this project is structured (correspondence, medium, environment, and 
circumstance), I have not sought to apply the language of contemporary ecocritical theory to 
nineteenth-century texts, but rather to recover the language that Victorians writers themselves 
used to describe their relationship to ambient surrounds.  
This dissertation is organized chronologically, beginning with Mary Russell Mitford’s 
popular series of rural sketches, Our Village (1824-32), and ending in the final decades of the 
century with the adventure fiction of Robert Louis Stevenson. My first chapter, 
“Correspondences: Natural History, Lamarckian Biology, and the Environments of Mary Russell 
Mitford’s Our Village,” lays the conceptual groundwork for the chapters to follow by examining 
Mitford’s highly descriptive rural sketches in relation to two influential but competing discourses 
about environment: natural theology and natural history, on the one hand, and Lamarck’s early 
evolutionary theory, on the other. The chapter argues that Mitford’s sketches’ shift from a 
                                                
8 For an account of strategic presentism, see the “Manifesto of the V21 Collective”: 
http://v21collective.org/manifesto-of-the-v21-collective-ten-theses/. 
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descriptive to an increasingly narrative style over the course of Our Village’s eight-year 
publication enacts a movement away from a static, spatialized conception of environment, 
towards a dynamic, temporalized one focused on the exchanges between individuals and their 
surrounding media. In her earlier, more descriptive sketches, Mitford draws on natural 
theology’s notion of “harmonious correspondence” between creaturely bodies and their 
surroundings to develop what I call a “rhetoric of immediacy” that evokes a sense of material 
embeddedness in a rural landscape. In her later sketches, she moves instead towards narratives of 
dislocation and re-adaptation, generating an alternate sense of communal belonging based less on 
inhabitation of a shared space, than on a shared emotional structure of intense local attachment 
paradoxically linked to both a susceptibility to being uprooted, and an ability to adapt. 
My second chapter, “The Biological Media of George Eliot’s Novels,” explores Eliot’s 
imaginative engagement with the biological writings of Comte, Lewes, and Spencer, focusing in 
particular on her interest in the notion of an all-encompassing biological “medium” that both 
influences and nourishes individual organisms. I argue that Eliot’s evocative description of 
weather and landscapes in her novels reveals the ways in which she understood the environment 
or “medium” as a powerful force that mediates both sexual and social affect. In The Mill on the 
Floss, Eliot’s descriptions of landscape evoke a form of desire I call “environmental desire”—a 
diffuse, sensuous longing for a formative environment that offers an alternative to erotic 
attachments to particular objects and persons, attachments that the novel views as ethically 
perilous. In Middlemarch, weather and atmospherics act as an ambient medium that facilitates 
sympathetic connection between characters, offering an alternative to the identification- and 
abstraction-based theories of sympathy that dominate criticism of the Victorian novel. 
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My third chapter, “Thomas Hardy’s Ghostly Architectures and the Novel as Virtual 
Environment,” investigates the relationship between built and natural environments in Hardy’s 
Wessex novels. Although ecocriticism has often celebrated Hardy’s capacity to evoke a deeply-
rooted sense of place through detailed descriptions of natural phenomena, this chapter contends 
that Hardy’s interest in architectural structures (an interest he developed through his own early 
career as an architect) reveals the extent to which his novels are concerned with artificial 
environments as well as natural ones. Focusing in particular on The Woodlanders, I suggest that 
Hardy often turns to descriptions of architecture—especially the picturesque but impermanent 
vernacular architecture of huts, cottages, and even tents—as a means of testing the limits of 
fiction’s technical capacity to conjure virtual environments that temporarily screen or protect the 
reader from his or her material surroundings.  
My fourth and final chapter, “Robert Louis Stevenson’s Islands and the Victorian 
Discourse of Circumstance,” examines Stevenson’s island novels (Treasure Island, The Ebb-
Tide, and The Wrecker) in relation to the popular Victorian discourse of “circumstance.” While 
the concept of “circumstance” functioned in the Victorian vernacular as a catch-all term for 
determining forces outside the self that erode individual agency, I argue that Stevenson’s 
adventure fiction revises the discourse of circumstance to signify a non-deterministic relationship 
between the surface of the body and that of the physical world. For Stevenson, the interface 
between body and world is the site of a felicitously limited agency characterized by an equable 
and fluid give-and-take between the body and its environment. Through an examination of 
Stevenson’s island environments, I show how even in situations of environmental peril, 
Stevenson’s fiction appeals to an intimate physical affinity between an embodied self and an 
abiotic world, in which the limits that external phenomena place on the self are experienced as an 
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enabling and creative constraint. This chapter rounds out and sums up my dissertation by 
showing how, even at the end of the Victorian century, when “environment” had become all but 
synonymous with determinism in popular thought, environmental concepts continued to provide 
novelists with a source for imagining surprising new forms of agency, adventure, and even play. 
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Chapter 1:   
Correspondences: Natural History, Lamarckian Evolution, and the Environments of Mary 
Russell Mitford’s Our Village 
 
 Although he probably never read her, Georg Lukács would have hated Mary Russell 
Mitford. Alight with sunshine and abloom with minutely-described flowery landscapes, the rural 
sketches that Mitford published in four biennial volumes as Our Village between 1824 and 1832 
blithely commit all the crimes of description that Lukács denounces in “Narrate or Describe,” his 
manifesto-like essay decrying the excessive descriptive tendencies of late-nineteenth century 
fiction. In his essay, Lukács lambastes description’s tendency to forego any meaningful principle 
of selection in its presentation of visual details, a failure of selection that results in the elevation 
of all minor details to a uniform plane of significance, precluding any effort meaningfully to 
represent the salient aspects of historical experience. The descriptive school of writing, he 
claims, eschews the dynamic representation of historical process in favour of a static picture that 
takes for granted the relationship between the individual and his or her social and material 
context, dehistoricizing that relationship and granting individual details an autonomy that usurps 
the centrality of historical, human experience. Whereas narration “mention[s] only those aspects 
of a thing which are important to its function in a specific action,” a writer whose aim is 
“comprehensive description” must “either reject any principle of selection, undertake an 
inexhaustible labour of Sisyphus or simply emphasize the picturesque and superficial aspects 
best adapted to description” (130-31). In either case, “the description of things no longer has 
anything to do with the lives of characters,” “the characters’ lives . . . merely constitut[ing] a 
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loose thread for attaching and grouping a series of pictures and objects, pictures which are ends 
in themselves” (132, 134). 
 Lukács wrote his essay as a take-down of late nineteenth-century naturalism, but his 
characterization of the descriptive mode applies uncannily well to Mitford’s village sketches of 
the 1820s and 30s. Mitford’s sketches heartily embrace the pictorialism that Lukács denigrates, 
exhibiting a love for proliferating visual detail that resigns any overarching, organizational 
narrative impulse to the status of an afterthought. While Our Village’s individual characters do 
recur at intervals to enact minor human dramas on a small scale, the individuals are too shadowy 
and reappear too intermittently to provide a strong principle of continuity between sketches. 
Continuity is supplied instead by the sparkling descriptions of the gardens, lanes, hedgerows, 
cottages, and commons that constitute the landscape of the Berkshire village of Three Mile 
Cross, and among which the narrator takes her daily walks with her greyhound, May. 
Responding in a letter to a friend’s question as to whether her sunny representations of rural life 
are “true,” Mitford openly avows that her descriptive method aims, in Lukács’s terms, to 
“emphasize the picturesque and superficial aspects best adapted to description”: “Yes! yes! yes! 
as true as is well possible. You, as a great landscape painter, know that, in painting a favourite 
scene, you do a little embellish, and can’t help it; you avail yourself of happy accidents of 
atmosphere, and if anything be ugly, you strike it out, or if anything be wanting, you put it in. 
But still the picture is a likeness” (qtd. in Keith, 91). Following this principle of selection, not 
only does Mitford largely avoid most narrative efforts to demonstrate Three Mile Cross’s 
imbrication in the historical processes of modernization that were transforming the English rural 
landscape in the 1820s and 30s, but her narrator also goes out of her way explicitly to state that 
the village exists in a time capsule, detached and insulated from historical process. 
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 Twentieth- and twenty-first century critics of Our Village have largely adopted Lukács’s 
anti-description stance in their readings of Mitford’s sketches. When not overtly dismissive of 
Our Village, critics have often targeted the ways in which Mitford’s painterly descriptions of 
rural England obscure the historical processes of enclosure, agrarian depression, and political 
unrest that drastically reshaped the landscape during the early nineteenth century, suggesting that 
Mitford participates in this process of capitalist modernization by commercially repackaging the 
rural as a nostalgic idyll for the consumption of a predominantly urban readership. Elizabeth 
Helsinger, for example, argues that Mitford’s representation of the countryside as a static, idyllic 
tableau works uncritically to generalize the rural idyll into an image of the nation as a whole, 
thus “foreclosing questions of how rural locality and nation are [politically and economically] 
connected” (121), and “inviting us to forget how it is embedded in a national geography” (128). 
Deidre Lynch’s recent work on Mitford builds on Helsinger’s claim that Mitford’s sketches 
deliberately facilitate a commercialized relationship between country and city, but Lynch argues 
that Mitford also sought nostalgically to replace the increasingly fragmented, modernizing 
landscape of rural England with an imaginary, unified literary landscape shared by other rural 
novelists, naturalists, and poets, such as Jane Austen, Gilbert White, and William Cowper. In a 
Lukácsian vein, both Helsinger and Lynch thus emphasize the ways in which Mitford’s 
expansive and detailed visual descriptions of locale serve to obscure rather than to reveal, to 
screen the knottiness, dynamism, and rupture of real historical processes behind a static, 
idealized tableau. 
 Although Lukács’s polemic is overtly aimed at the verbal techniques and stylistic choices 
exhibited in the polished surfaces of descriptive prose, the target of his critique is an underlying 
conception of the relationship between the individual and what Lukács at various points in his 
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essay calls the “environment.” Analyzing the contrast between the representation of the 
individual-environment relationship in Balzac and Scott, on the one hand, and Flaubert, on the 
other, Lukács celebrates the two former writers for their capacity to describe characters’ 
environments in such a way as to foreground the dynamic, meaningful interactions between the 
individual and the objects and social institutions by which he or she is surrounded. Flaubert, by 
contrast, is criticized for aspiring to a “comprehensive exposition of the social milieu” in which 
“the characters . . . are nothing but observers of [the] setting. To the reader they seem 
undifferentiated, additional elements of the environment Flaubert is describing. They become 
dabs of colour in a painting which . . . assumes an importance which does not arise out of the 
subjective importance of the events, to which it is scarcely related, but from the artifice in the 
formal stylization” (115). Far from recommending that all description of the individual’s 
environing world be excluded from fiction, Lukács invokes a crucial contrast between the 
representation of environment as static visual backdrop against which unrelated plots unfold, and 
environment as a volatile solution of shifting historical dynamics, in which human agency is 
alternately curtailed and enhanced by external forces (Lukács staunchly rejects environmental 
determinism, insisting on the contrary that “the objective factors in a man’s environment . . . can 
provide instruments for his activity and for his career and even . . . turning points in his fortunes” 
[114]).  
 In this chapter, I re-evaluate the environments of Mitford’s fiction by situating her 
descriptive sketches in relation to the two competing discourses from which the concept of 
environment emerged during the first decades of the nineteenth century: natural theology and 
natural history on the one hand, and biological science, on the other. As scientific practices, 
natural history and biology were far apart during this period. Whereas natural theology and 
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natural history, championed chiefly by William Paley and Gilbert White, respectively, were 
aligned with the Anglican religious establishment and strove to render themselves accessible to a 
popular audience, biological science arrived on English shores predominantly from France, and 
was the province primarily of an emerging coterie of well-educated medical professionals and 
intellectuals.9 Although the geographic and demographic separation of these two kinds of science 
renders challenging any effort to make them speak to one another, this separation is also 
precisely what enabled them to coexist as a conceptual tension in public discourse. As I will 
show, the question of the relationship between the individual and his or her physical 
surroundings was central to both sciences, although they approached the question in very 
different ways. For natural theologians such as Paley, the perfectly harmonious correspondence 
between individual bodies and the media that surrounded them—light, air, and water—supplied 
crucial evidence that the natural world was the work of a divine designer. Natural histories, such 
as Gilbert White’s emblematic Natural History and Antiquities of Selborne, extended this notion 
through detailed accounts of plant and animal life couched in a tone of reverent awe.10 Natural 
history’s careful observations aspired to scientific accuracy, but this purported objectivity was 
not seen to conflict with an attitude of wonder, and often encouraged readers to marvel both at 
nature’s beauty and at the fine-tuned ecological adjustments between organisms and their 
environments. The concept of environment shared by natural theology and natural history was 
thus harmonious and largely static; while seasonal cycles allowed for change within the system, 
                                                
9 See Merrill, especially chapter 4, for a detailed examination of the relationship between natural 
history and biological science in the early decades of the nineteenth century. 
 
10 See King. 
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change was cyclical rather than linear, conjuring a vision of ideal environmental adjustment that 
suffered few radical destabilizations or permanent alterations.  
 The environment-organism relationship that early nineteenth-century biological science 
imagined differed dramatically from natural theology’s permanently and perfectly ordered 
system. While late-eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century biologists such as Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck and Geoffroy St-Hilaire were no less interested than Paley and White in the 
phenomenon of well-adaptedness, they viewed ordered adaptation not as an eternal, divinely-
ordained state of affairs, but rather as a possible end result of a lengthy and uncertain process. 
Advocating various models of what early nineteenth-century scientists called 
“transformationism,” according to which organisms adapt physically over time to environmental 
conditions, these biologists, decades before Darwin, viewed the natural world as a system in 
unstable, linear flux. Their conception of the relationship between the individual and its 
surrounding media was thus dynamic rather than static, with the plastic individual organism in a 
constant process of adjustment and attunement to an environment that was likewise frequently 
changing.  
 In what follows, I argue that Mitford’s rural sketches negotiate a tension between a static 
and a dynamic conception of the relationship between environment and organism, a tension that 
results in the generic heterogeneity of the 123 prose sketches that constitute Our Village. In the 
first section, I examine how Mitford’s highly descriptive “Walks in the Country” sketches draw 
on the descriptive techniques of Gilbert White’s Natural History of Selborne in order to 
emphasize the natural theological principle of “correspondence” between an organism and its 
surroundings. While natural theologians appealed to the perfect correspondence between 
organisms and their environments as evidence of God’s existence and benevolence, Mitford, I 
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suggest, treats it as an affective goal of her fiction, turning to the representational techniques of 
natural history in order to create a sense of pleasurable immediacy for her readers. In the second 
section, I examine how the narrative sketches that increasingly make up the contents of Our 
Village’s later volumes put forth a more dynamic conception of the relationship between 
individuals and their surroundings. Although numerous critics have read Mitford’s sketches as 
charming tableaux that idealize rural stasis, many of these narratives in fact take dislocation—
and the individual’s adaptation to their new, dislocated surroundings—as their central theme. In 
examining Our Village’s adaptation narratives, I will show how Mitford’s celebration of 
affective harmony between self and surroundings gives way, under the force of narrative, to a 
conception of the organism-environment relationship as a potential site for social critique.  
Natural Theology, Correspondence, and Mitford’s Rhetoric of Immediacy 
 The feature of Our Village that critics over the past two centuries have consistently 
singled out for praise is the immediacy and freshness of Mitford’s sketches. Recent critics of 
Mitford, including P.D. Edwards and Tim Killick, frequently appeal to a sense of freshness, 
immediacy, or intensity to describe the impression that Mitford’s prose produces.11 Nineteenth-
century criticism of Our Village lauded Mitford in almost identical terms, celebrating Mitford’s 
prose for its immersive qualities, for its capacity to make the reader feel as though he or she were 
truly inhabiting the bright, hermetic world of Three Mile Cross. In Margaret Oliphant’s 1870 
essay comparing Mitford’s prose to that of Austen, for example, the author readily concedes 
Austen’s technical superiority, but insists that she prefers Mitford’s rural sketches over Austen’s 
courtship novels because of a nearly inarticulable quality of vividness that pervades Mitford’s 
                                                
11 Edwards marvels at the “quite intense air of lifelikeness and ‘naturalness,’ . . . which [Our 
Village] achieves in spite of all that it leaves out or glosses over” (4). See also Killick. 
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prose: “Miss Austen was by much the greater artist, but the sweetness of the atmosphere about 
her humble contemporary was above anything proper to the great novelist. In presence of the one 
we admire and wonder, watching the work that by means so insignificant grows under her hands; 
while with the other we do little more than breathe the fresh air and flowers, and identify one 
little spot of soil, not created, but described” (313). The distinction Oliphant draws between 
Mitford and Austen’s prose is a distinction between two different approaches to fiction as a 
medium: in Austen’s fiction, she suggests, the reader is continually made aware of the process of 
Austen’s craft, her focus constantly redirected towards the virtuosity with which Austen 
manipulates the medium of language. In reading Mitford, however, language effaces itself, and 
in doing so records an intensity of sensory experience that creates the illusion of passive 
experience rather than active reading: “we do little more than breathe the fresh air and flowers.”  
 Many other Victorian readers employed such immersive language in describing the effect 
that reading Mitford had on them. Alice King transferred the immersive terms usually used to 
describe Mitford’s writing to Mitford herself, remarking that “it was all sunshine, all perfume in 
the atmosphere that surrounded her” (116). The novelist Anne Manning in 1870 recalled a 
childhood experience of discovering Our Village while bored at a grown-up London tea-party, 
the book becoming a mode of virtual transportation from the dull drawing-room full of adults to 
another, sunnier world: “As long as I read, I was enthralled,” she reports; “I knew little, then, of 
real country life, but . . . [Mitford] opened a gate into a path leading to pleasures that have been 
prolonged throughout my life. Her style became my ideal; it was never overweighted with 
allusion or metaphor, but had a freshness peculiar to itself, and to wilding thickets . . . full of 
violets” (346). Felicia Hemans describes a similar experience of immediacy in a letter to Mitford 
in 1836: “There are some writers whose works we cannot read without feeling as if we really had 
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looked with them upon the scenes they bring before us, and as if such communion had almost 
given us a claim to something more than the mere intercourse between author and ‘gentle 
reader’” (152). Hemans’s evocation of Our Village’s descriptive powers attributes to Mitford’s 
sketches the capacity to transcend not only the limits of fiction, making the reader feel “as if we 
really had looked . . . upon the scenes they bring before us,” but also the limits of print as a 
medium separating reader and writer, sparking a desire for “something more than mere 
intercourse between author and ‘gentle reader.’” If the clichéd phrase “gentle reader” signals the 
genteel, anonymous distance that print imposes between author and reader, Mitford’s style leaps 
across this gap, wrapping the reader in the immediate, almost physical embrace of a real world 
and a direct, human voice.  
 The sense of immediacy is a difficult concept to analyze in relation to literary form. 
Seemingly amorphous and subjective, neither a formal characteristic nor a genre, it is closer to a 
tone than to a technique, an auratic je ne sais quoi of style that impressed many of Mitford’s 
readers in oddly similar ways. In this section, however, I try to account for the immediacy of 
Mitford’s prose by situating it in relation to the twin scientific practices of natural theology and 
natural history, both of which placed a high value on immediate experience and strove to 
minimize the communicating interface of print as fully as possible. In what follows, I argue that 
Mitford draws on the discourses of natural theology and natural history in order to develop a 
rhetoric of immediacy that strove to occlude, or to render transparent, the mediating surface of 
print. For both Mitford and for scientific writers like Paley and White, immediacy was a highly 
desirable literary goal because it helped to promote a reader’s awareness of what natural 
theology called “correspondence”: the perfect fitness or harmonious accord between individual 
bodies and the environments in which they are placed. For natural theology, the notion of 
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correspondence served as evidence for the existence of a divine creator who had ordained such 
well-designed correspondences. While Our Village has no such religious agenda, much of 
Mitford’s description is equally invested in portraying an intimate, harmonious relationship 
between individuals and their physical surroundings, and the rhetoric of immediacy that 
Mitford’s descriptive language employs works to ensure that this harmonious relationship is not 
merely witnessed, but also shared, by the reader.  
 The idea of harmonious correspondence between an individual and his or her 
environment was a foundational concept for natural theology of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. As Stuart Peterfreund has shown, the concept of designed correspondence 
had been vital to natural theological discourse since the seventeenth century, but the privileged 
locus of that correspondence shifted in the early nineteenth century, as natural theologians 
shifted their attention from “the argument from the design of the mechanism” to “the argument 
from the design of the system” (xii). In other words, whereas early natural theology had 
concentrated more narrowly on the “fit” between form and function, appealing to the efficacy of 
singular anatomical mechanisms such as the hand, nineteenth-century natural theologians such as 
William Paley and the authors of the Bridgewater Treatises expanded their focus to the “fit” 
between bodily forms and the broader systems in which they participate and on which they 
depend. Paley marvels, and exhorts his reader also to marvel, that “the bodies of animals hold, in 
their constitution and properties, a close and important relation to natures altogether external to 
their own; to inanimate substances, and to the specific qualities of these, e.g. they hold a strict 
relation to the elements by which they are surrounded” (255, emphasis in original). Some 
chapters later, he elaborates on this idea in order to refute the idea that animal life could have 
arisen from spontaneous generation (an argument put forth by eighteenth-century naturalists such 
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as Buffon and Erasmus Darwin), and he does so by pointing out the near-impossibility of a 
spontaneously generated life form possessing a functional correspondence to a pre-existing 
environment: “Can it be doubted, was it ever doubted, but that the lungs of animals bear a 
relation to the air, as a permanently elastic fluid? They act in it and by it: they cannot act without 
it. Now, if generation produced the animal, it did not produce the air; yet their properties 
correspond. The eye made for light, and light for the eye. . . . The ear depends upon undulations 
of air” (221).  
 The anatomical examples that Paley uses here to illustrate correspondence—the eye’s 
relation to light, the ear’s relationship to air—are effective because, while they are examples of 
anatomical function in general, they function more specifically as examples of sensory 
perception. Paley infuses the human sensorium with a powerful affective charge as both the 
object of, and the medium for, wondering perception. As Colin Jager puts it in his reading of 
Paley’s theology, “If design is part of our perceiving apparatus, then we carry it around inside us, 
and it is activated not in response to institutional prompting nor to inherited ways of looking at 
things, but simply through openness to the natural world. Indeed, this is how Paley pictures 
himself: as simply bowled over by the design that everywhere presses upon him the minute he 
steps outdoors” (118). The intimate relationship between the body and the organic media in 
which it was immersed holds pride of place in Paley’s natural theology as an object of awe; as 
such, the divine wonder that natural theology sought to arouse was closely linked to the much 
more mundane feelings of the body itself experiencing a moment-to-moment sensation of well-
being. In other words, Paley wanted his reader to recognize and appreciate the base-level comfort 
of a body that seamlessly belongs in its environment as the crowning achievement of divine 
creation. The sublime emotions of awe that Paley sought to evoke were thus undergirded by the 
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much more banal and ubiquitous sensation of simply being alive, of experiencing the divinely 
ordained correspondency, or well-adaptedness, of one’s body to the media that surround it.  
 One of natural theology’s driving impulses was thus a desire for a powerful sense of 
immediacy, of the natural world presenting itself to the human senses in so direct and obvious a 
way that the existence of a creator was self-evident. Despite this emphasis on immediacy, 
though, natural theological texts were particularly concerned with the ways in which the human 
reader’s experience of the wondrous natural phenomena under discussion was mediated by the 
text itself. This was not least because, despite its emphasis on the primacy of immediate 
experience over textual revelation, early nineteenth-century natural theology became an ever-
expanding body of texts explicating the ways in which natural phenomena attested to God’s 
existence. Even within the covers of Paley’s book, the cumulative, repetitive character of his 
argument is visible in the seemingly endless proliferation of examples he supplies, all to 
establish an identical point. When the increasingly specialized scientific advances of the 1830s 
and 40s began to supersede the examples Paley had used in Natural Theology, the Earl of 
Bridgewater, an amateur naturalist and devout Anglican, commissioned a series of “Bridgewater 
Treatises,” each of which aimed to harmonize a specialized branch of modern science with 
natural theology’s argument from design. The writers of these treatises continued to figure nature 
as “the book of God”—a revelatory text that spelled out the truths of God’s benevolence and 
power no less clearly than did the Bible. The figure of the book, however, was double-edged: 
while at times it emphasized the clarity and immediacy with which nature disclosed God’s truth, 
at others it figured nature as yet another cryptic code requiring decipherment and interpretation 
(ideally by the knowledgeable author of a Bridgewater treatise). Thus in his 1834 Bridgewater 
treatise, Animal and Vegetable Physiology, Considered with Reference to Natural Theology, 
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Peter Mark Roget wrote of the need to gain creational literacy in order to excel at such 
decipherment: 
The more we extend our knowledge of the operations of creative power, as 
manifested in the structure and economy of organized beings, the better we 
become qualified to appreciate . . . the grand comprehensive plan of which they 
form a part. . . . By rendering ourselves familiar with the handwriting where the 
characters are clearly legible, we gradually learn to decypher the more obscure 
passages, and are enabled to follow the continuity of the narrative through 
chapters that would otherwise appear mutilated and defaced. Hence, the utility of 
comprehending in our studies the whole range of organized creation, with a view 
to . . . obtaining adequate ideas of the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of 
God. (33-34) 
 
While natural theology strove to establish a form of religious knowledge that was independent of 
the mediation of religious institutions and texts, its emphasis on the immediacy of divine 
experience resulted in an ever-expanding body of texts all its own, dedicated to explicating and 
interpreting the increasingly “obscure passages” of the natural phenomena that were supposedly 
self-explanatory evidence of God’s existence.  
 Gilbert White’s The Natural History and Antiquities of Selborne, republished to wide 
acclaim in 1827, decades after its quietly-received original publication in 1789, provided an 
attractive alternative to this proliferation of natural theological treatises, and at the same time 
offered a new genre for granting powerful immediacy to the divine correspondences of the 
natural world. Structured as a series of letters from White to Thomas Pennant and Daines 
Barrington, two gentleman naturalists of White’s acquaintance, Selborne recorded White’s 
careful and attentive observations of the day-to-day natural and agricultural occurrences and 
processes within the bounds of his home parish. The most salient formal innovations of White’s 
Selborne were, first, its selection of the parish as an organizational unit for scientific observation, 
and second, its epistolary form. Eschewing the systematic, repetitive elaborations of mechanical 
“contrivances” that constituted much natural theological writing, White’s book conveyed natural 
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theology’s celebration of divinely felicitous correspondence demonstratively rather than 
discursively, inviting readers to participate in a carefully delineated virtual world more vivid than 
their own. In the “Advertisement” that prefaces the text, White explains his innovative method of 
what he calls “parochial history”: 
The Author of the following Letters takes the liberty, with all proper deference, of 
laying before the public his idea of parochial history, which, he thinks, ought to 
consist of natural productions as well as antiquities. He is also of opinion that if 
stationary men would pay some attention to the districts on which they reside, and 
would publish their thoughts respecting the objects that surround them, from such 
materials might be drawn the most complete county-histories, which are still 
wanting in several parts of this kingdom. . . . If the writer should at all appear to 
have induced any of his readers to pay a more ready attention to the wonders of 
the Creation, too frequently overlooked as common occurrences . . . his purpose 
will be fully answered. (3-4) 
 
The sensation of reassuring embeddedness in a hospitable milieu that natural theology sought to 
make into the object of observation and awe became, in White’s book, a defining structural 
feature of the text itself. The book concretized the correspondence concept that natural theology 
had taken as an abstract principle by limiting its scope to a carefully delimited space in which a 
community of organisms, both human and non-human, coexisted in harmonious variety, the 
changing seasons marked by the recurring rhythms of agriculture and the departure and return of 
migrating birds. 
 The epistolary form of The Natural History of Selborne also helped to create for its 
reader the sense of observational immediacy that natural theologians such as Paley aimed to 
inspire in their readers. Where Paley didactically instructs his readers as to the response they 
ought to have to the wondrously ordered systems he describes, White directly models the desired 
response, first vividly describing the phenomenon that provokes it. White’s use of personal 
letters to frame his observations of natural phenomena permitted the reader to occupy a more 
participatory role vis-à-vis the natural world than did natural theology’s more abstracted, 
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mechanistic descriptions of natural mechanisms or “contrivances.”12 Like Paley, White employs 
a recurrent tone of wonder at the objects he observes, but the first-person, epistolary form of 
Selborne embeds that affective orientation in a concrete location and a specific moment in time, 
aligning the reader closely with the narrator’s moment-to-moment process of discovery. In Letter 
VIII to Thomas Pennant, for example, White marvels at the symbiotic relationship between the 
cattle, insects, and fish on his estate. The moment of wonder is embedded in a letter focusing on 
a group of small lakes on White’s land, and occurs in the letter almost as an afterthought: “A 
circumstance respecting these ponds, though by no means peculiar to them, I cannot pass over in 
silence,” White writes, and proceeds to describe the way in which cows drop dung while 
drinking from the ponds, which in turn results in insects nesting in the dung, and providing food 
for the fish (27). “Thus nature, who is a great economist, converts the recreation of one animal 
into the support of another!” White exclaims, before moving on to consider other forms of 
wildlife that inhabit the ponds. By directly modeling an emotional response to the ecological 
systems that surround him, and situating this response in a narrative context of spontaneous 
observation rather than ordered argument, White’s letters cultivate a tone of immediacy that 
Paley’s natural theology cannot attain. 
 Mitford draws heavily on White’s method of natural history to achieve the illusion of 
immediacy in her village sketches, particularly in the subset of sketches bearing the subtitle 
“Walks in the Country,” which, as critics such as Amy M. King have noted, resemble natural 
                                                
12 Tobias Menely contends that White’s use of the epistolary form was also a means of “drawing 
attention to a continuous process of collaboration” by “highlight[ing] interpersonal interchange” 
(55). While I think this was certainly part of White’s decision to publish Selborne in the form of 
letters, the fact that he does not include any of Barrington’s or Pennant’s letters has the effect of 
placing the reader in the position of White’s correspondent, creating a more direct, intimate 
reading experience than would have been afforded by a standard work of natural history. 
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histories more closely than any of Mitford’s more narrative sketches.13 Although the “Walks in 
the Country” constitute only a small fraction of the 123 sketches that comprise Our Village, they 
were the most frequently anthologized and reprinted portions of the book, and they remain the 
sketches considered most emblematic of Mitford’s strengths as a prose writer. Each “Walk in the 
Country” sketch follows Mitford’s narrator on a wide-ranging ramble through a different part of 
the countryside surrounding her cottage, usually in search of flowers, nuts, fruit, or the mere 
refreshment of a spring breeze. Highly descriptive of physical surroundings, the sketches take as 
their central aim a representation of the environs of Three Mile Cross so visually and haptically 
vivid that the reader can all but sense them as actually present. Like Paley’s natural theology and 
White’s natural history, the rhetoric of immediacy that Mitford employs throughout these 
sketches works to obviate the mediating surface of print, and to heighten the reader’s sense of 
unmediated, pleasurable contact with an enveloping environment. 
 Mitford’s rhetoric of immediacy comprises several techniques that she employs 
continually throughout her “Walks in the Country” sketches. In calling this set of techniques a 
“rhetoric” I draw on the work of Richard Sha, who identifies rhetoric as a vital component of the 
early nineteenth-century rural sketch. Sha points out that the rural sketch’s defining rhetorical 
strategy is precisely the denial of rhetoric: the sketch artist “deflect[s] attention away from excess 
figuration (its artfulness or rhetoricity) and foreground[s] naturalness,” frequently “substitut[ing] 
a narrative of its own origins for originality” (16-17). Mitford’s rhetoric of immediacy in the 
“Walks in the Country” sketches comprises a set of tactics that contribute to a similar denial of 
rhetoricity. First, she employs present-tense, moment-to-moment narration that occludes the 
process of literary composition; secondly, she employs direct addresses to the reader, enjoining 
                                                
13 See King, 463. 
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her to acknowledge that she “sees” the scenes the narrator describes; thirdly, she evokes a 
concrete, singular, and bounded locality as the authorizing source of her sketches, thereby 
implying their irreproducibility by any other writer; and fourthly, she repeatedly appeals to the 
unreliability of epistolary forms as a means of emphasizing her own sketches’ relative 
immediacy. In all of these rhetorical strategems, Mitford adapts, references, or exaggerates 
White’s descriptive techniques, capitalizing on natural history’s literary cachet while at the same 
time striving to outdo it.  
 Mitford announces her Whitean preference for small, bounded regions in the introductory 
sketch to the first volume. Preparing to take the reader on an introductory stroll through the 
village, she declares her love for the “nooks and turns of the shady lanes and sunny commons 
that we pass every day” (1). “Even in books I like a confined locality,” she writes, “and so do the 
critics when they talk of the unities” (1). Identifying The Natural History of Selborne, as well as 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, as spatial models for Our Village, Mitford celebrates throughout her 
sketches the feeling of snug, even providential “fit” between individual and dwelling: “a little 
world of our own, close-packed and insulated like ants in an anthill, or bees in a hive, or sheep in 
a fold, or nuns in a convent, or sailors in a ship” (1). Describing her own cottage in the 
introductory sketch, she paints the structure as a virtual concatenation of diminutive spaces: “A 
cottage, no, a miniature house, with many additions, little odds and ends of places, pantries and 
what not; all angles, and of a charming in-and-outness; a little bricked court before one half, and 
a little flower yard before the other” (6). The description enumerates further examples of the 
house’s “charming in-and-outness,” before remarking, “that house was built on purpose to show 
in what an exceeding small compass comfort may be packed” (6). Just as White’s Selborne 
insists that a restricted scope allows for the observation of an infinite proliferation of detail 
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within the finite space of the parish, so too does Mitford locate infinite plenitude in diminutive 
spaces, which have the capacity to subdivide into ever smaller compartments, breaking down 
into innumerable “odds and ends of places.” 
 Unlike the more narrative, character-focused sketches in Our Village, all of Mitford’s 
“Walks in the Country” are narrated in a vivid, ongoing present tense. This present-tense 
narration creates a sense of moment-to-moment immersion in the world of the sketch, as well as 
the impression that there is a direct connection between the narrator’s and reader’s perception 
that is unmediated by the narrator’s process of returning home to her writing desk and setting on 
paper the details of her day’s excursion. In her Preface to the first volume of Our Village, 
Mitford assures her reader that “[my] descriptions have always been written on the spot, and at 
the moment, and in nearly every instance with the closest and most resolute fidelity to the place 
and the people” (1). While White’s Natural History of Selborne simulates the temporality of day-
to-day experience by employing the epistolary conceit of the writer sitting down each evening to 
record his daily observations in a letter, Mitford’s style approaches still closer to this 
simultaneity of experience and representation by pretending to record the narrator’s perceptions 
“on the spot,” in the exact moment that they are occurring. Take, for example, the following 
passage: “Now we have reached the trees,—the beautiful trees! never so beautiful as to-day. 
Imagine the effect of a straight and regular double avenue of oaks, nearly a mile long, arching 
over head, and closing into perspective like the roof and columns of a cathedral, every tree and 
branch encrusted with the bright and delicate congelation of hoar frost, white and pure as snow, 
delicate and defined as carved ivory. How beautiful it is, how uniform, how various, how filling, 
how satiating to the eye and to the mind—above all, how melancholy!” (31-32). The frequency 
with which Mitford begins her sentences with the word “now” strains to return her reader over 
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and over again to a fictive present moment, each visual image of a natural object bursting on the 
inward eye in rapid, spontaneous succession. Although the objects that Mitford represents are 
implicitly static, scenes that both she and the reader visit repeatedly, she strives to establish the 
singularity of each moment that she represents: the trees are “never so beautiful as to day.”  The 
many self-interruptions of the narrator’s describing voice (“the trees,—the beautiful trees!”) also 
contribute to this sense of immediacy, foregoing the polished, eighteenth-century articulations of 
a well-constructed, well-edited period and substituting for it something closer to a stream of 
consciousness, performative and contrived as that consciousness may be. The anaphoric 
repetition of “how” before a series of adjectives describing the trees in the last sentence conjures 
a surfeit of perception that inundates the consciousness, and which language must struggle to 
contain. 
 In adapting and heightening the present-tense temporality of White’s descriptions, Mitford 
also confronted the option of framing her descriptive prose pieces, as White did, in the format of 
epistolary correspondence. That she chose not to do so indicates Mitford’s acute awareness of 
the ways in which the protocols of print culture had changed in the decades since Selborne’s 
publication, and of the ways in which the letter form would enhance or obstruct the intimate 
relationship she aimed to establish with her readership. The idea of writing Our Village’s 
sketches in epistolary form was suggested to Mitford by her close friend and frequent 
correspondent Sir William Elford, a baronet and amateur scientist who was one of the earliest 
and staunchest supporters of Mitford’s literary career. An avid admirer of White’s Selborne, 
Elford apparently felt, upon reading a first draft of Mitford’s sketches, that they would benefit 
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from an epistolary format similar to White’s.14 Elford made the suggestion in June of 1824, 
writing to Mitford to point out the affinities between the sketch and the letter as literary forms, 
and to recommend that future sketches be framed as letters. Mitford responded kindly but firmly 
to Elford, offering him a complex and thoughtful explanation for why, in her words, “it would 
never have done”:  
The sketches are too long, and necessarily too much connected, for real 
correspondence; and as to any thing make-believe, it has been my business to 
keep that out of sight as much as possible. Besides which, we are free and easy in 
these days, and talk to the public as a friend. Read ‘Elia,’ or the ‘Sketch Book,’ or 
Hazlitt’s ‘Table Talk,’ or any popular book of the new school, and you will find 
that we have turned over the Johnsonian periods and the Blairian formality to 
keep company with the wigs and hoops, the stiff courtesies and low bows of our 
ancestors. In short, my dear friend, letters are nowadays more the vehicles of 
kindness, and less of wit, than they used to be. It was very convenient, when 
people who wrote books were forced to put stiff stays on them, to have a sort of 
deshabille for the mind as well as for the body, and to write a letter as they put on 
a robe de chambre. But now the periodical press takes charge of those bursts of 
gayety and criticism which the post was wont to receive; and the public—the 
reading public—is, as I said before, the correspondent and confidant of every 
body. (Friendships 26) 
 
While Mitford claims that letters would be intrinsically unsuitable for the particular type of 
fiction she is writing—the sketches are too long and inter-connected to be plausible as real 
letters—her real reasons for why Our Village ought not to be epistolary fiction have nothing to 
do with the formal features of epistolary writing in itself, and everything to do with the 
historically situated relationship between letter-writing and the changing media ecology of early 
nineteenth-century print. Mitford’s striking characterization of letters as “a sort of deshabille for 
the mind” relegates their usefulness to a past historical moment in which the mental deshabille of 
epistolary writing formed a meaningful contrast to the rigid formality of most published prose. In 
                                                
14 In a letter to Mitford on 9 April 1812, Elford avows himself to be “extremely fond of natural 
history” and remarks that he is “highly delighted with that book [The Natural History of 
Selborne].” See Mitford, Friendships, 59.  
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these days, Mitford insists, all prose is published in a state of undress, and thus epistolary fiction 
appears obsolete and unnatural in that it presumes exclusively to offer an intimacy and 
informality that is in fact everywhere available. While the letters of White’s Selborne work to 
make White’s descriptions immediately palpable and accessible, differentiating Selborne from 
the rigidly structured books of natural history and philosophy that preceded White, letters would 
have precisely the opposite effect on Our Village in 1824, imposing an obsolete rhetoric of 
intimacy on a text that can already presume such intimacy by virtue of a public well-accustomed 
to print’s newly familiar tone. While letters granted White’s text its immediacy, they would, 
Mitford feels, have the opposite effect on Our Village. 
Yet even as Mitford rejects Elford’s suggestion, it is nevertheless clear that the idea of 
Our Village as a kind of denatured epistolary fiction remained in Mitford’s mind as she wrote 
Our Village. In the introductory sketch to the book’s third volume, published in 1828, Mitford 
makes the unusual move of introducing the volume in epistolary form. Titled “Extracts from 
Letters,” the introductory sketch begins thus: “‘Any changes in our Village since the last 
advices? What news of May and Lizzy and Fanny and Lucy? Is the pretty nymph of the shoe-
shop married yet? And does the Loddon continue to flow as brightly as when we gathered musk 
roses together in the old grounds of Aberleigh?’” (1). Placed in quotation marks but unattributed 
directly to any speaker, these questions initially appear to be rhetorical questions attributed to 
Mitford’s implied reader, who returns to the third volume after having read the first two, and 
refers to scenes and characters from earlier sketches as though they are experiences the reader 
has directly shared with the narrator. In the following paragraph, though, Mitford contextualizes 
these questions: “These interrogatories formed part of a letter from India, written by my pretty 
friend, Emily L., now the wife of an officer of rank on that station; and my answer to her kind 
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questioning, may serve to satisfy the curiosity of other gentle readers as to the general state of 
our little commonwealth” (1). In the transition between the first and second paragraphs of this 
introductory page, Mitford dramatically positions and then repositions her reader, requiring 
readers swiftly to reorient themselves in relation to the world of Three Mile Cross. While the 
volume’s opening questions invite the reader to imagine herself as a physical inhabitant of 
Mitford’s village, returning, perhaps, after a sojourn away to revisit people remembered and 
places already experienced, the second paragraph drastically distances the reader by introducing 
Mitford’s correspondent “Emily L.” as the real implied reader of Our Village. This rhetorical 
move relocates the reader as an outsider eavesdropping on Mitford’s and Emily L’s 
correspondence, first pulling the reader into the intradiegetic space of the story and then 
immediately pushing her back outside the diegetic frame of Mitford’s discourse. 
This exclusionary move also has the contradictory effect of initially effacing, and the next 
moment foregrounding, the material surface of print that mediates Mitford’s connection to her 
readership. At first invited to envision themselves as real inhabitants of Mitford’s universe rather 
than readers of a book or periodical, the reader is speedily disabused of this illusion and 
repositioned as the third reader of a letter that has been written by someone else, to someone 
else. Mitford goes on, however, to discuss the differences not just between print and immediate 
experience, but also between print and handwriting, a shift that has the effect of foregrounding 
the question of medium, but also elevating print as a more immediate, transparent medium than 
that of handwriting. Describing the position of her mass readership, she quickly mitigates the 
roughness with which she has relegated her reader to the position of textual eavesdropper by 
suggesting that they are actually in a more privileged position of communication with her than is 
“Emily H.” due to the greater ease of reading print: 
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They who condescend to read the letter-press will have the advantage of my fair 
correspondent. Indeed I doubt whether she herself may not derive her first 
information from the printed book; my epistle being, as far as I can judge, wholly 
illegible to all but the writer. Never was such a manuscript seen! for being 
restricted to one sheet of paper, . . . I had fallen into a silly fashion of crossing, not 
uncommon amongst young ladies; so that my letter first written horizontally like 
other people’s, then perpendicularly to form a sort of chequer-work, then 
diagonally in red ink,--the very crossings crossed!—and every nook and cranny, 
the part under the seal, the corner where the date stood, covered with small lines 
in an invisible hand, the whole letter became a mass of mysterious marks, a 
puzzle like a Coptic inscription, or a state paper in cypher to those unacquainted 
with the key. I must put an extract into print if only for the benefit of my 
correspondent; and here it is. (1-2) 
 
Although the narrator here foregrounds the relative effectiveness of different media of 
communication (handwriting and print), the upshot of the passage is less to emphasize the 
materiality of print, than to emphasize its transparency as a medium relative to manuscript. 
Instead of positioning Emily H. as the narrator’s most immediate addressee, and the reader as an 
indirect eavesdropper of sorts on another’s correspondence, as do most eighteenth-century 
epistolary novels, Mitford thus imagines the general public as occupying the most immediate 
relationship to her narrator, due both to the greater legibility of print, and to the implication that 
the print copy will in all likelihood reach Mitford’s readers before it arrives in India. Mitford 
thus inverts the usual association of letter-writing with intimacy and mass print with anonymous 
readership, implying that print’s transparency is more capable of establishing a bond between 
reader and writer. By making the print medium of Our Village visible to the reader, Mitford 
paradoxically emphasizes print’s relative invisibility. 
Furthermore, the language that the narrator uses to describe the manuscript copy of her 
letter to Emily H. evokes the landscape of Three Mile Cross as though the village’s topography 
is superimposed on the letter itself. In telling her reader that “the very crossings [are] crossed!” 
the narrator seems to be referring not only to her own handwriting, but also to the name of Our 
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Village itself, and her description of the surface of the letter as full of “nooks” and “crannies” 
and “corners” engages the vocabulary of snugness, enclosure, and proximity that everywhere 
pervades the locodescription of Our Village. By making the topography of Three Mile Cross 
visible not in the illegible content of the letters themselves, but rather in the narrator’s printed 
description of the letters’ mediating surface, the narrator of Our Village grants her anonymous 
print readership a more intimate and transparent access to the virtual space of Three Mile Cross 
than is given to her personal correspondent.  
For all her celebration of old-fashioned customs and tightly-bound community over 
against the encroachments of modern technology and communication, Mitford nevertheless 
strives to transfer the value of intimate, immediate communication away from the older media 
with which such values had traditionally been associated, and applies it instead to the modern 
print media that make her literary efforts available to a large, anonymous readership. As Alison 
Booth argues, one of Mitford’s most notable innovations in Our Village is to “[offer] a new 
model of subjectivity along with an appealing relation between narrator and audience” 
characterized by “the intimacy of correspondence” (46). What we see in this passage is a 
concerted effort to create this “intimacy of correspondence” precisely by rejecting 
correspondence’s material form. In so doing, Mitford domesticates the medium of periodical 
print and imbues it with an aura of communal intimacy, while simultaneously estranging and 
defamiliarizing the more intimate form of communication embodied in the manuscript letter. 
Unlike White, who retains the letter form throughout the Natural History of Selborne, Mitford 
takes pains to simulate mere traces of manuscript correspondence in Our Village, presenting the 
introduction in the form of extracts from letters, but leaving the sketches themselves unmarked 
by any indication of their having originated as personal letters. By declining to sustain the 
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paratextual indicators of the letter form as White does, Mitford seamlessly moves the reader out 
of the extradiegetic position inhabited by the reader of both epistolary fiction and the natural 
history correspondence, and repositions her as a direct addressee.  
“All Transplantable Things”: Adaptation Narratives in Our Village 
 The detailed, locodescriptive “Walks in the Country” sketches that I have been discussing 
thus far have gained more popular and critical attention than any of the other prose pieces 
collected in Our Village. Critics such as Amanpal Garcha, Amy King, and Franco Moretti have 
all emphasized the non-narrative elements of Mitford’s sketches, what Garcha describes as their 
“plotlessness” (14). Critics have emphasized the static qualities of Mitford’s sketches both in 
order to point out her affinities to natural history writing, as does King, and to position her as the 
popularizer of the sketch as a genre that embraces a fantasy of historical stasis, as does Garcha. 
Mitford’s lasting popularity as a predominantly descriptive writer throughout the nineteenth 
century attests to the significance of her descriptive sketches as formal innovations. As Franco 
Moretti has noted, however, the “Walks in the Country,” which feature prominently in the first 
volume of Our Village, peter out in subsequent volumes, to the point that Mitford appears 
eventually to drop the subgenre altogether in favour of more narrative, character-based sketches. 
While the first volume contains seven “Walks in the Country,” the second contains only four; the 
third, none at all; the fourth, three; and by the time the final volume appeared in 1832, the 
“Walks in the Country” have disappeared altogether, replaced by new sketch subgenres with 
recurring subtitles such as “Early Recollections” and “Christmas Amusements.” Moretti 
attributes the disappearance of the “Walks in the Country” to the waning of the sketch genre’s 
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ability adequately to represent the rapidly modernizing landscape of rural England (63-64).15 In 
this section, I argue that Mitford’s movement towards narrative, individual-focused sketches also 
points to a positive rethinking of the static model of environment that she had inherited from the 
discourse of natural history. The shift from a more descriptive to a more narrative sketch style 
over the course of the publication of the five volumes of Our Village reflects, not Mitford’s loss 
of the vitality of her early style, as Moretti argues, so much as a movement away from a static, 
spatialized conception of environment, towards a dynamic, temporalized one that focuses less on 
topographic description of stable regions than on the dynamic exchanges between individuals 
and their physical surroundings. 
Harriet Martineau was one of the few nineteenth-century critics to assert that Mitford’s 
literary talents were essentially novelistic, pointing out that “each story is as complete and 
rounded as a sonnet, and provided with a plot which would serve for a novel if expanded. . . . It 
was for stories of this kind that Miss Mitford exchanged the earlier and easier sketches from the 
Nature around her which we find in Our Village” (39). It is clear from Mitford’s letters that she 
understood her growing interest in narrative as an expansion, rather than diminishment, of her 
literary ambitions. Throughout the 1830s and 40s, Mitford alludes frequently in her letters to her 
plans for a novel, even going so far as to excitedly provide her friend Sir William Elford with a 
tentative outline of the plot. The projected novel was never written, but its shadowy, ongoing 
presence in her correspondence suggests that the increasingly ambitious narrative scope of her 
                                                
15 In making this claim, Moretti is drawing on the work of cultural historians such as Raymond 
Williams, who demonstrates in The Country and the City how capitalism’s rapid privatization of 
commonly-held land in the early nineteenth century made the pastoral ideal of a landscape across 
which one could freely roam (like Mitford’s narrator does) into a bygone, nostalgic fantasy. 
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rural sketches during the 1830s can be read as exercise or practice for the larger literary project 
that never materialized. 
Mitford’s narrative sketches share with her descriptive sketches an intense preoccupation 
with the intimate correspondence between individual and environment, yet this affective 
relationship undergoes marked changes when it is transposed into a narrative, rather than a 
descriptive, context. While the plotlessness of Our Village’s descriptive sketches embraces stasis 
as a way of evoking harmonious adaptation between individual and environment, the narrative 
sketches of Our Village’s later volumes spend less time dwelling on plotless plenitude and 
instead investigate the processes by which this plotlessness is achieved. These adaptation 
narratives, as I am calling them, typically chart the gradual processes of adaptation and 
adjustment that characters undergo in relocating from one place to another. Mitford’s cast of 
adapting characters ranges from individuals who move to a new home within a single village, to 
characters who have immigrated to Three Mile Cross from a distant county, to a naval captain 
who must adjust to life on land, to French emigrees fleeing the revolution, to a poverty-stricken 
poacher forced to relocate to the workhouse.16 Mitford’s deep thematic interest in dislocation is 
unusual for English rural writing in the early nineteenth century, which typically celebrates deep, 
almost insular rootedness in a confined location (Gilbert White’s natural history is paradigmatic). 
Yet the trajectory of Mitford’s own career as a member of the downwardly-mobile genteel 
poor—she relocated from her family estate to a small cottage in Three Mile Cross when her 
father gambled away the family fortune, and took up writing rural sketches in order to support 
                                                
16 In “The First Primrose,” “The Chalk-Pit,” “An Admiral on Shore,” “Mademoiselle Therese,” 
and “Tom Cordery,” respectively. 
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him financially—indicates that rural writing and the shocks of dislocation were, for her, 
intimately and even painfully connected. 
In this section, I examine how Mitford’s adaptation narratives revise the static conception 
of the individual-environment relationship presented in her “Walks in the Country” sketches. 
Rejecting natural theology’s model of harmonious, providential stasis, these later sketches 
embrace instead a dynamic environmental model in which the level of attunement between body 
and environment varies and shifts across a wide scale. Her adoption of a dynamic, narrative 
conception of environment resonates less with the natural history of Gilbert White than with the 
emerging biological science of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, whose early evolutionary theory 
pioneered the notion that bodies of living organisms exist in an intimate, dynamic relationship to 
their environments, gradually altering shape and habit as environmental conditions change. 
While it is unlikely that Mitford read Lamarck directly, her connectedness to British literary and 
intellectual culture, as well as the diffusive status that transformationist theory had achieved by 
the 1820s and 30s, points to the likelihood of her having encountered his ideas in some form.17 
Lamarck’s central thesis, explained in Chapter VII of Zoological Philosophy (1809), “On the 
Influence of the Environment,” is that “the environment affects the shape and organization of 
animals, that is to say that when the environment becomes very different, it produces in course of 
time corresponding modifications in the shape and organization of animals” (107). Lamarck is 
quick to specify that “whatever the environment may do, it does not work any direct 
modification whatever in the shape and organization of animals” (107). Rather, modification 
                                                
17 While Lamarckian thought had not become ubiquitous by the 1830s, his theories were popular 
in radical intellectual circles, and influential for figures such as Harriet Martineau, Robert Knox, 
Robert Edmond Grant, and others. For further discussion of the English reception of Lamarck’s 
ideas in the early nineteenth century, see Desmond. 
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occurs gradually through the medium of habit: environmental conditions affect organisms’ 
needs, animals develop habits in order to satisfy those needs, and habits in turn can generate 
changes in bodily form through the use or disuse of various faculties. Although Lamarck is now 
known primarily for his mostly erroneous theory that acquired traits could be inherited by 
offspring, his insistence on the powerful impact of environmental influence on organisms’ health 
and behavior was groundbreaking. Witness the excitement with which he insists on the 
environment’s power to generate different developmental outcomes in the same species: 
“Among individuals of the same species, some of which are continually well fed and in an 
environment favourable to their development, while others are in an opposite environment, there 
arises a difference in the state of the individuals which gradually becomes very remarkable. How 
many examples I might cite both in animals and plants which bear out the truth of this 
principle!” (108).  
What this early nineteenth-century transformationist thought made available to Mitford 
was a conception of environment and organism as entities not necessarily ideally suited for one 
another, but with the potential for mutual adjustment. Two corollaries of a dynamic 
environment-organism model were, on the one hand, a conception of the plasticity of the 
individual, and, on the other, the possibility that the process of adaptation might fail—whether 
due to the failings of the individual, or of the environment itself. For this reason, the concept of 
environment could become a locus of incipient social critique and reform, by providing a 
conceptual tool for imagining human nature itself as a potential object of reform, and, 
alternately, for making visible the ways in which social spaces and institutions fail to 
accommodate the exigencies of individual well-being. This section will show how Mitford 
adapts and explores a dynamic concept of environment in the later volumes of Our Village in a 
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way that both aerates the insularity of the rural idyll and grants an unwonted edge of social 
critique to her narratives of village social life. 
Although Mitford’s prose typically skews away from highly technical scientific language, 
the one area in which her prose does show scientific expertise is in the realm of botany. Mitford 
frequently turns to botanical language as a way of framing her adaptation narratives, returning 
with particular frequency to the horticultural metaphor of transplantation. Transplantation is a 
potent figure in the context of the rural sketch because, while the celebration of plant life appears 
to go hand in hand with the rural idyll’s commitment to stasis, the metaphor of transplantation 
conjures images of relocation that run against the grain of this emphasis on rootedness and 
immobility. Lamarck, too, took plant life as a paradigmatic case of dynamism rather than stasis, 
of the capacity of organisms to alter their forms and physiology under the influence of new 
environments. He presents the example of transplantation early on as a preliminary evidence for 
his argument about the transformational force of environmental influence: 
Every botanist knows that plants which are transported from their native places to 
gardens for purposes of cultivation, gradually undergo changes which ultimately 
make them unrecognizable. Many plants, by nature hairy, become glabrous or 
nearly so; a number of those which used to lie and creep on the ground, become 
erect; others lose their thorns or excrescences; others again whose stem was 
perennial and woody in their native hot climates, become herbaceous in our own 
climates and some of them become annuals; lastly, the size of their parts itself 
undergoes very considerable changes. These effects of alterations of environment 
are so widely recognized, that botanists do not like to describe garden plants 
unless they have been recently brought into cultivation. . . . Where in nature do 
we find our cabbages, lettuces, etc., in the same state as in our kitchen gardens? 
(109) 
 
While Lamarck’s argument about transformation through environmental adaptation would go on 
to concentrate primarily on animals, especially invertebrates, plants formed an ideal starting-
point for his argument because plants are directly tied to, and dependent on, their immediate 
surroundings in ways that animals, possessing the ability to transport themselves from location to 
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location, are not. Plants are thus the ultimate example of absolute environmental dependency, 
both in their inability to select or seek out specific environmental conditions, and in their 
correlative ability to adapt their own form and physiology to new surroundings when forcibly 
relocated. Botanical plasticity therefore involves passivity and immobility vis-à-vis 
surroundings, which cannot be controlled or chosen, but also a certain limited agency vis-à-vis 
the body itself, which can be gradually modified through the force of adaptive habit. Georges 
Canguilhem describes this Lamarckian relationship between individual and environment as a 
“distressful and distressed” process infused, as Robert Mitchell remarks, by “deep pathos”: “The 
life and the medium that is unaware of it are two asynchronous series of events. The change of 
circumstances comes first, but it is the living [being] itself that, in the end, initiates the effort to 
not be let go by its medium. Adaptation is a repeated effort on the part of life to continue to 
‘stick’ to an indifferent medium” (Mitchell 153; Canguilhem 12). As Canguilhem points out, the 
affective resonances of Lamarckian adaptation are dramatically different from those of natural 
theology’s correspondence model: “Adaptation as the result of an effort is . . . neither 
harmonious nor providential; it is earned and never guaranteed” (12). By transposing the natural 
theological concept of ordered adaptation onto a temporal scale, Lamarck reshapes the affective 
resonance of the individual-environment relationship as precariously nourishing at best, and 
agonistic at worst. His temporalization of adaptation also transformed it into a narratable process, 
rather than merely a static phenomenon that could be fully captured by natural theology’s 
descriptive methods. 
Throughout Our Village, Mitford uses the language of transplantation to capture the 
emotionally charged precariousness of the relationship between self and surrounding. In an early 
sketch entitled “The First Primrose,” Mitford’s narrator describes her own past as a prototype for 
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the adaptation narratives that would become a prevalent mode for sketches in subsequent 
volumes. Walking in the country with her greyhound, she passes a cottage that had formerly 
been her own home, and reminisces briefly yet evocatively about the emotions that accompanied 
the process of moving from one place to another: “This is the exact description of the home 
which, three years ago, it nearly broke my heart to leave. What a tearing up by the root it was! I 
have pitied cabbage plants and celery, and all transplantable things ever since; though, in 
common with them and with other vegetables, the first agony of the transportation being over, I 
have taken such firm and tenacious hold of my new soil, that I would not for the world be pulled 
up again, even to be restored to the old beloved ground” (I.78). In classifying herself in a genus 
with “all transplantable things,” Mitford aligns herself with a wide variety of life forms, united 
less by their inhabiting a shared space, than by an emotional structure of intense attachment 
paradoxically paired with the ability to adapt. That Mitford declines to disclose any details of the 
circumstances that required her to move from one house to another within the same parish 
reinforces the impression that external narrative details are secondary to the structure of 
emotional experience that she shares with cabbage and celery. This trajectory of intense 
attachment, followed by involuntary relocation, followed by “firm and tenacious” reattachment, 
appears so frequently in Our Village’s subsequent sketches that the pathos of transplanted 
cabbages and celeries becomes an emotional emblem for a wide swath of Mitford’s characters. 
While “The First Primrose” employs the relatively small movement from one house to 
another within the same neighbourhood as the spatial frame for its adaptation narrative, later 
sketches increasingly test the limits of this frame by exploring adaptive transitions, not only 
between houses, but also between counties and regions, and even between nations. In one of the 
darkest sketches in Our Village, “The Chalk-Pit,” Mitford tells the story of her friend Mrs. 
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Mansfield and her daughters Clara and Ellen, who move to Three Mile Cross from their home 
village in Sussex for reasons that the narrator does not explain, although it is implied that Mrs. 
Mansfield has recently married the village vicar. Only eight pages long, the sketch is divided 
between a description of Ellen and Clara, and a brief but violent anecdote from the Mansfields’ 
home parish of Lanton, narrating the deaths of three young boys in the collapse of a local chalk-
pit in which they had taken shelter during a storm. The sketch is an exercise in thinking through 
the contradictions of local attachment as a value. The narrator oscillates between celebrating the 
two women’s residual attachment to their Sussex village as a structure of intimate feeling that 
parallels her own affection for Three Mile Cross, and exulting at the ease with which Three Mile 
Cross’s superior charm will succeed in transferring the immigrants’ affections to their new home. 
The two daughters, Clara and Ellen, represent two different moments in the adaptation process. 
Ellen, the elder, is a talented painter of flora, and the narrator attributes to Ellen’s amateur 
natural history painting her ability to maintain an attachment to Lanton at the same time that she 
adapts to Three Mile Cross: “Ellen had great delight in comparing our Sylvan Flora with the 
minute and fairy blossoms of the South Downs, where she had passed the greater part of her life. 
She could not but admit the superior luxuriance and variety of our woodland plants, and yet she 
had a good deal to say in favour of the delicate, flowery carpet, which clothes the green hills of 
Sussex; and in fact was on that point of honour a little jealous—a little, a very little, the least in 
the world, touchy” (138-39). Mitford’s narrator links Ellen’s ability to adapt to her new home in 
Three Mile Cross to her painting—a representational practice that, far from annulling her old 
regional attachments and replacing them with new ones, enables her aesthetically to appreciate 
the comparative merits of the two different regions. Regional attachment on Ellen’s model is less 
a passionate zeal for the beloved singularity of one’s own native region, than an aesthetically 
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detached appreciation for the regional singularities of multiple places. Mitford does not fully 
separate this appreciation from forms of instinctive, patriotic emotion, jibing that Ellen is “a little 
jealous—a little, a very little, the least in the world, touchy” about the beauty of “delicate, 
flowery carpet, which clothes the green hills of Sussex” (139), yet the narrator’s pettish 
observation reflects as much on her own defensive regional attachments as it does on Ellen’s, 
implicitly elevating an attitude of detached, appreciative comparison—a detachment that allows 
for re-attachment to new surroundings—above the residual regional jealousies of which both the 
narrator and Ellen continue to feel traces. 
 Ellen’s younger sister Clara exhibits a nativist melancholy that both recalls the narrator’s 
own remembered “agony of . . . transportation” in “The First Primrose” and forms an emotional 
counterpoint to the aesthetically detached serenity that enables Ellen to hold her attachments to 
both Lanton and Three Mile Cross in painterly balance. The narrator continues to describe 
Ellen’s warm yet transferable attachment to Sussex, before contrasting it against Clara’s 
stultifying nostalgia: 
She loved her former abode, the abode of her childhood, with enthusiasm; the 
downs; the sea, whose sound, she said, seemed to follow her to her inland home, 
to dwell within her as it does in the folds of the sea-shell; and, above all, she 
loved her old neighbours, high and low. I do not know whether Mrs. Mansfield or 
her daughters returned oftenest to the ‘simple annals of the Sussex poor.’ It was a 
subject of which they never wearied; and we to whom they came, liked them the 
more for their clinging and lingering affection for those whom they had left. We 
received it as a pledge of what they would feel for us when we became better 
acquainted—a pledge which has been amply redeemed. I flatter myself that 
Aberleigh now almost rivals their dear old parish; only Clara, who has been here 
three years, and is now eighteen, says, very gravely, that ‘people as they grow old, 
cannot be expected to form the very strong local attachments which they did when 
they were young.’ I wonder how old Clara will think herself when she comes to 
be eight-and-twenty? (3.139) 
 
In seemingly contradictory fashion, this passage eloquently and even lyrically celebrates the 
richly intimate “enthusiasm” of intense attachment to one’s environment, while at the same time 
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deriding the notion that such an enthusiasm is permanent and non-transferable. The language 
with which the narrator describes Ellen’s environmental attachment resonates with the biological 
language of Lamarck, with its imagery of interpenetrating fluids and folds of living tissue that 
organically bind individuals to their surroundings in physical dependency: “[Ellen] loved . . . the 
sea, whose sound, she said, seemed to follow her to her inland home, to dwell within her as it 
does in the folds of the sea-shell” (139). The sea-sounds link Ellen’s organism to the 
environment of Sussex as canalized fluids link Lamarckian organisms to their natural media. The 
Lamarckian language of fluids and media aligns Ellen with a biological narrative of constant, 
open-ended adaptation that, though founded on the intensity of specific local attachments, 
validates the narrator’s reading of her “clinging and lingering affection” for Lanton as “a pledge 
of what [she] would feel for us when we became better acquainted,” rather than as an affective 
block or obstruction to the formation of new attachments. Clara’s rejection of this open-
endedness—her claim that an individual’s capacity to form attachments diminishes over time—
invites the narrator’s ridicule because it insists that the strength of environmental attachment 
signals its non-transferability, linking two things that Mitford’s narrator views as necessarily 
separable. 
 Mitford expands the purview of her characters’ adaptive capacities to include relocations 
across national boundaries in the brief sketch “Mademoiselle Therese,” collected in the third 
volume of Our Village. The sketch describes the home and habits of its titular character, an 
elderly French émigrée who has fled the revolution to settle in Burley-Hatch, a village near 
Mitford’s own. Throughout the sketch, Mitford’s narrator takes pains to emphasize the English 
village’s capacity to accommodate and assimilate Mademoiselle Therese’s foreign ways, as well 
as the adaptive ease with which Mademoiselle Therese, formerly an aristocratic French socialite, 
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has “gradually los[t] sight of her few and distant foreign connexions, and [found] all her 
happiness in her pleasant home and her kind neighbours—a standing lesson of cheerfulness and 
contentment” (299). The narrator intimates, however, that “Mademoiselle Therese’s loyalty to 
the Bourbons, was in truth a very real feeling,” and that “Mademoiselle” has maintained a 
suppressed attachment to her homeland since her emigration during the revolution (303). When 
Mademoiselle attempts to return to France following the Bourbon restoration in 1814, she finds 
it painfully altered: “In less than three months . . . Mademoiselle Therese came home again. She 
complained of nobody; but times were altered. The house in which she was born was pulled 
down; her friends were scattered, her kindred dead; Madame did not remember her (she had 
probably never heard of her in her life); the king did not know her again (poor man! He had not 
seen her for these thirty years); Paris was a new city; the French were a new people; she missed 
the sea-coal fires; and for the stunted orange-trees at the Thuilleries, what were they compared 
with the blossomed limes of Burley-Hatch!” (305). As with Clara Mansfield’s nostalgia for 
Sussex in “The Chalk-Pit,” Mitford’s narrator here corrects Mademoiselle Therese’s misguided 
nostalgia by demonstrating the falseness of her nostalgia’s object, and then redirecting the pain 
of this recognition towards Mademoiselle’s reabsorption into her rural community. While 
Mitford reveals Clara’s Sussex village to be the site of domestic tragedy, she shows 
Mademoiselle’s home country to be so ravaged by history that nostalgic return is impossible. 
That Mademoiselle’s nostalgia is only quelled when she finds her old home painfully altered by 
historical trauma underscores the English village’s status as idyllic haven from history and 
tragedy alike. At the same time, Mitford’s seemingly insular parochialism has an oddly 
ecumenical tinge in its assurance that the English village provides a haven from history not just 
for the English, but for anyone who seeks refuge there.  
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 While adaptation narratives such as “The First Primrose,” “The Chalk-Pit,” and 
“Mademoiselle Therese” all emphasize the plasticity of the human organism, as well the capacity 
of the village to absorb and placate the shocks of dislocation, Mitford’s narrator often struggles 
to apply this narrative of adaptability to members of the lower classes. One sketch in particular, 
“Tom Cordery,” stands out as a failed adaptation narrative, in which the open-ended process of 
relocation results in tragedy rather than gradual change through habituation. The eponymous 
protagonist of “Tom Cordery” is a former poacher who, after maiming himself with a misfired 
gun, has adopted the more lawful vocation of “rat-catcher, hare-finder, and broom-maker” 
(I.165-66). Mitford dedicates the greater part of the sketch to anecdotes illustrating the 
persistence of Tom’s mischievous good humour, recounting his prank of leading landlords on 
hunting excursions to barren regions under the pretense of his superior knowledge of animals’ 
hiding places, and remarking affectionately on his usefulness as an expert purveyor of village 
gossip. It is only near the end of the sketch that Mitford’s light-hearted description of character 
and scenery turns to tragedy, as the narrator turns her attention to a description of Tom’s decrepit 
cottage, which collapses during an especially snowy winter. Tom’s landlord refusing to rebuild 
the destroyed home, Tom is abruptly relocated to the parish workhouse, where he soon dies of 
typhus fever. 
 While the sketch’s sequence of events is relatively scant and straight-forward, the 
botanical imagery that Mitford employs throughout the piece establishes clear thematic links 
with the other narratives of dislocation and adaptation in Our Village, but is modified in such a 
way as to highlight the difficulties, rather than the potentialities, of relocation and adaptation. 
The sketch opens with a meditation on the seeming immortality of an old oak tree that, as the 
narrator eventually clarifies, is a metaphor for Tom himself. “There are certain things and 
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persons that seem as if they could never die,” the narrator begins; “things of such vigour and 
hardiness, that they seem constituted for an interminable duration, a sort of immortality” (164). 
She proceeds to describe “an old pollard oak of [her] acquaintance” in language overloaded with 
references to life and vitality as abstract forces animating bodily forms. The tree is “full of 
crooked life”; “tough, vigorous, lusty, concentrating as it were the very spirit of vitality into its 
own curtailed proportions” (164). The tree, however, has recently been felled by an “admirer of 
British woods,” an unhappy circumstance that leads the narrator to link the tree’s fate with that 
of Tom Cordery, “another piece of strong nature in a human form” who “used to convey to me 
exactly the same feeling” (165). Mitford’s choice of the large oak tree as Tom’s botanical 
equivalent, rather than the transplantable vegetables and flowers to which she compares herself 
and other inhabitants of Three Mile Cross, is significant because it points up the rootedness and 
static immobility that seem congruent with the rural idyll and which are largely absent from 
many of Our Village’s other narrative sketches.  
 By describing Tom as in every way integrated with and rooted in his bucolic 
surroundings, the narrator establishes him as a figure for the type of harmonious adaptation that 
in other adaptation narratives is the very goal of the relocation process, and which, in the “Walks 
in the Country” sketches, Mitford typically describes as the condition of an entire harmonized 
landscape. The narrator tells us that Tom is “no unfit emblem of the district in which he lived,” 
describing him as a “human oak [that] grew on the wild North-of-Hampshire country, . . . A 
country of heath, and hill, and forest, partly reclaimed, inclosed, and planted by some of the 
greater proprietors, but for the most part uncultivated and uncivilized” (165). Tom is presented as 
a veritable genius loci, an amateur Gilbert White whose knowledge of “beasts and birds, their 
ways and doings, [is] a knowledge so minute and accurate, that it might have put to shame many 
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a professed naturalist” (168). This idealization of the rural poor as a static, visually pleasing, 
integrated aspect of the landscape can be attributed to the blinkered partialness of Mitford’s 
vision, her self-described method dictating that “if anything be ugly, you strike it out, or if 
anything be wanting, you put it in.” Yet what follows as the sketch progresses suggests that 
Mitford’s positioning of Tom as an emblem of providential, harmonious correspondence in the 
sketch’s opening pages is a more knowing artistic choice, a foregrounding of the idea of the 
perfectly-adapted poor that only serves to underscore the sketch’s subsequent dismantling of that 
image. 
  This dismantling begins as soon as Mitford’s narrator shifts her attention from Tom’s 
relationship with his natural environment, to his relationship with his built environment, at which 
point this idealized relationship loses its fully aestheticized character and is complicated by 
indicators of severe poverty. Mitford’s description of Tom’s hovel and its surrounding landscape 
struggles to balance the aestheticizing idiom of the picturesque against a thoroughly 
unsentimental style of description more closely aligned with social realism: “It is a scene which 
hangs upon the eye and the memory, striking, grand, almost sublime, and above all eminently 
foreign. No English painter would choose such a subject for an English landscape; no one in a 
picture would take it for English. It might pass for one of those scenes which have furnished 
models to Salvator Rosa. Tom’s cottage was, however, very thoroughly national and 
characteristic; a low, ruinous hovel, the door of which was fastened with sedulous attention to 
security, that contrasted strangely with the tattered thatch of the roof, and the half broken 
windows” (36). The narrator uses a number of competing registers of value in this passage, and 
the clashes between them produce a confused assessment of the scene as a whole. The dominant 
contrast in this description is phrased in national terms, the wild, “eminently foreign” scenery 
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contrasting with the “thoroughly national and characteristic” appearance of Tom’s home. A 
second contrast, between the austere sublimity of the valley and the “low, ruinous hovel,” invites 
interpretation either as a contrast between the highly aestheticized landscape and the sobering 
realism of the cottage, or else as a less jarring contrast between two aesthetic registers: the 
sublime and the picturesque. The national contrast and the aesthetic contrast align imperfectly, 
and signify differently depending on whether the description of the “low, ruinous hovel” is read 
as an attempt at social realism, or as a celebration of the homely picturesque. Either the narrator 
is celebrating the English picturesque above the overblown, foreign sublime of Rosa’s paintings, 
or else she is turning a critical eye on English complacency itself by implying that a pathetic 
image of abject rural poverty is the very quintessence of Englishness. While the first appears 
more in line with the cheerful, conversational tone that Mitford maintains throughout Our 
Village, it is difficult not to see a critical attentiveness to the living conditions of the rural poor 
both in the description of the decrepit hovel, and in the sketch’s tragic conclusion. 
 In the final pages of “Tom Cordery,” the hovel ceases to be merely a visual component of 
a landscape and becomes instead an indirect cause of Tom’s death. Mitford’s narrator assumes 
an uncharacteristically diagnostic position, making a noticeable effort to parse the social causes 
of Tom’s death beyond the immediate cause of typhus fever: 
The roof fairly fell in during the deep snow of last winter, killing, as poor Tom 
observed, two as fine litters of rabbits as ever were kittened. Remotely, I have no 
doubt that he himself fell a sacrifice to this misadventure. The overseer, to whom 
he applied to reinstate his beloved habitation, decided that the walls would never 
bear another roof, and removed him and his wife, as an especial favor, to a tidy, 
snug, comfortable room in the workhouse. The workhouse! From that hour poor 
Tom visibly altered. He lost his hilarity and independence. It was a change such 
as he had himself often inflicted, a complete change of habits, a transition from 
the wild to the tame. (175) 
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Tom’s death from typhus follows shortly after his forced domestication, and Mitford’s narrator 
records it in an incongruously humorous tone, attributing his contraction of the disease to the 
excessive, unaccustomed luxury of the workhouse: “Alas, poor Tom! The warmth, and snugness, 
and comfort, whole windows, and entire ceiling, were the death of him. Alas, poor Tom!” (176). 
The narrator’s tonally jarring attribution of Tom’s death to a surfeit of comfort, rather than to its 
glaring absence, is a strikingly unsuccessful attempt to contain the bleak desolation of Tom’s end 
within the conventional emotional contours of the rural sketch as a genre. Yet the causal 
connections Mitford’s narrator makes in this passage betray a concerted effort to contextualize 
Tom’s suffering by attributing it to environmental conditions. There are, in fact, two 
environmentally-caused deaths in “Tom Cordery”: the deaths of the rabbits, who are directly 
killed by the collapse of the decrepit cottage, and Tom’s own, which Mitford attributes directly 
to the too-hospitable workhouse environment, but insists that “remotely,” it too has been caused 
by the inadequacy of Tom’s living conditions. Even Mitford’s insistence that Tom’s death results 
from the physical conditions of the workhouse—even if she specifies that it is the comfort, not 
the inadequacy, of these conditions that is to blame—is only a step away from the more 
systematic critiques of impoverished living conditions that were soon to emerge in Edwin 
Chadwick’s 1842 report on The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population and Frederick 
Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844. One would barely have to 
rewrite the narrative sequence of “Tom Cordery” in order to recast it from nostalgic idyll (a 
genre in which Cordery’s death sits very uneasily) into an indictment of the effects of the Poor 
Law (Tom figuring as a forerunner, perhaps, of Our Mutual Friend’s Betty Higden) and of 
unjust landlords (Tom’s overseer an early type of Middlemarch’s careless Mr. Brook).  
   62 
 While it would be a stretch to read Our Village as trenchant social critique, Mitford’s 
movement towards a dynamic conception of environment, and towards an understanding of 
environmental influence as potentially detrimental in its effects, points towards an emerging 
sense of the organism-environment relationship as an object of critical—and narrative—scrutiny 
rather than descriptive lyrical celebration. That such an opening for critique should appear in a 
rural sketch is surprising, given that genre’s alliance to the timeless, edenic idyll as a mode in 
which to present the relationship between an individual and his or her environment. 
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Chapter 2:  
The Biological Media of George Eliot’s Novels 
 
Although George Eliot is a novelist no less engaged in the provincial mode than Mary 
Russell Mitford, Eliot is rarely thought of primarily as a locodescriptive writer, and certainly not 
as a nature writer. If Mitford’s descriptions of her natural surroundings in Our Village sprawl 
into painterly tableaux that overwhelm most of the narrative content of her rural sketches, Eliot’s 
description does something nearly the opposite: it annexes and fuses itself so seamlessly to her 
fiction’s narrative and psychological pull that to call the content of her descriptions “natural” in 
any ecological sense seems willfully perverse. Even when her descriptive passages focus on 
plants, trees, or landscape, as they not infrequently do, they are so ostentatiously filtered through 
individual or cultural consciousness—whether that of the narrator, or of the characters—that it 
seems more accurate to read them as representations of consciousness for which the content of 
the representation is relatively arbitrary, than as a faithful representation of any externally 
existing phenomenon. 
The strange, prefatory chapter of The Mill on the Floss, one of Eliot’s most self-
consciously provincial novels, consists almost entirely of landscape description, but the 
metaphoric and psychological saturation of her prose showily pulls away from the “merely” 
loco-descriptive mode of Our Village even as she clearly references and emulates it. The 
chapter’s opening paragraph lovingly describes the pastoral surroundings of Dorlcote Mill, the 
protagonist Maggie’s home, from an initially undisclosed perspective: 
A wide plain, where the broadening Floss hurries on between its green banks to 
the sea, and the loving tide, rushing to meet it, checks its passage with an 
impetuous embrace. On this mighty tide the black ships--laden with the fresh-
scented fir-planks, with rounded sacks of oil-bearing seed, or with the dark glitter 
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of coal--are borne along to the town of St. Ogg's, which shows its aged, fluted red 
roofs and the broad gables of its wharves between the low wooded hill and 
theriver-brink, tingeing the water with a soft purple hue under the transient glance 
of this February sun. Far away on each hand stretch the rich pastures, and the 
patches of dark earth made ready for the seed of broad-leaved green crops, or 
touched already with the tint of the tender-bladed autumn- sown corn. There is a 
remnant still of last year's golden clusters of beehive-ricks rising at intervals 
beyond the hedgerows; and everywhere the hedgerows are studded with trees; the 
distant ships seem to be lifting their masts and stretching their red-brown sails 
close  among the branches of the spreading ash. Just by the red-roofed town the 
tributary Ripple flows with a lively current into the Floss. How lovely the little 
river is, with its dark changing wavelets! It seems to me like a living companion 
while I wander along the bank, and listen to its low, placid voice, as to the voice 
of one who is deaf and loving. I remember those large dipping willows. I 
remember the stone bridge. (3-4) 
 
Several features of this passage betray a strong stylistic debt, even a self-conscious one, to the 
direct, unmediated form of Mitford’s village sketches. As though miming the descriptive 
techniques of Our Village, Eliot employs the present tense, giving the impression of an 
individual gaze surveying a scene piece by piece in an unmediated moment-to-moment process. 
The description’s opening sentence fragment gives a sense of unfiltered, sensory registration, as 
though the image of the wide plain were wrought back on the enjoying sense without an 
intervening organizing or interpretive principle. The narrator’s exclamation of delight—“How 
lovely the little river is, with its dark changing wavelets!”—purports to record a surfeit of 
pleasurable experience that bubbles over from description into exclamation, a rhetorical 
technique that Mitford uses to such excess in her sketches that to the (rare) modern reader of 
Mitford it often seems cloying.  
But even as this passage references selected formal and rhetorical features of Mitford’s 
description, each of these features is also undercut in a way that detracts from its seeming 
immediacy and transparency. The sustained, immersive use of the present tense is undermined 
by the abrupt invocation of nostalgia in the paragraph’s final two sentences, which seem to 
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dissipate the preceding description into a nostalgic mirage that suggests more about the 
narratorial voice’s psychology than about the landscape itself: “I remember those large dipping 
willows. I remember the stone bridge.” The immediacy of the opening sentence-fragment is 
outweighed by subsequent observations that suggest a more interpretive, temporalized 
knowledge of the surrounding landscape, such as the identification of the green “tint of the 
tender-bladed . . . corn” on the fields as “autumn-sown,” and the assessment that the “golden 
clusters of beehive-ricks” are “last year’s.” The attempt to arrest the “lovely . . . little river” into 
a static tableau by means of exclamation is in tension with the “dark changing wavelets” that 
identify change and transience as the image’s main feature. The tension between immediate 
pictorialism, on the one hand, and a more submerged intimation of temporal change and loss, on 
the other, surfaces in the next paragraph as a tension within the narrator’s consciousness, when 
we learn that the scene just described is in fact a lost childhood Eden, a descriptive reverie from 
which the narrator awakes as from a dream, and plunges into the novel proper. 
This sense of psychological or symbolic overdetermination is an aspect of Eliotic 
description that critics have frequently remarked upon, both positively and skeptically. Barbara 
Hardy, Elaine Freedgood, and Andrew H. Miller all note that Eliot’s descriptive language 
typically exceeds its basic local function of creating what Roland Barthes called an effet de reel, 
the level of descriptive detail conducive to creating a mimetic fictional reality, and instead forms 
a commentary on the themes or designed “meaning” of the novel as a whole. In all three of their 
accounts, Eliot’s description is characterized by an unusual degree of instability between the 
elements that ascend or ossify into symbolic significance, and those that remain on the sensory, 
denotative level of “mere” description, to which no symbolic or metaphorical significance need 
be attached. As Hardy puts it, many scenes of Eliot’s fiction “are filled with prolific examples of 
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the detail which is neither totally symbolic nor painstakingly naturalistic . . . The surface is not 
evenly transparent, the detail sometimes does and sometimes does not create an epitome” (57). 
Miller argues that the prolific metaphoricity of Eliot’s description creates a sense of rich 
meaningfulness in the text, folding into the reading process an emphasis on the value of 
perceiving significance in the details of one’s life: Eliot’s endlessly dense networks of possible 
metaphor, he claims, are “committed to cultivating in her readers an emotionally powerful 
appreciation of meaningfulness and vulnerability—our engagement with meaningful objects and 
our desperation when their significance vanishes” (163). Freedgood argues more skeptically that 
Eliot’s narrator works aggressively to “curtail” the disruptive readerly potential of her dense 
descriptions by reducing the “infinite individual possibilities for metonymic interpretation” to 
“proper metaphor,” a goal she achieves by exhaustively pursuing all the metonymic associations 
of a described object before fixing it with a dominant, metaphorical meaning. 
 This chapter suggests that Eliot’s unusually rich, emotionally and symbolically infused 
descriptions in her fiction are not merely bids to imbue her texts with an intensive and unique 
aesthetic “literariness,” as Freedgood and Miller would have it. Instead, I connect the enriched 
description of surrounding milieux in Eliot’s writing—their powerful affective charge, their 
organic inseparability from narrative and psychological drive—to an emerging notion in a range 
of British sciences in the 1850s of “the environment” as newly intimate, relentlessly dynamic, 
and foundational to life itself. In the writings of biological, psychological, and sociological 
organicist thinkers such as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and G.H. Lewes, with all of whose 
writings Eliot was deeply familiar, the 1850s saw the emergence of a conception of “the 
environment” as an abstract yet influential entity that developed in intimate reciprocity with the 
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individual and exerted a powerful influence over him or her.18 This meant that the inanimate and 
non-human world, whether natural, cultivated, manufactured, or some combination of these, 
could no longer be conceived as a mere pictorial backdrop for human action and development, 
but was instead intimately and materially involved in those processes.  
The environment’s newly acquired prestige as an explanatory rubric for much of what 
takes place in human affairs meant that the novelist was no longer justified in representing 
“character” as the realist novel’s sole agent; the paraphernalia of circumstance that surrounded 
individual characters—including other characters, social conventions, landscapes, domestic 
interiors, clothing, even the weather—were no less vital to fiction’s action. Eliot used a several 
different terms for this array of ambient conditions, but the one to which she returned most 
frequently was the idea of a “medium” in which individuals move and live. In a letter to R.H. 
Hutton in 1863, Eliot defended her inclusion of an overburdening excess of historical detail in 
Romola through reference to this idea of a medium, which, she insists, is central to all of her 
fiction: “It is the habit of my imagination,” she writes, “to strive after as full a vision of the 
medium in which a character moves as of the character itself. The psychological causes which 
prompted me to give such details of Florentine life and history as I have given, are precisely the 
same as those which determined me in giving the details of English village life in ‘Silas Marner,’ 
or the ‘Dodson’ life, out of which were developed the destinies of poor Tom and Maggie” (97). 
Eliot’s justification of her descriptive practices is significant, both in its emphasis on the idea of 
a biological-sounding “life” as the goal of her representational aims, and especially in its 
insistence on the link between the static detail of description and the dynamic development of 
plot: the “destinies of poor Tom and Maggie” are “developed” directly from the “details English 
                                                
18 For an account of the environment concept’s rise, see Mao, chapter 1. 
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village life.” The stasis typically associated with description is not easily disentangled from the 
dynamism of development. 
In this chapter, I examine two of Eliot’s novels in which environmental description plays 
a central role. I aim throughout not merely to trace a scientific concept as it appears discursively 
in Eliot’s fiction, but rather to ask how Eliot shapes the basic fabric of a fictional world—the 
creation of a described environment—in a way that responds to, and puts to use, the newfound 
emphasis in the mid-century sciences on the environment as an essential part of creaturely and 
human life. Although in dialogue with the theories of organism-environment interaction 
propounded by thinkers such as Comte and Spencer, I suggest, Eliot’s unique mode of 
conjoining emotion with description works against the determinism associated with these 
positivist accounts by imagining characters’ interactions with their environments in an affective, 
rather than a strictly causal, register. In both The Mill and the Floss (1860) and Middlemarch 
(1872), Eliot uses the descriptive representation of environment to reimagine the novel’s central 
emotional categories, imagining environments that act alternately as objects around which 
emotion constellates or as conduits through which it travels. In The Mill on the Floss, I argue, 
Eliot’s emotionally suffused description of the landscape in which the novel’s protagonist 
matures correlates to the novel’s fascination with a form of desire I call “environmental 
desire”—a diffusive, generalized desire for an ambient set of surroundings that offers an 
alternative to the eroticized desire for a specific, concrete object, a type of desire whose 
exclusivity the novel finds persistently vexing and potentially dangerous. In Middlemarch, Eliot 
imagines a model of sympathy in which the recognition of a shared environment or “medium” 
plays a central role in the individual’s ability to sympathize with another; an environment acts as 
a communicative medium for sympathetic connection. 
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The Organism-Environment Relationship in Mid-Victorian Organicist Thought 
 During the 1850s, the singular concept of an “environment” for all living organisms 
became central to Victorian biology and sociology, as major scientific writers such as Auguste 
Comte and Herbert Spencer came to define life itself as a phenomenon constituted by the 
relationship of an organism with its environment. Arguing against earlier vitalist biologists such 
as Xavier Bichat, who had held that life was a deeply interior, intrinsic force that the organism 
had to defend and protect from external impingements, Comte and Spencer insisted that life was 
a continual process of exchange between an organism and its external surroundings. Though 
originally coined by Carlyle in 1827, the word “environment” did not achieve widespread use 
until the mid-1850s. As historian of science Trevor Pearce has noted, the first appearance of 
environment as a singular term was in Harriet Martineau’s 1853 translation of Comte’s Cours de 
philosophie positive, in which Martineau used the word to translate Comte’s use of the French 
term “milieu” to denote the sum total of external influences acting on an organism. Spencer, who 
read Martineau’s translation of Comte at George Eliot’s behest in the early 1850s, subsequently 
adopted the term in his 1855 Principles of Psychology, and continued to use the concept of 
environment throughout his biological, psychological, and sociological writings during the 1850s 
and 1860s. Comte, and to a greater extent Spencer, relied on the idea of organism-environment 
interaction as the foundation for their theories of biological life, and, by extension, of social and 
psychological life as well. For both thinkers, the environment was no less essential to life than 
were the inner workings of the body. As Comte wrote in his Philosophie positive, “the harmony 
between the living being and the corresponding medium (as I shall call its environment) 
evidently characterizes the fundamental condition of life; whereas on Bichat’s supposition, the 
whole environment of living beings tends to destroy them” (360, qtd. in Pearce, 248). Spencer 
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followed Comte in insisting that “the changes or processes displayed by a living body, are 
specially related to the changes or processes in the environment” (Principles of Biology, 79), 
going so far as to offer a basic definition of life itself as “the continuous adjustment of internal 
relations to external relations” (PB 99). This emphasis on a constant, gradual adjustment between 
organism and medium in the writings of Comte and Spencer avoids both the tragic overtones of 
total environmental determinism and the complacent confidence of Paleyan natural theology in 
which perfect harmony between environment and organism always obtains. Instead, their 
organicist theory enabled an affective orientation towards environment that fell on an 
intermediate spectrum between such emotional and philosophical extremes. 
 Although the work of Darwin is now a major reference point for the idea of 
environmental influence, chiefly in the context of the theory of natural selection, Darwin in fact 
very rarely used the term “environment” in his writings, preferring the more capacious but less 
specific phrase “conditions of life.” The widespread mid-nineteenth-century interest in the idea 
of environmental influence owed more to the scientific and sociological writings of Comte and 
Spencer than to Darwin’s. This is largely because the environment in Darwin’s natural selection 
theory operated on a temporal scale so vast as to be applicable only with difficulty to day-to-day 
human experience, or even to the scale of an individual human life. Whereas for Comte and 
Spencer, individual organisms could adjust to their environment on a perceptible scale—the 
dynamic “adjustment of internal relations to external relations” occurring constantly throughout 
the lifetime of a cell, an individual, a community, and a nation—for Darwin, such adjustment 
took place mainly on the level of the species rather than the individual, with ill-adjusted 
individuals being weeded out by the environmental pressures of natural selection, rather than 
adapting to their environments gradually over time. When Darwin writes, in On the Origin of 
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Species, that “natural selection is daily and hourly . . . working, whenever and wherever 
opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and 
inorganic conditions of life” (76-77), the ever-improving intimacy between the “being” and its 
“conditions of life” is a relationship, not between an individual and the environment, but between 
a whole species and its environment. For Comte and Spencer, by contrast, this ever-improving 
intimacy was occurring from moment to moment, as well as from epoch to epoch.  
 The biological writings of Comte and Spencer imagined an environment distinguished by 
several unique features that set it apart from Darwin’s concept of the environment. First, it was 
always described as a singular, abstract concept—an “environment” or “medium” rather than 
Darwin’s preferred “conditions of life”—that theoretically encompassed a diverse and 
heterogeneous range of factors and influences, but was always referred to in shorthand as a 
singular entity, leading those who wrote about “the environment” often to imagine it 
aesthetically as a unified entity or homogeneous substance. Secondly, its degree of determinism 
was often qualified or left ambiguous, which meant that individuals were not necessarily 
understood to be helpless at the mercy of their powerful surroundings, as they often were in 
Darwinist accounts, but were rather protected and nourished as much as they were shaped and 
determined by them. Thirdly and finally, organicist science expanded the environment concept 
beyond the limits of biology, proposing that it could be applied with equal validity to social 
phenomena as to biological ones. This migration of the concept of environment outside of the 
scientific discipline where it originated helped weakened distinctions between nature and culture, 
suggesting that humans and human societies were comparable to non-human organisms in their 
modes of development. 
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 The use of the singular terms “medium” and “environment” to refer to an organism’s 
influencing surroundings, in place of plural terms such as “conditions” or “circumstances,” had a 
subtle but significant effect on the ways in which Victorian thinkers envisioned the organism-
medium relationship. As Pearce has noted, its subsumption of the array of individual influencing 
factors into a single noun effected a “progressive concealment of the different elements that 
make up the world outside the organism and the relationship between these elements” (249). 
Concomitantly, the singularized term rhetorically conferred a unified agency (or, sometimes, a 
unified vulnerability) on the abstract entity called “the environment,” providing a convenient 
shorthand for describing the environment as a sum of causes, but also making it more difficult to 
distinguish between those causes. On the level of representation and aesthetics, this 
singularization invited thinkers to envision individuals’ environments as ubiquitous substances or 
media, like the liquid or gaseous fluids that support invertebrate and single-celled organisms, 
rather than the motley, discontinuous sets of objects and substances that actually make up the 
environments of plants and vertebrates. Indeed, the invertebrate organism is the privileged 
example throughout Comte and Spencer’s writings about the relations between organism and 
medium, and is treated as a prototype of life in its most basic form. The utter material 
dependence of the marine invertebrate on its liquid medium only makes visible the intimacy that, 
according to Comte and Spencer, obtains equally, if in a more abstract way, in the relationship 
between more complex organisms and their homogeneous milieux or media. To visualize a dog 
or a person swimming about in the fluid, airy atmosphere as a protozoa swims through water 
thus has a certain diagrammatic truth to it, insofar as it provides a concrete image for the abstract 
but not always perceptible truth about the relationship between more highly-developed life forms 
and their world. The aesthetic promoted by the singularized notion of environment can thus be 
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described as an ambient aesthetic, a sense of an almost ineffable continuity between objects, 
media, substances—a heightened awareness of physical bodies as always in communication with 
something ubiquitous and proximate.  
 This palpable ubiquity of the environment as it was imagined by Spencer and Comte was 
linked to a sense, modified from Lamarck, of the organism’s relationship with its environment as 
affectively charged in ways both positive and negative. Unlike a Darwinian environment, in 
which the “conditions of life” are primarily a winnowing agent, indifferently eliminating ill-
adapted individuals, Spencer and Comte both embraced a more flexible view of the organism-
medium relationship, acknowledging that it could on occasion be agonistic, but also insisting that 
environments and organisms evolve in tandem towards higher degrees of complexity, the life of 
each individual always pressing towards greater harmony with its environment. Comte insisted, 
for example, that although “certain perturbations of the medium occasionally destroy life, its 
influence is, on the whole, preservative; and the causes of injury and death proceed at least as 
often from necessary and spontaneous modifications of the organism as from external 
influences” (304-5). In his Principles of Biology, Spencer uses the Paleyan term 
“correspondence” as a general word for the varying degrees of adjustment that the organism 
makes to its environment. Insisting that “the changes or processes displayed by a living body are 
specially related to the changes or processes in its environment” (74), he nevertheless finds this 
special relationship to be almost inarticulable: “we have no word sufficiently general to 
comprehend all forms of this relation between the organism and its medium, and yet sufficiently 
specific to convey and adequate idea of the relation; . . . the word correspondence seems the least 
objectionable” (79).  For both Spencer and Comte, the organism-medium relationship is intimate 
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but highly variable, running along a spectrum of affective orientations from the agonistic to the 
profoundly nurturing. 
 While this reciprocal conception of environments and organisms shared some features 
with earlier Lamarckian models, organicist thinkers like Comte and Spencer departed from 
earlier frameworks in their ambitious application of biological models to social phenomena. 
When Spencer insisted that the social milieu was a “medium” to which humans respond and 
adapt just as organisms respond and adapt to their natural media, he meant it literally rather than 
metaphorically, making no ontological distinction between physico-natural and social 
phenomena. Historian of science Georges Canguilhem has noted that the rise in the nineteenth 
century of the idea that biological life is tied to its milieu correlated to an embrace of forms of 
historical and social thought in which “human history is unintelligible without understanding the 
connection of humanity to the land and to the whole earth” (15). For Spencer and Comte, this 
basic dependence of human life and history on a physical environment was rendered even more 
complex by the development of social organizations, which formed another layer of 
environmental influence—psychological and social, rather than biological—on top of purely 
physical phenomena. At every level, though, biological and social development was thought to 
proceed according to the same law of the “adjustment of internal relations to external relations,” 
of organism to environment.  
 Eliot and G.H. Lewes were very much at the center of this burgeoning discourse about 
environment-organism relations in the 1850s. Lewes was instrumental in popularizing Comte’s 
Cours de philosophie positive to the English-reading public through a series of essays 
summarizing Comte’s philosophical system, published in the Fortnightly Review in the early 
1850s. Lewes’s own biological and psychological writings—particularly his Problems of Life 
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and Mind—were profoundly influenced by Comte and Spencer’s theories of organism-
environment interaction, and employed much of the same vocabulary as they did in their 
writings. Eliot, as is well known, was close friends with and romantically entangled with 
Spencer, and corresponded with him and others at length about his own and Comte’s theories. 
Yet perhaps the most vivid evidence of Eliot’s and Lewes’s interest in contemporary biological 
theories is the writings they both produced during a natural history excursion to Jersey, the Scilly 
Isles, Ifracombe, and Tenby in May and June of 1856, as Eliot was also preparing to write The 
Mill on the Floss. 
 The body of writings that Eliot and Lewes produced during their natural history 
excursion to Jersey, the Scilly Isles, Ilfracombe, and Tenby in May and June of 1856 shows how 
much the idea of the relationship between organisms and their environments was at the forefront 
of their minds. During this trip Lewes wrote Sea-Side Studies, a work of popular science 
recounting his collection of and experiments on marine invertebrates, and throughout the book he 
remarks extensively on the organism-medium interactions observable in these creatures. Unlike 
Whitean or Paleyan natural history, Lewes’s book is less interested in externally observable 
behaviors or diagrammable anatomical forms than in the occulted, dynamic life processes that 
constitute organism-environment exchange on the most microscopic, elemental level. Noting that 
mollusks assimilate the materials for their shells from the “lime” dissolved in ocean water, for 
example, Lewes links this microscopic activity to the ocean currents that structure whole 
ecosystems: “were there no secreting animals in the sea capable of removing from the water its 
surplus lime, the stormy winds might agitate its surface, and rouse its waves like troops of 
roaring lions shaking back their manes of spray; but there would be no strong currents with 
beneficent effect; and in a little while the ocean would become a huge salt-lake. . . . The sea is a 
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great lime-quarry; but the lime is arranged in beautiful forms, and subserves a great organic end. 
Not only are animals thus furnished with houses and solid structures, but the water, relieved of 
its excess, is enabled to flow in mighty currents. . . . Was I not justified in saying that the 
Mollusc was deeply interesting in its relations to the great forces of the Universe? Does not this 
one example show how the great Whole is indissolubly connected with its minutest parts?” (358-
360). The book is experimental as much as it is observational, most of Lewes’s specimens taken 
from tide-pools and stored in glass jars and aquaria in the cottages where he and Eliot lodged in 
the towns they visited. The experiments Lewes conducted on his specimen included dissection 
and vivisection (a practice he defends in the book by arguing that invertebrates cannot feel pain 
for lack of a central nervous system), but the type of experiment the book most frequently 
records is the immersion of specimens to different environments or media with an eye to testing 
their capacities to thrive under different conditions.  
 The journal Eliot kept during this trip show that she enthusiastically accompanied Lewes 
in the collection and organization of the invertebrate specimen collection. She shares his naive 
excitement at the discovery of their first anemone in Ilfracombe, noting that they “afterwards 
disdained to gather [the very common organism] as much as if it had been a nettle” (“Ilfracombe 
Journal” 243). When the anemones fail to attach to the deep glass jars in which they are initially 
stored, she recalls, “I was constantly called upon to turn up my sleeve and plunge in my arm up 
to the elbow to set things right” (243). But even as Eliot was up to her elbows in this joint natural 
history project, her writings from the trip also display an expansive interest in applying the 
biological framework of these activities to the local human communities that she was observing 
no less closely than Lewes was observing his invertebrates. Eliot’s detailed descriptions of the 
natural landscapes and small towns of the southwest coasts of England translate social and 
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cultural existence into biological terms, re-naturalizing human habitations as an outgrowth of 
landscape, and comically reducing human existence to the level of invertebrate life. Describing 
the tiny town of Capstone viewed from a neighbouring ridge, she remarks that 
In hilly districts, where houses and clusters of houses look so tiny against the 
huge limbs of Mother Earth one cannot help thinking of man as a parasitic 
animal—an epizoon making his abode on the skin of the planetary organism. In a 
flat country house or a town looks imposing—there is nothing to rival it in height, 
and we may imagine the earth a mere pedestal for us. But when one sees a house 
stuck on the side of a great hill, and still more a number of houses looking like a 
few barnacles clustered on the side of a great rock, we begin to think of the strong 
family likeness between ourselves and all other building, burrowing house-
appropriating and shell-secreting animals. (241-42) 
 
The most basic point of kinship between humans and other living things is, for Eliot, their 
dependence on a supporting environment—“the planetary organism” upon which human 
habitations look like barnacles, and which aligns us with “all other building, burrowing house-
appropriating and shell-secreting” beings; in other words, beings that live by managing the 
boundary between the body and what lies outside it.  
 Eliot’s readiness to translate her descriptions of human society into the language of 
organism-environment interaction carries over, as I will show in the next two sections, into her 
fiction. Yet whereas for thinkers such as Comte, Spencer, and Lewes, the theory of organism-
medium relationship is always put in service of a theory of historical development, Eliot’s fiction 
traces out the affective resonances that I have been suggesting inhered, but were never made 
explicit, in the mid-nineteenth-century biological concept of environment.  
Environmental Desire in The Mill on the Floss 
 
 Critics have tended to read The Mill on the Floss as a novel about the tensions between 
desire, on the one hand, and the constraints and demands of social cohesion and cultural 
determination, on the other. Different arguments have placed different values on either side of 
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this opposition. Many feminist critics have read Maggie’s unruly desires, particularly her desire 
for Stephen Guest, as a laudable aspiration for female autonomy and self-determination that is 
denied by an oppressively patriarchal social order.19 Others, including Rachel Ablow, have 
suggested that Eliot represents Maggie’s desires as an ethical danger whose egoism threatens to 
disrupt the organic model of sympathy-based community that Eliot prized so highly.20 Despite 
this disagreement about whether the novel celebrates or chastises Maggie’s erotic desire, the 
foundational opposition between (internal) desire and (external) social pressure is rarely 
questioned, resulting in seemingly irreconcilable readings of the novel as either a bitter feminist 
tragedy, or an austerely conservative ethical argument about the obligations of organic 
community. 
 In this section of my chapter, I propose that these readings much too narrowly 
circumscribe the forms and objects of emotion that count as desire in The Mill on the Floss. 
Instead of structuring erotic desire as an intense, singular attachment to one object, an attachment 
that is then assailed from without by a barrage of unwanted obligations and prohibitions, the 
novel envisions desire as a diffuse network of multiple attachments that align or compete in 
unpredictable ways. While this more diffuse vision of desire certainly includes erotic 
attachments, it also registers an equally powerful if less well-defined feeling that, I suggest, is 
partially modeled on the newly intimate model of organism-environment interdependence in 
mid-Victorian biological science. The intensely embodied sensation of dependence on, and 
                                                
19 See, for example, Auerbach and Jacobus, both of whom argue that Maggie’s female desire is 
so socially subversive that it requires of Eliot’s narrator a departure from realist, analytic modes 
of representation. More recently, Sara Ahmed has argued that Maggie’s desirousness offers a 
positive model of feminist “willfulness” that refuses to be silenced by the disapproving 
judgments of a patriarchal social environment. 
20 Ablow argues that Eliot privileges affective exchanges more conducive to social cohesion, 
such as remorse and gratitude, over individual erotic desire and fulfillment. See Ablow, 87. 
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desire for, a familiar and benign environment, is a feeling that The Mill on the Floss represents 
frequently, lavishing as much evocative lyrical description on its elaboration as on any of the 
novel’s accounts of erotic seduction. In what follows, I argue that this elusive but ubiquitous 
feeling that I am calling “environmental desire” offers an alternative to the singular, possessive 
problems of erotic desire in The Mill on the Floss. Deliberately confusing the distinction between 
desire and obligation, between freedom and environmental determination, that is so often 
mapped onto the novel, Eliot on the contrary imagines an ethically ambiguous attachment to 
environment that pulls both Maggie and the reader back towards the submergence of the self in a 
wider context, whether natural or social. Its ambiguity arises from the fact that this feeling works 
both in the service of a punitive and conservative status quo, and as a source of self-
transcendence that encourages a widely-distributed attentiveness to the inanimate world and to 
human community. 
 In aiming to contest the emotional exclusivity that is often accorded to romantic love in 
this novel, I draw on the recent work of Talia Schaffer, who suggests that, in the characters of 
Tom Tulliver and Philip Wakem, the novel offers Maggie the possibility of “familiar 
marriage”—a form of Victorian marriage, often between proximate friends or cousins, based not 
on erotic desire but rather on the pleasures and reassurances of longstanding “companionship, 
alliance, and friendship” (4). Familiar marriage offers among other things the security and 
comfort of remaining supported by one’s already-existing network of kinship structures and 
community ties, rather than risking one’s fortunes and identity with a single, often relatively 
unknown stranger, such as Stephen Guest. In a similar vein, Rachel Ablow argues that The Mill 
on the Floss militates against the “awful exclusivity” (73) of marriage by repeatedly aborting 
Maggie’s marriage plot, favoring instead affective connections such as gratitude and remorse, 
   80 
which are more favorable to “establish[ing] ethically productive relationships between 
subjectivities when those subjectivities threaten to compete with or lose themselves in another” 
(94). It is my contention that Eliot’s representation of affective attachment in The Mill on the 
Floss expands still further, beyond attachments to other subjectivities, to include also 
attachments to environments and physical surrounds. My argument has two interrelated strands: 
first, I argue that The Mill on the Floss sets up an opposition between two categories of desire: 
the possessive desire that attaches to a singular object or person (thus including both the erotic 
desire for a person, and the economic desire for a piece of property), and a form of attachment I 
am calling “environmental desire,” which attaches to a diffuse surrounding or supportive 
medium, and privileges coexistence above consumption, consummation, or ownership. Secondly, 
I argue that Eliot’s privileging of environmental over possessive desire works to blur the 
opposition often read onto the novel, whereby individual autonomy and environmental 
determination are always at odds. Instead, the novel’s economic and erotic plots often conflate 
the experience environmental influence with the experience of erotic desire. To link both 
arguments in one sentence: the opposition the novel sets up between possessive and 
environmental desire results in the deliberate blurring of the agonistic opposition between desire 
and determination. 
 The few moments in The Mill on the Floss where the narrator uses explicitly biological 
language to describe the relationships of her characters with their environments do not conjure 
the sense of harmonious intimacy that mid-nineteenth-century biology often attributed to this 
relationship. Whereas for Spencer and Lewes, the relationship between an organism and its 
medium is usually characterized by a cooperative dynamism, Eliot’s narrator consistently uses 
the Comtean term “medium” to describe a state of “stuckness” or immobility within an 
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undesirable state of consciousness. The narrator uses the term to describe Tom’s struggles at 
school, noting that his “school course . . . went on with mill-like monotony, his mind continuing 
to move with a slow, half-stifled pulse in a medium of uninteresting or unintelligible ideas” 
(186). Following the disastrous loss of Dorlcote Mill and Mr. Tulliver’s ensuing illness, “Mrs. 
Tulliver’s mind was reduced to such confusion by living in this strange medium of 
unaccountable sorrow, against which she continually appealed by asking, ‘Oh dear, what have I 
done to deserve worse than other women?’ that Maggie began to suspect her poor mother’s wits 
were quite going” (255). Mr. Tulliver’s absorption of the fatal letter that sends him into a coma is 
slow, the narrator tells us, because “he took in the sense of a statement very slowly through the 
medium of written or printed characters” (198), and the narrator characterizes the 
communication problems in the Tulliver marriage by comparing Mrs. Tulliver to a goldfish 
trapped in a glass bowl: “After running her head against the same resisting medium for thirteen 
years [she] would go at it again to-day with undulled alacrity” (75). Eliot’s use of the term in all 
of these cases is surprisingly diverse in terms of the thing being described as a medium—it can 
be print, an emotion, an intellectual content, or a marital relationship. Where the term lacks 
diversity is in its affective connotations, which are strikingly uniform: in each of these cases, the 
individual’s relationship with the medium in which she finds herself is one of resistance, 
frustration, and immobility. Far from promoting an organism’s progressive development or 
growth as they do in the organic development theory of Lewes and Spencer, “media” in the 
world of The Mill on the Floss actually tend to inhibit and prevent such growth. Eliot’s insistence 
on the intractable resistance of media in general is so strong that in some of these cases it causes 
a kind of torsion within the metaphor itself, where she seems to misrecognize the component of 
the situation that is most obviously a medium. In comparing Mrs. Tulliver to a goldfish, for 
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example, it would be more accurate to identify the water, rather than the glass bowl, as the 
goldfish’s “medium,” yet doing so would undermine the narrator’s larger point in this passage 
that Mrs. Tulliver, like many of the other characters in the novel, is a benighted organism 
struggling against a diffuse network of forces that are wholly external to, and obstinately 
resistant towards, her own consciousness.  
 Yet if in these abstracted, scientific modes Eliot’s narrator often emphasizes the 
obstructive, recalcitrant pull of organic media, her actual descriptions of material 
environments—both natural and built—tell a rather different story. The description of physical 
surroundings in The Mill on the Floss is imbued with intense desire from the very first page of 
the novel, a desire whose rhetoric strives to blur and transform a discrete set of surroundings into 
a ubiquitous aquatic medium that incites pleasure rather than frustration. In the opening chapter, 
as we have seen, the narrator begins by describing a landscape that centers on the river Floss and 
its tributary, the Ripple, on which Dorlcote Mill is located. “How lovely the little river is, with its 
dark, changing wavelets!” she exclaims. “It seems to me like a living companion while I wander 
along the bank and listen to its low placid voice, as to the voice of one who is deaf and loving” 
(7). The narrator’s sense of intimate companionship with the river is implicitly transferred to 
other features of her physical environment, as she recollects the “large dipping willows” and “the 
stone bridge” under the companionable influence of the river’s voice. As the description 
proceeds, the discrete features of the observable environment are fused into a generalized sense 
of liquid immersion figured by ducks submerging their heads in a nearby pond: “As I look at the 
full stream, the vivid grass, the delicate bright-green powder softening the outline of the great 
trunks and branches that gleam from under the bare purple boughs, I am in love with moistness, 
and envy the white ducks that are dipping their heads far into the water here among the withes, 
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unmindful of the awkward appearance they make in the drier world above” (7-8). The narrator’s 
declaration that she is “in love with moistness” awkwardly abdicates the dignified, 
commentatorial distance that is the usual office of the narrator of an Eliot novel, and expresses 
an uncomfortably physical desire for an actual merging of the embodied self with its material 
surroundings. Abstracting the discrete, solid features of her environment—stream, grass, moss, 
trunks, branches, and boughs—into a generalized medium of “moistness,” the narrator expresses 
a strangely primal longing for physical contact with, and immersion in, this sustaining surround, 
a shockingly immediate sensation of the liquid air or water pushing up against and permeating 
one’s very skin. As though she were one of Lewes’s invertebrates in Sea-Side Studies, the 
narrator evinces a desire for sensory evidence of her own intimate and ongoing dependence on 
an external medium that is never fully external. 
 Water’s erotic amorphousness in the prefatory chapter gives way, in the novel’s first two 
books, to a mounting conceptual tension around whether water is a supportive medium or an 
object that can be claimed and owned. Mr. Tulliver’s lawsuit over river water—the lawsuit that 
initiates the Tullivers’ financial downfall—strives to transform water from the illimitable, 
ubiquitous medium of the opening chapter, into a limited, measurable possession that can be 
owned, traded, and litigated. According to Joshua Getzler’s recent study of the history of British 
water law, water law during the first half of the nineteenth century was highly unstable but 
increasingly central to property disputes, largely because of water power’s vital role in powering 
the industrial revolution. The instability of water legislation was in large part due to the 
elemental nature of flowing water itself, its resistance to being treated as a static, bounded object. 
Getzler notes that, unlike land, “water as an ephemeral and changeable element was hard to fit 
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within any available legal or philosophical categories,” and that this “enabled water . . . to 
challenge the law’s basic ideas about all forms of property” (329).  
 Eliot’s presentation of the Tulliver lawsuit plays up this categorical difficulty in its 
description of Mr. Tulliver’s efforts to treat water as a discrete, possessible object. The narrator’s 
use of free indirect discourse to describe Tulliver’s reasoning about the lawsuit pokes sly fun at 
the mill-owner’s excessive literalism in suing the farmer Pivart, “who, having lands higher up the 
Ripple, was taking measures for their irrigation, which either were, or would be, or were bound 
to be (on the principle that water was water), an infringement on Tulliver’s legitimate share of 
water-power” (154). The narrator’s vague vacillation between tenses undermines the flatly literal 
assertion of “the principle that water was water,” pointing up the extent to which the river 
water’s fluid ubiquity resists being treated as objectifiable, measurable property. Tulliver’s direct 
dialogue reiterates this tension between an acknowledgement of water’s ontological difficulty, 
and a tautological insistence on its self-evident simplicity: “Water’s a very particular thing—you 
can’t pick it up with a pitchfork,” Tulliver laments, just before insisting that nevertheless, “It’s 
plain enough what’s the rights and wrongs of water, if you look at it straightforrard; for a river’s 
a river, and if you’ve got a mill, you must have water to turn it; and it’s no use telling me, 
Pivart’s erigation and nonsense won’t stop my wheel: I know what belongs to water better than 
that” (155-56). Despite his acknowledgment that “you can’t pick [water] up with a pitchfork,” 
the possessive language Tulliver applies to water throughout this speech strains to circumscribe 
the moving, liquid substance as a singular object, a “particular thing,” in his words. 
 Although the water lawsuit appears to have little to do, thematically, with the troubled 
marriage plot that predominates in the novel’s later books, I want to suggest that the 
representation of water in the novel’s early books sets up the novel’s overarching emotional 
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opposition between possessive and environmental desire, between the desire for exclusive 
possession of an object or person, and the desire for the mere pleasure or well-being experienced 
in the mere proximity or presence of another person or set of surroundings. Mr. Tulliver’s 
litigious, proprietary attitude towards the Ripple contrasts against that narrator’s (and Maggie’s) 
more diffuse attachment to this feature of Dorlcote Mill’s landscape in a manner analogous to the 
contrast between the exclusive claims of romantic love on Maggie, and her frequent appeals to a 
language of diffuse emotion in her efforts to explain why the bonds of erotic attachment cannot 
hold her.  
 Even as Mr. Tulliver’s lawsuit strives to transform a feature of the environment into a 
claimable piece of property, the novel simultaneously develops a rich affective language for that 
same environment of Dorlcote Mill, imagining an alternate mode of attachment to it that is 
foreshadowed in the novel’s first chapter. The few passages of Maggie’s childhood that are free 
from anger and pain—moments whose enticing memory later restrains Maggie from eloping 
with Stephen—are all fleeting instants of emotional connection to a physical surrounding. 
During one of the novel’s rare scenes in which Maggie and Tom’s childhood fleetingly embodies 
the Edenic harmony for which Maggie afterwards remembers it, the narrator remarks wistfully 
on the children’s false perception that their childhood life will never change. She then muses,  
We could never have loved the earth so well if we had had no childhood in it,—if 
it were not the earth where the same flowers come up again every spring that we 
used to gather with our tiny fingers as we sat lisping to ourselves on the grass—
the same hips and haws on the autumn hedgerows—the same redbreasts that we 
used to call ‘God’s birds,’ because they did no harm to the precious crops. . . . 
[W]hat grove of tropic palms, what strange ferns or splendid broad-petalled 
blossoms, could ever thrill such deep and delicate fibres within me as this home-
scene? These familiar  flowers, these well-remembered bird-notes, this sky, with 
its fitful brightness, these furrowed and grassy fields, each with a sort of 
personality given to it by the capricious hedgerows—such things as these are the 
mother tongue of our imagination, the language that is laden with all the subtle 
inextricable associations the fleeting hours of our childhood left behind them. Our 
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delight in the sunshine on the deep-bladed grass to-day, might be no more than 
the faint perception of wearied souls, if it were not for the sunshine and the grass 
in the far-off years which still live in us, and transform our perception into love. 
(41-42) 
 
In this passage, Eliot articulates a Wordsworthian view of the relationship between the self and 
the natural world, in which nature behaves as a benevolent, formative entity that provides a 
foundation for the eventual development of the self’s moral perception, the images of 
childhood’s natural surroundings persisting into adult memory as an ethical touchstone. Kevin 
Morrison argues that this passage develops a theory of “a precultural psychological self with 
complex affective ties to the social and physical geography of what the narrator calls a ‘home-
scene,’ or an initial sphere of activity and interrelationship” (85). The narrator’s lyrical 
description of Maggie’s intense, fulfilling attachment to a formative environment or “home-
scene”—an attachment that narrator and reader are likewise invited to share—runs against the 
grain of the narrator’s more abstract allusions throughout the novel to a recalcitrant “medium” 
that constrains, determines, and frustrates characters rather than supporting them. Instead, it 
offers a model of attachment to an environment that exceeds the possessive, one-way attachment 
of an owner to his property, as well as the total erosion of agency associated with environmental 
determinism. 
 The sensation of intimate attachment to one’s formative milieu that The Mill on the Floss 
so frequently describes resonates suggestively with the work of the mid-twentieth-century 
philologist Leo Spitzer, whose essay “Milieu and Ambiance” is now considered a classic in the 
history of climatological thought. In the essay, Spitzer tracks the history of the interrelated 
concepts of “environment,” “medium,” “milieu,” and “ambiance” in Western intellectual history, 
from ancient Greece to the early twentieth century. One of the essay’s primary concerns with 
these concepts is their varied affective resonances. Throughout the essay, Spitzer measures 
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modern understandings of milieu against the ancient Greek concept of periechein, a term for the 
atmosphere that connotes a benign, protective, and organic relationship between humans and the 
space that surrounds and supports them. Spitzer treats periechein as a lost affective ideal towards 
which humans yearn: “[It] illustrates the ability of the Greeks to conceive, not a ‘cold’ 
abstraction but a ‘warm’ one: an abstraction which is visualized and which has not severed its 
ties with life, but remains organic and close to the bodily. And the warm nuance of periechein is 
protective: absent is the modern brand of fatalistic determinism envisaged as a menacing force. 
Moreover . . .the visualized abstract term covers a wide range of life: periechein embraces 
climate, the air that feeds (spiritually as well as physically), the environment that conditions, 
ether, space, place—and the ocean embracing the earth” (187). Spitzer tells the story of this 
warm abstraction’s gradual cooling over the history of Western thought. He attributes this shift 
to a wide variety of cultural and intellectual influences, including the rise of Newtonian physics 
in the seventeenth century, which reimagined space as “an infinite chilly cosmos traversed by 
innumerable forces of attraction” (206), and nineteenth-century sociology, which emphasized 
“the determining, conditioning efficacy of the milieu,” over and above its protective connotations 
(213). He points, however, to nineteenth-century biology as a discourse in which the original 
sense of an affectively suffused periechein re-emerges after a long historical hibernation. In the 
biological writings of Lamarck and Comte, he suggests, the environmental surround becomes an 
intrinsic part of the organism’s life, rather than something that merely surrounds or determines it 
materially. Insofar as it “represents the element in which an organism lives and upon which it 
depends for sustenance,” he excitedly notes, it is “a periechein on an infinitesimal scale!” (211). 
While the elegiac tone of Spitzer’s intellectual-historical narrative may itself ask for 
historicization, Spitzer’s identification of Victorian biology as a discourse within which a 
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positive emotional orientation towards environment briefly re-emerged is useful for its evocative 
articulation of a pervasive—and often overlooked—affective resonance of the environment 
concept in the nineteenth century. It also suggests that Eliot, personally involved as she was with 
the writers at the vanguard of mid-Victorian biological thought, may have been more closely in 
dialogue with this periechein-like notion of a benign, protective medium, than with the 
Darwinian idea of a more austere, competitive environment. 
 D.W. Winnicott is another important theorist of the affective relationship between 
individual and environment, offering a compelling description of the diffuse kinds of attachment 
that bind a person emotionally to a set of surroundings. Winnicott locates the basic framework of 
this affective experience in infancy, suggesting that the infant relates emotionally to its mother 
not as one person, but as two: what he calls the “object-mother,” on the one hand, and the 
“environment-mother,” on the other. He describes their differences thus: 
It seems possible to use these words “object-mother” and “environment-mother” 
in this context to describe the vast difference that there is for the infant between 
two aspects of infant-care, the mother as object, or the owner of the part-object 
that may satisfy the infant’s urgent needs, and the mother as the person who 
wards off the unpredictable and who actively provides care in handling and in 
general management. . . . In this language it is the environment-mother who 
receives all that can be called affection and sensuous co-existence; it is the object-
mother who becomes the target for excited experience backed by crude instinct-
tension. (75-76). 
 
By describing the infant’s relationship to the “environment-mother” as a relationship 
characterized by “affection and sensuous co-existence,” Winnicott places at the foundation of 
human psychology an emotional category that is generated by a desire not for an object, but 
rather for a diffuse sense of well-being that is enabled by a protective surround. The sense of 
ease that the benign environment provides enables the infant to “relax” into this sensuous co-
existence, leading to a sense of self-dissolution that is more comforting and supportive than it is 
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traumatic or ecstatic: “the infant is able to become unintegrated, to flounder, to be in a state in 
which there is no orientation, to be able to exist for a time without being either a reactor to an 
external impingement or an active person with a direction of interest or movement” (34).  
 For Winnicott, this experience of sensuous co-existence with a benign environment is a 
developmental stage to be outgrown, but it is an affective experience to which Eliot frequently 
returns in her fiction as a state reminiscent of, but not necessarily confined to, childhood or 
infancy. In Romola, for example, Eliot’s eponymous protagonist experiences one such moment 
in a strange episode towards the end of the novel, as she floats down the Arno river in a boat 
towards a new life: “The delicious sun-rays fell on Romola and thrilled her gently like a caress. 
She lay motionless, hardly watching the scene; rather, feeling simply the presence of peace and 
beauty. While we are still in our youth there can always come, in our early waking, moments 
when mere passive existence is itself a Lethe, when the exquisiteness of subtle indefinite 
sensation creates a bliss which is without memory and without desire” (245). In this passage, the 
“subtle indefinite sensation” of perfect equilibrium with a caressing environment is elevated 
above, and set apart from, the progressive and regressive narrative propulsions of memory and 
object-oriented desire. The language of caress echoes both the embracing warmth of Spitzer’s 
periechein and the protective ubiquity of Winnicott’s environment-mother, imagining an 
emotional state of that derives pleasure from the mere “presence” of a supportive surround. The 
relationship between self and environment is less a temporalized process of influence and 
determination, than a passive co-existence in which causal boundaries between inside and 
outside become blurred. 
 In The Mill on the Floss, the desire for this state of sensuous coexistence—an 
environmentally-supported affective plenitude—is one of the novel’s most frequently and 
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lyrically described emotional states. It is, moreover, a state associated not just with Maggie, but 
also with several of the novel’s characters who are otherwised circumscribed by very narrow 
emotional ranges, such as Tom and Mr. Tulliver. The most evocative descriptions of 
environmental desire occur during the novel’s economic plot, in which Mr. Tulliver loses the 
ownership of Dorlcote Mill to his rival, Wakem. Although the novel at first presents Tulliver’s 
attachment to the mill as a litigious desire to retain hold of property, the affective intensity of this 
attachment eclipses its object, resulting in an expression of desire that emphasizes diffuse 
integration of self and environment rather than proprietary control. During the economic plot’s 
deepest crisis, Mr. Tulliver realizes that the mill is forfeit to Wakem, but accepts the humiliation 
of continuing his life at the mill as Wakem’s employee because of a nostalgic environmental 
attachment so strong that it exceeds the humiliation of the loss of ownership. The narrator 
describes Tulliver’s attachment to his habitual environment in richly sensuous terms: 
But the strongest influence of all [in Tulliver’s decision to remain at the Mill] was 
the love of the old premises where he had run about when he was a boy, just as 
Tom had done after him. . . . It was when he got able to walk about and look at all 
the old objects, that he felt the strain of this clinging affection for the old home as 
part of his life, part of himself. He couldn’t bear to think of himself living on any 
spot other than this, where he knew the sound of every gate and door, and felt the 
shape and color of every roof and weather-stain and broken hillock was good, 
because his growing senses had been fed on them. Our instructed vagrancy, which 
has hardly time to linger by the hedgerows, . . . can hardly get a dim notion of 
what an old-fashioned man like Tulliver felt for this spot, where all his memories 
centred, and where life seemed like a familiar smooth-handled tool that the 
fingers clutch with loving ease. (263) 
 
The organism-medium relationship that this passage imagines is one of nourishment and 
benevolent shaping, rather than the obstruction and resistance that emerges in the novel’s various 
other allusions to the idea of an organic medium. Mr. Tulliver’s affectionate attachment to his 
surroundings is linked to his memories of his own development under their influence, memories 
that are embedded in the very sensorium of his body: “every roof and weather-stain and broken 
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hillock was good, because his growing senses had been fed on them,” we are told. Such a vision 
of the shaping environment is no less causally deterministic than an environment represented as 
an external pressure, but the language of nourishment that Eliot uses to describe environment’s 
influence—something that feeds the “growing senses”— embraces environment as something 
that grants the determined self coherence and support, rather than a force that erodes its agency. 
This affective bond to an environment that is deemed “good” precisely because it has exerted a 
formative power over one’s own development posits an evolutionary relationship with one’s 
medium free of Darwinian evolution’s agonistic strain.  
 As the narrator proceeds to incorporate a wider cast of characters into her descriptions of 
environmental desire, there gradually emerges a set of ethical values that are consistently 
associated with this particular category of affective experience. The description in which this 
connection emerges most explicitly is narrated from the perspective of Tom Tulliver, one of the 
novel’s most ethically and emotionally brittle characters. As the young Tom approaches his 
childhood home after his first quarter at Mr. Stelling’s school, the narrator describes his longing 
for his home as an emotional experience with distinct ethical ramifications: 
The happiness of seeing the bright light in the parlor at home . . . The happiness of 
passing from the cold air to the warmth and the kisses and the smiles of that 
familiar hearth, where the pattern of the rug and the grate and the fire-irons were 
‘first ideas’ that it was no more possible to criticize than the solidity and extension 
of matter. There is no sense of ease like the ease we felt in those scenes where we 
were born, where objects became dear to us before we had known the labor of 
choice, and where the outer world seemed only an extension of our personality: 
we accepted and loved it as we accepted our own sense of existence and our 
limbs. Very commonplace, even ugly, that furniture of our early home might look 
if it were put up to auction; an improved taste in upholstery scorns it; and is not 
the striving after something better and better in our surroundings, the grand 
characteristic that distinguishes man from the brute—or, to satisfy a scrupulous 
accuracy of definition, that distinguishes the British man from the foreign brute? 
But heaven knows where that striving might lead us, if our affections had not a 
trick of twining round those old inferior things—if the loves and sanctities of our 
life had no deep and immovable roots in memory. . . . There is no better reason 
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for preferring this elderberry bush than that it stirs an early memory—that it is no 
novelty in my life, speaking to me merely through my present sensibilities to form 
and colour, but the long companion of my existence, that wove itself into my joys 
when joys were vivid. (151-52) 
 
Like the description of Mr. Tulliver’s love of Dorlcote Mill, this passage celebrates the 
recollection of a period of passive development under the influence of a surrounding assemblage 
of external objects. Both passages contrast this passive attachment favorably against the modern 
individual’s (and, implicitly, the urban reader’s and narrator’s) aspiration towards social and 
physical mobility, and both vivify the relationship between individual and environment by 
describing it in terms of a prosthetic integration of the individual’s body with a diffuse array of 
surrounding, inanimate objects, evoking, as Morrison describes it, a “sense of longing for 
nonseparateness and undifferentiation” (92). Yet here, Eliot situates this desire for a sensation of 
intimacy with one’s environment within a larger ethical landscape, in which environmental 
desire acts as a moral check on egoism and the concomitant impulses to exploit natural, 
economic, and human resources in a vain “striving after something better and better in our 
surroundings”—of these impulses, the narrator warns, “heaven knows where [they] might lead 
us.” Instead of validating the independence from biological environment that supposedly 
separates the more highly evolved human from other forms of life (or, more problematically, the 
“British man” from the “foreign”), Eliot insists on the ethical value of affirming both a kinship 
with organisms that are more obviously dependent on their biological media, as well as a 
recognition of the ways in which our own dependence on the people, objects, and landscapes that 
have shaped us can provide a sense of coherence and support in addition to, or even instead of, a 
resentment of one’s own determination by external forces. 
 As I have thus far argued, the economic plot of The Mill on the Floss often uses the 
language of desire to describe the attachment of individuals to their environments. As the novel’s 
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focus shifts away from Dorlcote Mill to the development of Maggie’s romantic entanglements in 
its later books, however, the narrator chiasmically inverts these registers, and begins to use the 
language of environmental influence to describe desire. The passivity that has thus far been 
aligned with the self’s shaping by its natural and social environment—and the rich affective 
attachments that arise from this abdication of agency, for both the Tulliver children and their 
parents—migrates into the novel’s descriptions of Maggie’s desire for Stephen Guest.  
 From Maggie’s earliest encounters with Guest, her desire for him is articulated spatially 
as a desire for a partly-imagined world from which she has hitherto been excluded, rather than a 
desire for a specific person or thing. In the early, emotionally charged days of Maggie’s and 
Stephen’s acquaintance, the narrator insists that “it was not that [Maggie] thought distinctly of 
Mr. Stephen Guest . . .  It was rather that she felt the half-remote presence of a world of love and 
beauty and delight, made up of vague, mingled images from all the poetry and romance she had 
ever read, or had ever woven into her dreamy reveries. . . . The music was vibrating in her still—
Purcell’s music, with its wild passion and fancy—and she could not stay in the recollection of 
[her] bare, lonely past. She was in her brighter aerial world again” (385). The distinctness of a 
particular object of desire is here replaced by an attachment to a vague, atmospheric 
intermingling of spatial registers: an “aerial world,” the pervasive vibrations of music, an array 
of literary images. One effect of presenting Maggie’s attraction to Stephen as an auratic space, 
rather than a linear attraction between a desiring subject and a desired object, is that Maggie’s 
desire takes on a passive, rather than an active, cast. The transitive active verb “thought” is 
negated in favour of the more passive “felt,” Maggie simply finding herself in the “aerial world” 
of her desire, her sensations impinged upon by a “half-remote presence” that urges itself upon 
her rather than being actively pursued. Stephen’s physical appearance and personal qualities are 
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only minimally described; instead, he hovers constantly at the margins of Maggie’s awareness as 
what the narrator continually alludes to as a “presence.” During an awkward conversation with 
Stephen at the Deanes’ during their early acquaintance, Maggie “ha[s] no distinct thought—only 
a sense of a presence like that of a closely hovering broad-winged bird in the darkness” (406); 
when she, Lucy, and Stephen go boating together, his offer of his arm affects her with “a sense 
of help—the presence of strength that is outside [her] and yet [hers]—[that] meets a continual 
want of the imagination” (408). Above all, Stephen is associated with music by virtue of his 
pervasive voice: he “seem[s] to make all the air in the room alive with a new influence . . . 
Maggie . . . was taken ahold of and shaken by the invisible influence—was borne along by a 
wave too strong for her” (418). Maggie’s passivity in Stephen’s presence correlates to the 
narrator’s representation of him, less as a distinct person or attractive solid object, than as a 
pervasive atmosphere, an “invisible influence” that carries her along. 
 The passive terms in which Eliot repeatedly describes Maggie’s desire for Stephen 
complicates the notion that The Mill on the Floss is a novel about “the struggle . . . between 
culture and freedom” (Buzard 290), between the grave pressure of social integration and the 
centrifugal flight of individual desire and ambition. Classic readings of the novel, by such critics 
as Mary Jacobus and Nina Auerbach, persuasively argue that Eliot turns to the richly figurative 
languages of witchcraft (Auerbach) and of natural disaster (Jacobus) to assert the uncontainable 
force of Maggie’s feminine desire in the face of an oppressive social milieu in which her desires 
must go unfulfilled. More recently, Sara Ahmed has argued that Maggie should be read as a 
paradigmatic figure of feminist “willfulness,” one whose very diagnosis as overly willful by both 
the narrator and the other characters marks her as a valuable point of identification for readers 
who, like her, have experienced “the process of becoming conscious of harshness—the affective 
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consequence of injustice” (247). While these readings of Maggie’s character accurately describe 
her appetitive, self-assertive behavior as a child in the novel’s first half, they fail quite to take 
into account how the novel’s climactic test of Maggie’s desire—her romantic entanglement with 
Stephen Guest—represents her desire as more passive than assertive, more unconscious than 
willful. 
 In one of the few readings of the novel that attends to this passivity, Elisha Cohn applies 
the term “affective form” to the atmospheric suspension of agency that attends Maggie’s desire 
for Stephen, arguing that in its weirdly spatialized representations of Maggie’s emotional states 
the novel frequently resorts to “a decentered lyricism associated with experiences not contained 
within any individual, not dependent on the vigilance of consciousness, and not productive of 
individual autonomy” (100). While Cohn suggests that such moments of “decentered lyricism” 
work to undermine the ethical drive of Eliot’s fiction by registering swaths of emotional 
experience that do not work to any ethical or political ends, I contend that these moments’ 
tendency to environmentalize desire—to represent it as a powerful and even insidious external 
influence, rather than a deeply authentic impulse of the self—is in productive dialogue with the 
many earlier scenes in the novel where external environments are paradoxically imbued with rich 
desire. By showing how desire can feel like an inescapable environmental pressure, while 
environments in turn can cultivate in the individuals they shape all the affective magnetism of 
desire, Eliot suggests that the starkly drawn line between the authentic freedom of the self and 
the alienating demands of environmental pressures ought to be blurred.  
 The amorphous flow or wave of desire on which Maggie is borne is literalized in the 
novel’s climactic elopement scene, when Maggie and Stephen float down the river Floss towards 
the sea. The narrator’s description of Maggie’s mental state during this episode takes on the same 
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lyrical, blurred quality that characterizes the descriptions of Maggie’s and other characters’ 
loving attachments to the landscape surrounding Dorlcote Mill: 
The breath of the young, unwearied day, the delicious rhythmic dip of the oars, 
the fragmentary song of a passing bird heard now and then, as if it were only the 
overflowing of brim-full gladness, the sweet solitude of a twofold consciousness 
that was mingled into one by that grave untiring gaze which need not be 
averted—what else could there be in their minds for the first hour? . . . What 
could words have been but an inlet to thought? And thought did not belong to that 
enchanted haze in which they were enveloped—it belonged to the past and the 
future that lay outside the haze. Maggie was only dimly conscious of the banks, as 
they passed them, and dwelt with no recognition on the villages. (404) 
 
In this passage, the narrator physicalizes Stephen and Maggie’s mutual desire into an “enchanted 
haze” that envelops them, sequestering them temporally, from “the past and the future,” as well 
as spatially, intervening between the boat and the lovers’ homes on the shore. Although the 
emotional plenitude evoked in this passage resembles what have thus far been calling 
environmental desire, the novel’s earlier passages evoking an attachment to a physical 
surrounding do so through an appeal to memory, to the recollection of one’s development in a 
particular place. In this elopement scene, the enchanted haze that surrounds Maggie suspends 
memory and anticipation alike, surrendering her to a partially externalized influence that has no 
temporal connection to the nourishing “medium” of her youth. Its immediacy resembles that of 
an ambience or atmosphere, more than an environment, insofar as it consists of an 
interpenetrating mixture of physical substance and emotional or spiritual “mood” that envelops 
the self without being strictly external to it. As Spitzer defines it, “ambience” is a close 
conceptual cousin of “environment” and “medium”: it is “a word evocative of a spiritual climate 
or atmosphere, emanating from, hovering over, a milieu—or even a thing . . . a word offering not 
a definition but an escape into the poetry of the vague and the imponderable: the antithesis of the 
deterministic milieu (218-19). Even as the idea of a spiritual ambience appears to offer an 
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alternative to the deterministic milieu of biology and sociology, Spitzer suggests, it also emerges 
alongside this increasingly mechanistic sense of determination as a kind of fantasy of escape: an 
“antithesis of the deterministic milieu” that at the same time “emanat[es] from . . . a milieu.” 
Even as the haze of her desire screens Maggie from the narrow constraints of poverty and 
provincial society, it also subjects her to an evacuation of will that parallels the erosion of agency 
that she already experiences in her everyday life.  
 This confluence of the usually-opposed languages of individual desire and self-
determination, on the one hand, and of environmental influence, on the other, troubles the 
novel’s multiple scenes of erotic decision, in which Maggie must choose between her sexual 
desire for her two lovers and her more diffuse attachments to her family and social community. 
Within a few brief pages in the novel’s penultimate book, “The Great Temptation,” Maggie 
refuses offers of love from both Philip Wakem and Stephen Guest, appealing to the ecological 
network of affections and attachments that would be jeopardized by her acceptance of either 
offer. When Philip pleads with her to renew their youthful love that had been sacrificed to her 
father’s feud, she tells him, “I desire no future that will break the ties of the past” (444). When 
Stephen makes a similar offer of love in the following chapter, insisting that their desire for one 
another should be honoured as “natural,” she replies with a version of the answer she gave Philip 
that is both more developed and more emotionally confused: 
O it is difficult—life is very difficult! It seems right to me sometimes that we 
should follow our strongest feeling; but then, such feelings continually come 
across the ties that all our former life has made for us—the ties that have made 
others dependent on us—and would cut them in two. If life were quite easy and 
simple, as it might have been in paradise, and we could always see the first being 
first to whom . . . . I mean, if life did not make duties for us before love comes, 
love would be a sign that two people ought to belong to each other. But I see—I 
feel it is not so now: there are things we must renounce in life; and some of us 
must renounce love. Many things are difficult and dark to me; but I see one thing 
quite clearly—that I must not, cannot, seek my own happiness by sacrificing 
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others. Love is natural; but surely pity and faithfulness and memory are natural 
too. (449-50) 
 
Although Maggie’s troubled processing of her situation resolves, at the end of this speech, into 
an abstract validation of “pity and faithfulness and memory,” the broken sentences at the heart of 
her speech register a less moralized attachment to the lyrically described “home-scene” of the 
novel’s early chapters. Note the abrupt shift in the middle of Maggie’s uncompleted sentence: “If 
life were quite easy and simple, as it might have been in paradise, and we could always see that 
one being first towards whom . . . . I mean, if life did not make duties for us before love comes, 
love would be a sign that two people ought to belong to each other.” In this jagged substitution 
of one explanation for another, Maggie initially identifies as the source of her constraint a merely 
temporal priority—the idea that our strongest attachments are to the objects of our earliest 
consciousness—and then breaks off her thought, replacing it with an abstract moral priority: the 
more familiar idea that duty ought to trump desire. While this latter idea sounds more like an 
Eliotic aphorism, Maggie’s first, unfinished sentiment, in all its unorthodox, inarticulate 
strangeness, seems more fully to suggest the unruliness of Maggie’s immediate experience of her 
erotic dilemma, while also linking that dilemma to the language of environmental desire that has 
been developed throughout the novel. 
 In wishing that Stephen Guest had been “that one being” whom she had “see[n] . .  first,” 
Maggie implicitly situates her desire for Stephen within a complex network of competing 
emotional attachments, the strength of whose claims are based partly on their temporal sequence. 
Certainly, she wishes that she had seen Stephen before Lucy had seen and become engaged to 
him, a temporal reversal that would remove the necessity of betraying her cousin in order to 
fulfill her desire for Stephen. As well, her words express the wish that she had seen Stephen 
before she herself had seen (and been seen by) Philip, a man whose love she has drawn without 
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ever fully reciprocating it, and who will now be deeply hurt by her romantic involvement with 
another. Underlying both these desires, though, Maggie’s incomplete wish that “we could always 
see that one being first . . .” suggests a more general longing to have seen the object of her love 
prior to the whole network of people, places, and things that formed her very earliest sensations 
and attachments: her family, Dorlcote Mill, and the entire, originary environment of childhood 
that the narrator so lyrically celebrates earlier in the novel. In longing to have seen Stephen first, 
Maggie imagines that her desire for him would have been viable if it had been like her 
attachment to the “home-scene” of Dorlcote Mill. Maggie’s half-articulated sentence resonates 
with the narrator’s earlier description of the objects of a childhood home as “first ideas”: “the 
pattern of the rug and the grate were the ‘first ideas’ that it was no more possible to criticize than 
the solidity and the extension of matter” (151). Maggie longs for her love for Stephen to have the 
same precultural, even premoral aura of unimpeachability that sanctifies the life-giving, benign 
attachment of a child and a formative environment. 
 Maggie articulates no such feelings when she finally leaves Stephen on the brink of their 
elopement, but the narrator steps in at this point to express, in fragmentary free indirect discourse 
that verges on stream-of-consciousness narration, the failure of erotic desire to overpower the 
multiplicity of attachments that bind her to her childhood environment. While this moment has 
often been read as a triumph of Maggie’s moral agency, the fragmentary narration of Maggie’s 
departure from Stephen insists that this action is characterized by the same passivity that has 
attended Maggie’s entire dreamy trip downriver: 
Maggie was not conscious of a decision as she turned away from that gloomy 
averted face, and walked out of the room: it was like an automatic action that 
fulfills a forgotten intention. What came after? A sense of stairs descended as if in 
a dream—of flagstones—of a chaise and horses standing—then a street, and a 
turning into another street where a stage-coach was standing, taking in 
passengers—and the darting thought that that coach would take her away, perhaps 
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towards home. . . . Home—where her mother and brother were—Philip—Lucy—
the scene of her very cares and trials—was the haven towards which her mind 
tended—the sanctuary where sacred relics lay—where she would be rescued from 
more falling. (479) 
 
The language of Maggie’s desire is spatialized rather than object-oriented. Unlike her earlier 
speech to Stephen in which her desire for her home is rhetorically moralized into a duty, the 
fragmentary images of Dorlcote Mill that float through her consciousness form a constellation of 
desires and loving attachments, rather than of duties she must strain to obey. Spaces, 
surroundings, and scenes, not people or conscious moral principles, are the dominant motif in her 
consciousness: home, a scene, a haven, a sanctuary. It is the desire to be immersed and at home 
in a particular place or atmosphere, rather than to possess a particular person or object. Maggie’s 
scarce-conscious decision, the narrator insists, is not a triumph of moral choice, but a falling 
back on instinct, an inability of conscious desire to overrule deep-rooted environmental 
attachment. The narrator’s shift into incomplete sentences and paratactic phrases echoes the 
opening chapter of the novel, in which the usually-omniscient narrator is affectively embedded in 
the same place that draws Maggie’s longing away from Stephen. Although Maggie’s rejection of 
Stephen at this moment ultimately leads to her oppressive ostracization from St. Ogg’s society, 
and even, albeit obliquely, to her tragic death, the fact that it is articulated in terms of an 
emotional attraction toward a desired environment, rather than a moral revulsion from an act of 
sin, makes her departure an act of desire rather than self-abnegation. 
 Thus far, I have argued that Eliot’s representation of different forms of desire in The Mill 
on the Floss is deeply and imaginatively engaged with the organism-environment relationship as 
it was theorized in the mid-Victorian biological writings of Comte, Spencer, and Lewes. Tracing 
out the affective dimensions of the distinctively non-agonistic relationship between organisms 
and their media outlined in organicist biology enables Eliot to represent forms of emotional 
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attachment that exceed and complicate the dualistic relationship between a subject and an object 
of desire. By conflating the agential language of individual desire with the passive, spatial 
language of environmental influence, Eliot’s novel evokes a more varied spectrum of emotional 
orientations towards formative environments than are registered by conventional Darwinian 
readings of The Mill on the Floss as an agonistic drama of the defeat of individual aspiration by 
an inhospitable social context. Moreover, in its repeated lyrical evocation of the diffuse, non-
possessive attachment to inanimate surroundings that I have been calling environmental desire, 
the novel insists on a dynamic interrelation between the emotional and ethical patterns that 
structure intersubjective relationships, and the often more occluded ones that structure 
relationships between humans and the materials of the world they inhabit. In so doing, The Mill 
on the Floss places the described world of fiction—both natural and cultural—at the center rather 
than the periphery of its drama. 
 In the next section, I move from The Mill on the Floss to Middlemarch, a novel arguably 
even more closely in dialogue with mid-Victorian biological science. Like The Mill on the Floss, 
Middlemarch devotes considerable attention to the representation of the environments and 
atmospheres that both obstruct in and support its characters. As I will suggest, though, in moving 
from the earlier novel to the later one, Eliot shifts her attention from how an environment can 
function as an object of desire in direct relationship with a single individual, to the ways in which 
it acts between characters as a communicative medium for that most Eliotic of emotions, 
sympathy. 
Middlemarch’s Sympathetic Atmospheres 
 In the final chapter of Middlemarch, Eliot’s narrator delivers one of the novel’s most 
frequently quoted aphorisms, one that also constitutes the most obvious evidence in Eliot’s 
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magnum opus of the novel’s interest in questions of environmental influence. Remarking on the 
extent to which the straitened scope of Dorothea’s life ultimately fails to realize her youthful 
ideals, the narrator explains, “There is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not 
greatly determined by what lies outside it” (784-85). So apparently emblematic is this sentence 
that the most recent Oxford World Classics edition of the novel places it in bold type on the back 
cover, and historian of science Trevor Pearce, in a recent essay on the nineteenth-century origins 
of the concept of organism-environment interaction, reaches out of his field in the essay’s 
conclusion to quote the aphorism as surprising evidence that an interest in the relationship 
between organisms and their environments had passed, by the 1870s, from science into literature. 
 Eliot’s didactic closing appeal in Middlemarch to the power of external “circumstance” 
or “environment” to determine the actions and outcomes of human individuals appears a 
promising starting point for a discussion of the novel’s relationship to the new discourse of 
environment in Victorian biology—so promising a starting point, in fact, as to threaten to end the 
discussion before it has begun, rendering the connection so obvious as to be hardly worth 
proving. Yet the abstract, universalizing rhetoric of Eliot’s statement about human determination 
by externalities also tends to obscure the novel’s nuanced and contradictory representations of 
the actual relationships between individual characters and “what lies outside” them. By 
emphasizing so strongly a deterministic, even hostile relationship between organism and 
environment, this narratorial pronouncement screens out the various and subtle ways in which 
this relationship is represented, not in the narrator’s extradiegetic discourse, but in the novel’s 
scenes as they are described and narrated. 
 Numerous critics have noted that Eliot’s use of description in Middlemarch is unique for 
its unusually light reliance on those modes of supposedly neutral presentation that characterize 
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both the writing of earlier realists and proto-realists such as Dickens and Gaskell, and Eliot’s 
own earlier novels. As Elaine Freedgood notes in her study of objects in the Victorian novel, 
Middlemarch is distinguished by a surprising absence of objects that are “just there,” of details—
especially details in descriptions of domestic interiors—that nestle in the descriptive prose 
merely to enhance the visibility of a fictional world without rising to a symbolic or metaphoric 
plane. The objects that do appear—Dorothea’s “poor dress,” a pier-glass, a set of emeralds—are 
so over-freighted with symbolic meaning that they strain away from literal description and 
towards interpretation. Freedgood identifies Eliot’s treatment of objects and detail as the 
inauguration of a wider trend in realist fiction after 1870 in which “the distribution and therefore 
the interpretation of novelistic things in literary fiction becomes . . . less and less metonymic and 
contingent, and more and more metaphoric and apparently necessary” (116). 
 Yet at the same time that Middlemarch does not read like an inventory of objects and 
interiors to the extent that many of Dickens’s or Gaskell’s do, largely avoiding the affectively-
charged descriptions of homes that we find in Mill on the Floss (does any reader of Middlemarch 
come away from the novel with a detailed sense of what Tipton and Freshitt are “like”?), much 
of the novel’s immersive power nevertheless comes from its representation of shifting 
atmospheres and changing meteorological dynamics. If Eliot neglects to describe the material of 
the furniture on which Rosamond sits, or the pattern of the curtains at Lowick Manor, she 
dedicates plenty of attention to the pervasive labyrinthine gloom that hangs over Lowick, the 
sunlight streaming in on the melancholy figure of Dorothea in Rome, or the gentle alternation of 
rain, cloud, snow, and sunshine—usually seen from the window of Dorothea’s boudoir—that 
lends much the novel its slow rhythm. That Eliot had an acute interest in atmospheric phenomena 
is well-documented in the notes she took in preparation for writing Adam Bede, devoting 
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considerable effort to researching the weather conditions in the midlands in 1799, the year in 
which the novel was set.21 Consulting farmers’ almanacs and meteorological records for that year 
in the Gentleman’s Magazine, Eliot coordinated her plotting of her first novel with the historical 
dates of fine days, wet summer weeks, and the bad harvest of 1799. In Middlemarch, however, 
no specific dates are given for its detailed descriptions of weather, and even in its countryside 
settings, agriculture is usually kept at a genteel distance such that meteorological events do not 
exert an immediate existential pressure on most of the characters’ lives.  What relation, then, do 
the carefully-described, light registrations of weather on the novel’s bodies and consciousnesses 
bear to the deterministic “outside” environment that Eliot invokes as an irresistible force in the 
novel’s finale?  
 In this section, I argue that the pervasiveness of atmospheric description in Middlemarch 
is crucial to establishing ethical and affective connections between the novel’s characters, 
particularly characters from disparate plots and different social classes. Far from presenting a 
uniformly deterministic relationship between humans and their environments, the fluid 
atmospheres of Middlemarch act as an ambient medium that is more communicative than 
obstructive or determinative, facilitating sympathetic exchange between characters rather than 
circumscribing them in their own worlds. By emphatically invoking a turn towards 
environmental and atmospheric conditions as a vital, positive element in the novel’s most 
meaningful moments of sympathetic perception, Middlemarch’s representation of physical 
surroundings complicates the environmentally-constricted model of agency outlined in the 
narrator’s aphoristic discourse in the novel’s final chapter. Instead, it moves towards a model of 
interpersonal sympathy that is predicated on an awareness of a shared medium or environment. 
                                                
21 See Eliot, A Writer’s Notebook, 30-34. 
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Finally, I conclude with a consideration of the ways in which the multiplot novel, in Eliot’s 
hands, itself behaves as a sympathetic medium for a community of readers. 
 In order to understand how the atmospherics of Middlemarch contribute to the way in 
which the novel frames and enacts sympathetic connection between the novel’s characters, it is 
important briefly to revisit the vast body of scholarship on the definition and role of sympathy in 
Eliot’s oeuvre, and in nineteenth-century realist fiction more broadly. Most theories of sympathy 
in the realist novel can be sorted across a divide between identification-based feeling and 
abstraction-based feeling. Audrey Jaffe and Catherine Gallagher both understand sympathy 
within a paradigm of identification, in which a spectator experiences sympathy by imagining him 
or herself in the position of a suffering other. Jaffe, following Adam Smith, imagines sympathy 
as a “scene” in which “the sufferer is effectively replaced by the spectator’s image of him or 
herself” (2), while Gallagher follows Hume in contending that sympathy is achieved through the 
imaginative appropriation of another person’s feelings (171). In her recent book on empathy and 
the novel, Suzanne Keen claims along similar lines that what nineteenth-century writers called 
“sympathy” was essentially what we now call “empathy,” which she defines in identificatory 
terms as a “spontaneous sharing of affect” in which “we feel what we believe to be the emotions 
of others” (4-5). 
Other recent critics, most notably Rae Greiner, incline towards a conception of sympathy 
based on distance and abstraction.22 Like Jaffe, Greiner turns to the work of Adam Smith as a 
source for Eliot’s representation of sympathetic situations, but unlike Jaffe, she interprets 
                                                
22 Others who have recently argued for a model of sympathy based on abstraction include Cara 
Weber, who draws on Amanda Anderson’s influential The Powers of Distance (2007) to contend 
that ethical insight in Eliot’s fiction is achieved through a “distance . . . [that] works to counteract 
the temptation to sympathetic identification.” See Weber, 502. 
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Smithian sympathy as primarily narrative and cognitive, rather than scenic and visual. As such, 
sympathetic connection is enabled less by specular identification with an image of another’s 
suffering, than by the capacity to abstract from that immediate image in order imaginatively or 
rationally to grasp the narrative context within which the other’s suffering occurs; sympathy is, 
as Greiner argues, comparable to a kind of historicization, effected through a cognitive process 
of abstraction or distancing from one’s own immediate situation (304).  
 Both of these models of sympathy come with their own ethical and cognitive difficulties. 
Framing sympathy as a matter of identification, as Rachel Ablow has noted, poses the problem 
of “threaten[ing] to make the other into merely an extension of the self—or the self into an 
extension of the other” (71), dealing with difference simply by factitiously eliminating it. The 
abstraction/distancing model of sympathy, on the other hand, tends to reify difference into 
something absolute and insurmountable, requiring what Greiner calls “strenuous imaginative 
labour” and burdening the sympathetic self with the task of performing near-impossible heroics 
of the imagination if his or her sympathy is not to be rendered inauthentic by points of specious 
identification (10). In both cases, the difficulty arises from sympathy’s dualistic nature as a 
transaction between two irremediably discrete entities: an epistemological void separates self and 
other, and it can only be traversed only by collapsing the other into the self, or by a heroic 
cognitive leap into alterity. 
 I want to suggest that Eliot’s use of fluid atmospherics in Middlemarch—her close 
attention to the not-quite-empty spaces between and around characters, to weather and to 
atmospheres—helps to aerate the vacuum that often separates self and other in theories of 
sympathy. It does so by interposing a third term between the opposed duality of self and other in 
scenes of sympathy, forming an intervening medium in which characters become capable of 
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accommodating both similarity and difference, a necessary capacity that is often absent from 
theories of sympathy. It proposes a model of interpersonal feeling based neither on abstract 
projection, nor on wishful identification, but rather on recognition of co-presence in a shared 
environment or “medium,” to use Eliot’s (and Lewes’s) term. Such a recognition enables the self 
to accommodate similarity (of situations and contexts) and differences (of both embodiment and 
psychology) simultaneously, in such a way that the shared medium becomes a medium for 
shared feeling. 
 This ambient type of sympathy is enacted in one of the few scenes in which Casaubon 
crosses paths with a character outside of his own plot line, when he and Lydgate meet on the 
grounds of Lowick in order to discuss the older man’s failing health. The scene is perhaps the 
only scene in all of Middlemarch in which a character other than Dorothea feels any compassion 
for Casaubon. Strikingly, the possibility of this sympathetic exchange seems to have everything 
to do with the narrator’s description of the sunny afternoon that surrounds the two men:  
When Lydgate entered the Yew-Tree Walk he saw Mr Casaubon slowly receding 
with his hands behind him according to his habit, and his head bent forward. It 
was a lovely afternoon; the leaves from the lofty limes were falling silently across 
the somber evergreens, while the lights and shadows slept side by side: there was 
no sound but the cawing of the rooks, which to the accustomed ear is a lullaby, or 
that last solemn lullaby, a dirge. Lydgate, conscious of an energetic frame in its 
prime, felt some compassion when the figure which he was likely soon to 
overtake turned round, and in advancing towards him showed more markedly than 
ever the signs of premature age—the student’s bent shoulders, the emaciated 
limbs, and the melancholy lines of the mouth. (395) 
 
This moment of sympathy is the result neither of identification, nor of distanced reflection. 
Indeed, Lydgate’s response to the sight of Casaubon’s body is closer to disidentification than to 
identification. Although Lydgate’s compassion for Casaubon does result from a recognition of 
the older man’s embodiment, it arises through a sense of drastic contrast rather than similarity or 
substitution. It is precisely because of his “conscious[ness] of an energetic frame in its prime,” a 
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consciousness engendered by the “lovely afternoon,” that Lydgate is able to recognize that the 
prematurely withered Casaubon must experience the sunny day in a radically different way. 
Although the detail of the first few sentences—the falling leaves, the “somber” evergreens, the 
funeral dirge of the rooks—resembles a straightforward case of pathetic fallacy in which 
Casaubon’s surroundings reflect his sense of his own decline, the fact that this passage is 
focalized through Lydgate’s perspective indicates a more complex emotional circuit. This is not 
a simple dualistic exchange between a solipsistic self and the external world, but rather a triple 
structure in which Lydgate’s compassion for Casaubon is occasioned by a physical sense of 
mutual immersion in a common medium—a perception that two very differently embodied 
selves walk under the same trees and breathe the same air. Sympathy in this way is predicated 
not on a specular identification with the body of the other, as the identification-theory argues, nor 
on abstract reasoning about the other’s situational context, as abstraction-based theories 
emphasize; rather, the site of sympathy is the in-between place where the body and its medium 
meet. 
 Although it does not appear in this passage, the word “medium” occurs frequently in 
Middlemarch in contexts like this one, in which characters struggle to coordinate their internal 
states with an external milieu, or to comprehend the internal states of other people within that 
milieu. As we saw in The Mill on the Floss, Eliot frequently uses the word “medium” to convey 
an agonistic relationship between an aspiring or desiring protagonist and a constraining social 
environment, and she occasionally uses it this way in Middlemarch as well. Thus, in an early 
chapter, Dorothea suffers from a “passionate desire to know and to think, which in the unfriendly 
mediums of Tipton and Freshitt had issued in crying and red eyelids” (36). Coerced by Bulstrode 
into voting for Mr. Tyke against his better judgment, Lydgate likewise resents the “petty medium 
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of Middlemarch [that] had been too strong for him” (175). In both of these instances, the word is 
used to designate an inhospitable milieu (in Dorothea’s case, Tipton and Freshitt, and in 
Lydgate’s, the town of Middlemarch) in which the self struggles to find traction for its desires 
and ambitions.  
 Yet other instances of the word in the novel indicate the encroachment of a more positive 
connotation, one that tends to promote connection and communication between characters, rather 
than the self-enclosure and isolation of individuals within an inhospitable world. Such positive 
instances of Middlemarch’s “media” appear most frequently in scenes where characters from the 
novel’s multiple plot-lines momentarily cross paths, forging intense yet fleeting connections with 
people from outside of their immediate social universes. In the first convergence of Dorothea and 
Lydgate’s plot lines, for example, during the first onset of Casaubon’s illness, the two characters, 
barely acquainted, share an important moment of wordless, mutual understanding: “For years 
after Lydgate remembered the impression produced on him by this involuntary appeal—this cry 
from soul to soul, without other consciousness than their moving with kindred natures in the 
same embroiled medium, the same fitfully illuminated life” (272). Although the vaguely-
specified “medium” here is no less muddied and “embroiled” than in the earlier passages, it also 
harbors flickers of “life,” and enables the transmission of feeling between individuals who would 
otherwise find one another opaque. While Dorothea and Lydgate’s sympathetic connection is 
predicated in part on their “kindred natures,” the narrator places much greater emphasis here on 
their “consciousness” of “the same embroiled medium” in which they move. The similitude that 
enables their sympathy is less the similitude of their natures, or their ability to imaginatively 
identify with one other’s admittedly very different internal states, than their recognition of a 
shared medium that imposes different hardships on both of them but also links them together in a 
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common world.  
 As J. Hillis Miller notes in his classic essay on Middlemarch’s dominant metaphors, the 
novel’s processes of figuration develop “a quasi-scientific model to describe the subjective life 
of the individual, the relations of two persons within the social ‘medium,’ and the nature of that 
medium as a whole” (132). Although Miller does not pursue the scientific connection far, he 
evocatively describes the novel’s strange monism, its representation of all things and beings as in 
some way consubstantial. The novel’s dominant metaphors, he points out, imagine the world of 
the novel and everything it includes as “a spatially or temporally deployed material complex--a 
labyrinth, or flowing water, or woven cloth,” all of which work to imply that “a society is in 
some way like a material field” characterized by a “strict homogeneity between the large-scale 
and the small-scale grain or texture of things” (129). Miller proceeds to analyze the 
epistemological assumptions and problems that this quasi-scientific model of a pervasive, 
homogeneous medium rests on and raises, but does not elaborate on his suggestive insight that 
this metaphor does something specific to “the relations of two persons within the social 
‘medium.’” The wide-ranging similitude implied by a society that can be compared to a 
continuous, homogeneous “material complex” is difficult to reconcile with the strenuous 
negotiation of difference that is at the heart of Eliot’s representations of sympathy, a negotiation 
that Eliot’s narrators so often insist is no easy thing. 
 Eliot’s interest in the idea of a pervasive medium characterized by an ability to support 
and cultivate difference shows a closer kinship with the biological writings of Lewes than with 
those of Darwin. While critics such as Ian Duncan and Gillian Beer have argued for reading the 
biological language of Middlemarch in a Darwinian context, the term “medium” is found much 
more frequently in the scientific writings of G.H. Lewes, who read Darwin but was arguably 
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more indebted to Comte and to Spencer in his understanding of evolutionary development.23 A 
major question on which Lewes diverged from Darwin was in his understanding of the role 
environmental influence played in the development and maintenance of “variation.” For Darwin, 
environmental influence (what he called the “conditions of life”) acted primarily as a winnowing 
force that culled ill-adapted life forms from populations, so that the species inhabiting each 
environmental niche moved towards a single, ideally-adapted form. Darwin’s environment is 
thus a parsimonious entity that works largely against variety and difference, selecting from the 
vast raw material of variation a smaller number of forms that are better-adapted than the rest.24  
In the Second Series of his Problems of Life and Mind, published in 1877, Lewes explicitly 
contrasts his own theory of environmental influence against Darwin’s, suggesting a theory of 
organism/medium relations much more accommodating of difference than Darwin’s 
parsimonious “conditions of life.” As Suzanne Graver notes, “Darwin’s view of adaptation [w]as 
largely a matter of chance and accident,” while the Lewes/Spencer conception of adaptation 
“gives great importance to what Darwin undervalues, namely, the significance of the social 
medium in both shaping and in being shaped by individuals” (152). Instead of assigning to 
environmental pressure the omnipotent capacity to hone species into a single, ideally-adapted 
form, Lewes imagines both a more accommodating medium and a more active diversity of living 
individuals: 
Supposing that on a given spot there are a dozen protoplasts closely resembling 
                                                
23 See Beer, chapter 5, and Duncan. 
 
24 In On the Origin of Species, Darwin defines natural selection as the principle that “leads to the 
improvement of each creature in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life” (116), a 
process that winnows down variation: “It may metaphorically be said that natural selection is 
daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting 
that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good” (76). This process of selection 
“leads to . . . much extinction of the less improved and intermediate forms of life” (116). 
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each other, yet each in some one detail slightly varying; if this variation is one 
which, by its relations to the external medium, admits of a difference in the 
assimilation of materials present in the medium it may be the origin of some new 
direction in development, and the ultimate consequence may be the formation of a 
shell, an internal skeleton, a muscle, or a nerve. Were this not so, it would be 
impossible to explain such facts as that chitine is peculiar to the Articulata, 
cellulose to Molluscoida, carbonates of lime to Mollusca and Crustacea, and 
phosphates to Vertebrata--all assimilated from the same external medium. But we 
see that from this medium one organism selects the materials which another 
rejects; and this selection is determined by the nature of the structure: which 
assimilates only those materials it is fitted to assimilate. We hear a great deal of 
Adaptation determining changes of structure and function, and are too apt to 
regard this process as if it were not intimately dependent on a corresponding 
structural change. (142) 
 
In a Darwinian iteration of this thought experiment, the “dozen protoplasts closely resembling 
each other” at the outset would be whittled down to a smaller number of organisms better-
adapted to the medium than the others. For Lewes, however, structural difference is not a zero-
sum game, in which only the fittest structure survives; rather, structural difference enables the 
coexistence of distinct individuals within the same medium insofar as each distinctive structural 
trait provides a different path towards adaptation, the slight diversity in the organisms’ structures 
becoming gradually more pronounced and diversified as “one organism selects the materials 
which another rejects.” In this sense, the relationship between an organism and its medium, for 
Lewes, allows for and even promotes the coexistence of differences, rather than exclusively 
pitting those differences against one another in a struggle for survival.  
While it would be a stretch to argue that Middlemarch allegorizes Lewes’s theory of 
adaptation in any direct way, I do want to suggest a connection between Lewes’s capacious and 
forgiving theory of the environment-organism relationship, and Eliot’s own appeal to the idea of 
an all-encompassing medium—whether natural or social—in her novel. What Eliot’s fiction 
shares with Lewes’s biological writings is the sense of, or desire for, a mediating surround that 
promotes coexistence, even community, while also permitting and even facilitating difference; a 
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desire to expand the organism-environment relationship beyond an agonistic dualism straining 
towards seamless adaptation and into something more closely resembling an ecology.  
 An interest in the ability of milieux to accommodate difference is visible in Eliot’s 
persistent emphasis on the media that surround characters—weather, physical landscape, or more 
abstracted or figurative atmospherics—in scenes where characters from Middlemarch’s different 
plot-lines meet for the first time. The atmosphere-suffused scenes between Lydgate and 
Casaubon, and between Dorothea and Lydgate, that I discuss above are both scenes of first-
meeting between their respective characters, indicating a connection between heightened 
atmospherics and the mechanics of the multi-plot novel. This connection between fluid media 
and multiplottedness is further supported by the narrator’s striking description of the scene, in 
the opening pages of Book IV, in which the lonely Dorothea views Featherstone’s funeral from 
afar, seeing for the first time the motley group of Middlemarchers with whom her story is to 
become entangled. These are the opening sentences of Book IV: 
It was on a morning of May that Peter Featherstone was buried. In the prosaic 
neighborhood of Middlemarch, May was not always warm and sunny, and on this 
particular morning a chill wind was blowing the blossoms from the surrounding 
gardens on to the green mounds of Lowick churchyard. Swiftly-moving clouds 
only now and then allowed a gleam to light up any object, whether ugly or 
beautiful, that happened to stand within its golden shower. In the churchyard the 
objects were remarkably various, for there was a little crowd waiting to see the 
funeral. (303) 
 
The shifting sky and landscape here emphasize the material linking together of variety, providing 
a topography of dynamic, boundary-crossing flows. The limits of individual property are 
rendered permeable by the wind blowing “blossoms from the surrounding gardens on to the 
green mounds of Lowick churchyard,” a motion that suggests both the erasure of individual 
boundaries, as well as a complex weaving together of social and biological life, as the garden and 
the churchyard bleed into one another. The gleams of light cast by the “swiftly-moving clouds” 
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on the motley gathering of individuals create a shifting perspective that does not confine itself to 
a single psyche, skipping across and between different focal points, much like the novel’s third-
person narrator. The airy medium of May air that contains and surrounds the “remarkably 
various” crowd of funeral attendees is a living, shifting atmosphere that links discrete locales and 
individuals, resisting confinement to any local or individual perspective. 
 It is only after presenting this scene as if from an unseen aerial position that the narrator 
reveals that the vantage point actually belongs to Dorothea, who views the scene from an upper 
window of Lowick. The scene marks an important moment in Dorothea’s developing sense of 
her relation to an outside world in that it is her first moment of visual contact with the world of 
Middlemarch and its plots. This chapter does not stage an actual convergence of Dorothea’s plot 
with that of the Middlemarchers, for she remains separated by a window and a vertical remove 
that is both physical (she is on an upper floor of the house) and social (the gentry do not mingle 
with the townsfolk). The scene does remain with her psychologically, though, as the site of a 
dawning awareness that she exists in a multiplot novel: “Aloof as it seemed to be from the tenor 
of her life,” the scene “always afterwards came back to her at the touch of certain sensitive points 
in memory, just as the vision of St. Peter’s at Rome was interwoven with moods of 
despondency” (305). The narrator strangely characterizes the effects of the scene on Dorothea’s 
dawning awareness of her proximity to and potential involvement in other people’s lives by 
comparing it to the effect of vistas of landscape on perception and emotion: “Scenes which make 
vital changes in our neighbors’ lot are but the background of our own, yet, like a particular 
aspect of the fields and trees, they become associated for us with the epochs of our own history, 
and make a part of that unity which lies in the keenest selection of our consciousness” (306). 
Eliot’s superimposition of natural landscape onto an image of social relations collapses culture 
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into nature, figuring the lives that unfold around our own as a natural environment or ecosystem. 
It also strangely substitutes the image of a pastoral landscape devoid of human figures—an 
“aspect of the fields and trees”—for the more specifically-described vista of the cemetery, the 
overarching sky, and the human figures that populate it. This elision of the distinction between 
natural and social environments works to suggest that responsiveness to material surroundings, 
including even such seemingly neutral phenomena as weather, constitutes a first step, a kind of 
ground tone, to the establishment of sympathy with other minds.  
 This visual turn to backgrounds and surrounding media as a constitutive precondition for 
the ethical knowledge that one is only a minor character in other people’s plots is a descriptive 
technique that recurs throughout Middlemarch. Moments in which the beginnings of sympathy 
are ignited by a visual encounter with a shared environment are often narrated in a proleptic, 
almost prophetic mode that infuses them with moral significance. The sight of Featherstone’s 
funeral and its surrounding landscape “always afterwards came back to [Dorothea],” just as 
Lydgate “for years after . . . remembered the impression produced on him” by his fleeting 
moment of connection with Dorothea in the “embroiled medium” of Middlemarch life (272). 
This unusual proleptic narration takes seemingly fleeting moments of interpersonal perception 
and elevates them above the temporal flow of plot, marking them as epochal events possessing a 
surplus of symbolic or affective significance that far exceeds their minimal function as narrative 
causes or effects. That these affectively-charged moments always involve a turn, not only 
towards another person or people, but also towards a physical environment, whether abstract (an 
“embroiled medium”) or concrete (the “particular aspect of the fields and trees” to which the 
narrator compares the funeral scene), indicates the extent to which responsiveness to 
environmental conditions figures in Eliot’s understanding of the sympathetic connection that 
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elevates momentary experience above the transient flow of everyday life. Conversely, the vitality 
of environmental conditions as a necessary background to interpersonal recognition in Eliot’s 
novel also results in a narrative economy in which visual description of setting is rarely set apart 
from narrative prose, or relegated to “mere” world-making, a reality effect, as Barthes would call 
it. It is instead nearly always integrated, frequently even on the level of the sentence, into the 
narration of internal states and perceptions. 
 Suggesting that Eliotic sympathy is enabled by a recognition of a shared environment 
raises the problem of what, exactly, “counts” as a shared environment in Eliot’s fiction. Is the 
“shared environment” that momentarily unites two characters limited to a similarity of moral 
situation or social quandary, as it is with Lydgate and Dorothea struggling against the strictures 
of Middlemarch society? Does it mean that the two characters must be physically proximate to 
one another, as in the scene between Lydgate and Casaubon in the Yew Tree Walk of Lowick? 
The problem with both propositions, from an ethical perspective, is that such a framework seems 
to render sympathy dependent on sameness in a manner similar to the identification theory of 
sympathy: even if it doesn’t require a character to identify with another character’s body, as 
Adam Smith’s sympathy in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments does, it does seem to require a 
common situational point of reference that severely limits the degree of difference—whether 
situational or ontological—that sympathetic connection is capable of bridging. Just how 
“common” can this environmental point of reference be? How broadly can we delimit the 
“environment” shared between two characters before it becomes so general as to be 
meaningless? 
 The language of commonness and sharedness that I am using to describe characters’ 
relationships to their environments and each other raises questions about the relationship 
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between environment and property similar to those surrounding river water in The Mill on the 
Floss. By frequently evoking descriptions of landscapes and atmospheres at precisely the novel’s 
most significant moments of sympathetic connection, often between characters belonging to 
different social classes, Middlemarch’s descriptive techniques suggest a relationship to physical 
surroundings that does not correlate to ties of individual ownership or property, and which, 
moreover, is not a dual relationship between a single individual and a landscape, but rather a 
relationship with multiple lines of connection, involving other individuals as well. Kevin 
Morrison has argued that Middlemarch’s landscape description evokes a “dynamic of exchange 
between mind and landscape” that serves to create affective ties of affiliation for individuals with 
no indigenous, physical connection to a local community (“Cultural” 319). Morrison’s insight 
that Eliot’s representation of physical landscapes privileges nebulous, affective ties over the 
more concrete, legal ties of individual ownership is illuminating, but needs to be supplemented 
with the idea that these affective ties to landscape often tend to be transpersonal, linking the self 
both to the physical world but also, through it, to other groups and individuals. In this sense, 
Eliot’s evocation of a manifold bond between self, landscape, and other selves is structurally 
similar to the modern environmental sensibility that, as Harriet Ritvo has recently argued, 
emerged in Victorian Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century, in which a collective, 
“nebulous new sense of ownership” arose, characterized by “a sense that citizens of a nation (or, 
still more expansively and vaguely, members of a supranational cultural community) should 
have some say in the disposition of significant landscapes even if they held no formal title to the 
property in question” (4).25 While Eliot was not an environmental conservationist avant-la-lettre, 
                                                
25 Ritvo links this shift specifically to the furor that arose in the 1870s over the city of 
Manchester’s purchase and conversion into a reservoir of Thirlmere, a nearby body of water in 
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I do want to suggest that her descriptive tendency to obscure distinctions of individual property, 
while at the same time making the affective, perceptual attentiveness to physical environment 
into an integral step in sympathetic connection, registers a significant attentiveness to the 
environment—both natural and social—as a material entity that includes and supports a 
multiplicity of lives. This sense of multiplicity pushes against the usual duality of the organism-
environment relationship, encouraging rather a more multiple sense of relatedness that has less to 
do with property or indigenous blood ties to a particular locale, than with mutual dependence on 
a shared resource, property, or landscape. 
  Eliot’s use of environmental and atmospheric description to generate a sense of multiple 
relatedness is nowhere more evident than in her deployment of such description to coordinate 
Middlemarch’s multiple plots. Eliot’s narration of the scenes in which the novel shifts from one 
plot to another—particularly in the opening scenes of each book—frequently relies on 
invocations of the three-dimensionality of novelistic space through descriptions of weather and 
environmental conditions. Take, for example, the opening sentence of Book Six, in which the 
narrative transitions from Raffles and Bulstrode’s plot at Stone Court back to Dorothea’s plot at 
Lowick. The opening sentence enacts a careful spatial and temporal coordination of Dorothea’s 
and Raffles’s plots by situating them within the shared medium of weather: “By that delightful 
morning when the hayricks at Stone Court were scenting the air quite impartially, as if Mr. 
Raffles had been a guest worthy of the finest incense, Dorothea had again taken up her abode at 
Lowick Manor” (503). The sentence is referring back to an environmental irony the narrator 
notes in the previous chapter, in which the undesirable presence of Raffles is discordantly 
                                                
the Lake District. Her analysis suggests, however, that this new sense of nebulous ownership is 
both an innovation of the late nineteenth century, and not limited to this one instance. 
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welcomed by the exuberant beauty of Stone Court’s environs: “The fine old place never looked 
more like a delightful home than at that moment; the great white lilies were in flower, the 
nasturtiums, their pretty leaves all silvered with dew, were running away over the low stone wall; 
the very noises all around had a heart of peace within them. But everything was spoiled for the 
owner [Bulstrode] as he walked on the gravel in front and waited for Mr. Raffles, with whom he 
was condemned to breakfast” (494). Although Eliot introduces the environmental conditions of 
Stone Court in this initial passage as a simple irony based on an inverted pathetic fallacy (the 
environs of Stone Court failing to match Bulstrode’s mood), her reference to it at the opening of 
Book Six takes on a more expansive significance. Writing about weather in Romantic poetry, 
Jonathan Bate claims that poetic weather works as “both a mnemonic and an ecologic . . . A 
prime means of linking spatiality and temporality” (444). This is no less true of novelistic 
weather, which in Eliot’s hands works not only as a metaphoric means of reflecting characters’ 
moods and feelings, but also as denotative evidence of multiple characters’ spatial and temporal 
cohabitation of a specific place and time. In this passage, weather helps to coordinate Dorothea’s 
and Bulstrode’s plots temporally, as well as to create a spatialized sense of a common universe, a 
common air, in which the novel’s multiple plots progress and converge.  
 Whereas in earlier scenes of atmospheric connection, the differences mediated by an 
environment are often chiefly ethical (the gap between self and other, writ large), in this moment 
of plot-transition Eliot’s narrator develops the capacities of atmospheric connection to bridge the 
grittier, more material particularities of sociological difference as well, subtly flagging Raffles’s 
lower-class status by implying that he is decidedly not a “guest worthy of the finest incense.” By 
choosing the language of diffusion and odors, the narrator knowingly erodes such distinctions, 
underlining the extent to which atmospheric scents, whether of hay or of incense, are spatially 
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uncontainable and pervasive. Symbolically reserved for sacred purposes though incense may be, 
its diffusive physical properties defy efforts to confine it to sacred spaces or recipients. If Eliot’s 
atmospherics in the single-plot The Mill on the Floss tend often to envelop and isolate characters 
such as Maggie and Stephen in clouds of desire, Middlemarch’s multiplottedness means that 
atmospheres more frequently push “impartially” against such isolation, linking characters who 
don’t necessarily wish to be linked and providing a tissue of connection that coordinates and 
contains multiple plots. 
 The connection between environmental description and the linking of characters 
belonging to different social classes is nowhere more evident than in the scene where Mr. Brooke 
confronts his tenant Dagley, a scene that contains both the narrator’s most self-conscious 
reflections on her descriptive practices, as well as one of the novel’s most painfully awkward 
scenes of cross-class contact. As in the funeral scene discussed above, the narrator turns to the 
language of visual tableau as a way of invoking the fine ethical distinction between recognizing 
and failing to recognize as real the other lives that hover in the background of our own. But 
whereas for Dorothea, the scene of her Middlemarch neighbors under a windy sky remains 
embedded in her mind as an intimation of the entwinement of her own plot with these of other 
characters, in this scene, Eliot’s narrator explicitly warns of the tendency of such tableaux to 
have the opposite effect, by reifying other characters into picturesque works of art and placing 
them on the other side of an ontological distinction drawn between art and life rather than 
breathers of a common air. The narrator makes this point by describing Freeman’s End with a 
visual specificity that many of her other descriptions in Middlemarch lack:  
It is true that an observer, under that softening influence of the fine arts which 
makes other people’s hardships picturesque, might have been delighted with this 
homestead called Freeman’s End; the old house had dormer-windows in the dark-
red roof, two of the chimneys were choked with ivy, the large porch was blocked 
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up with bundles of sticks, and half the windows were closed with grey worm-
eaten shutters about which the jasmine-boughs grew in wild luxuriance; the 
mouldering garden wall with hollyhocks peeping over it was a perfect study of 
highly-mingled subdued colour, and there was an aged goat . . . lying against the 
open back-kitchen door. . . . All these objects under the quiet light of a sky 
marbled with high clouds would have made a sort of picture which we have all 
paused over. (394) 
 
The narrator self-consciously catalogs a list of discrete details that together compose the image 
of Freeman’s End, creating indeed the most detailed description of any building, home, or 
landscape in Eliot’s entire novel. The narrator seems to have reverted, in this passage, to the 
close physical description of Eliot’s earlier fiction, particularly Adam Bede and Scenes of 
Clerical Life. Yet the narrator’s careful qualification of this passage as an obstruction to adequate 
moral perception suggests that the very visual specificity of the description is part of what 
produces moral failure. Dividing Dagley and his family from the viewer by interposing an 
imaginary surface of canvas or text, the sharp focus of the description privileges the visual over 
other senses, and reduces environmental cues that might otherwise form a medium of connection 
between viewer and object—as does the rapidly shifting, windy sky in the scene of 
Featherstone’s funeral—to static, represented surface. Thus it is the unification of “all these 
objects under the quiet light of a sky marbled with high clouds” that, at the end of the passage, 
definitively freezes Freeman’s End into tableau, the sky acting as an ontological frame for 
cottage and cottagers that cordons them off from the “real” world of the viewer or reader. 
 What the contrast between Eliot’s descriptions of the Featherstone funeral and Freeman’s 
End suggests is a paradox whereby aesthetic focus—directly and intently looking at or 
considering a person or object as the subject of an artwork—is somehow less productive of 
ethical recognition than is the vague awareness of other people as shadowy presences inhabiting 
the background of one’s own, very real, world. If aesthetic focus is produced by detailed visual 
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description, the auratic perception that draws no sharp ontological line between the real and the 
virtual is produced, in Middlemarch, by the evocation of a dynamic atmosphere that, however 
lightly, presses in upon the senses a feeling of one’s own material continuity with the bodies of 
others, whether real or fictional. This sensation of multiplottedness, as I have called it earlier, 
thrives on details that record the contact or interactions between a body and a shared 
environment. Thus the antidote Eliot’s narrator offers to the illusory, picturesque description of 
the cottage is a set of details that replace the description’s “quiet light of a sky marbled with high 
clouds” with a chastening sense of meteorological conditions as an ambient force that must be 
continually contended with: the back-kitchen door of Freeman’s End is “the only entrance ever 
used, and one always open except in bad weather”; “the awkwardnesses of weather” are one of 
the few things that Dagley, by existential necessity, “kn[ows] thoroughly” (371, 373). Dorothea, 
too, protests her uncle’s disregard of the reality of his tenants’ poverty by mobilizing the 
language of vague physical sensation against picturesque visual detail: “I used to come from the 
village with all that dirt and coarse ugliness like a pain within me, and the simpering pictures in 
the drawing-room seemed to me like a wicked attempt to find delight in what is false” (242).  
 The ethical privilege that the novel grants to auratic over detailed description is confirmed 
in the novel’s most heroic act of sympathy, when Dorothea’s dim perception of the landscape 
outside her window at Tipton sparks the epiphany that motivates the visit she pays Rosamond to 
prevent her from committing adultery with Will Ladislaw. Following her traumatic vision of 
Rosamond and Will in romantic tete-a-tete, Dorothea weathers a long dark night of the soul, then 
turns her tear-reddened, short-sighted eyes on the pearly dawn:  
She opened the curtains, and looked out towards the bit of road that lay in view, 
with fields beyond, outside the entrance-gates. On the road there was a man with a 
bundle on his back and a woman carrying her baby; in the field she could see 
figures moving—perhaps the shepherd with his dog. Far off in the bending sky 
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was the pearly light; and she felt the largeness of the world and the manifold 
wakings of men to labour and endurance. She was a part of that involuntary, 
palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious shelter as a 
mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complaining. (741) 
 
The descriptive language in this passage studiously avoids all of the specificities of detail that 
deaden the description of Freeman’s End. The narrator’s use of the generic term “shelter” to 
describe the luxurious Tipton levels class distinctions by conjuring a sense of base-line survival, 
invoking the bare human requirement of shelter from the ravages of weather. The word distinctly 
recalls both the abandoned cottage schemes of Dorothea’s youth and the awkward visit to Dagley 
at Freeman’s End—the only dwelling in the novel that can be classified as a “shelter” in its most 
basic, literal sense. Despite its lyricism, this epiphanic landscape is not a figurative projection of 
Dorothea’s expansive mood, nor does it relegate the social world to mere background for 
Dorothea’s own plot. Read against the background of the novel’s frequently-invoked biological 
language of organic media, Dorothea’s recognition of her participation in the “involuntary, 
palpitating life” of the world points less to a vague symbolism than to the literal imbrication of 
biological bodies with each other and with their material environments. The spatial dynamics of 
outward expansion in this scene created by the arc of the “bending sky” and “pearly light,” as 
well as the expansive progression of the narrator’s description (from “curtains” to “road” to 
“field beyond”), grants Dorothea a sensation of multiplottedness itself, a network of disparate 
figures encompassed within a shared field or medium of experience. 
 The sensation of multiplottedness that is repeatedly enabled for Middlemarch’s characters 
by the novel’s atmospherics and landscape descriptions has an analogical relationship, I want to 
suggest, with the ethical function of fiction-reading as Eliot understands it. Atmospheres’ 
boundary-eroding tendency within the diegetic space of Middlemarch extends, in the novel’s 
finale, to the boundary between fiction and reality, between text and world. Readers are invited 
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to feel themselves enveloped by the novel’s world—and have similar responses to such 
envelopment—just as the characters experience and respond affectively to their shared 
envelopment by the novel’s represented weather and environments. While making such a leap 
from the world within the novel to the world of the reader may seem naively intuitive, I would 
nevertheless argue that Eliot’s understanding of the relationship between literature and material 
reality warrants such a move. Spencer and Lewes’s social organicist theory, with which Eliot 
was very familiar, positioned literature and language as material forces in the process of social 
evolution. As Suzanne Graver notes, “language is the crucial nexus between the individual and 
the social organism, compensating for nothing less than the one major difference between them,” 
namely that “the former . . . is composed of proximate parts that form a physical whole; the latter 
of living units more or less dispersed” (186). Language, according to Spencer, is what elevates 
the idea of a social organism from a metaphor to a literal reality, acting as a quasi-material 
substitute for the physical contiguity of the organism’s constituent parts, a vital medium that 
flows between and unites the discrete bodies that compose the social whole.26 Visible in Eliot’s 
frequent appeals to the idea of a pervasive medium in Middlemarch is a similar interest in 
locating a unifying, communicative substance capable of filling in the empty gaps between living 
bodies. 
 In the novel’s final pages, Eliot takes the biological idiom of the medium in which her 
characters live and extends it to her readers in such a manner as to further erode the boundaries 
between the novel’s intra- and extradiegetic space. The narrator positions the reader in direct 
relation to Dorothea using the atmospheric language of diffusion and immersion. In summing up 
the “issues” of Dorothea’s life, the narrator returns to the St. Theresa analogy of the novel’s 
                                                
26 See Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 1:447-48. 
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Prelude, lamenting that “there is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly 
determined by what lies outside it”; modern endeavor cannot follow the heroes of history 
because “the medium in which their ardent deeds took shape is forever gone” (785). Yet Eliot’s 
narrator compensates for this evaporated medium by employing a language of atmospheric 
surround that encompasses both Dorothea and a newly introduced “we.” Situating reader and 
narrator in a common world with Dorothea, Eliot envisions her readers as the preparers of a new 
medium in which Dorothea and those like her will enact their struggles: “But we insignificant 
people with our daily words and acts are preparing the lives of many Dorotheas” (785). Two 
sentences later, this relationship is inverted, and Dorothea is now the diffusive benefactor of 
“you and me.” Averring that Dorothea’s “spirit had still its fine issues,” the narrator ends, “But 
the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably diffusive: for the growing good of 
the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as 
they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in 
unvisited tombs” (785). If this passage begins with a pessimistic statement about the 
determination of all creatures (Dorothea included) by external environments and “media,” it 
nevertheless restores a version of historical agency by subsequently positioning Dorothea as an 
influential factor in other individuals’ environments. The narrator’s sleight of hand inverts figure 
and ground, organism and environment, so that the determined entity is now presented as a 
determining factor. While it may be difficult to ascertain the source of agency in such a 
scenario—if all agents are externally determined, how is freedom to be found in the fact that 
some of them influence one another?—it seems to arise from the space between individuals, 
from the diffusive atmosphere whose absence, we are told, forecloses meaningful action, but 
whose presence perhaps enables it. Spirit, fine issues, incalculable diffusion: the atmospheric 
   126 
evanescence of Eliot’s language at the novel’s close progressively effaces the boundary between 
inside and outside, text and reader, fiction and reality. The sympathetic relay between Dorothea 
and “us” (and, by extension, with other people both in and out of fiction) is dependent on a 
diffusion or suspension of fictional boundaries. 
  
   127 
Chapter 3:  
 
Thomas Hardy’s Ghostly Architectures and the Novel as Virtual Environment 
 
 The novels of Thomas Hardy are more frequently associated with the idea of 
environment than those of any other nineteenth-century writer. One of the few Victorian 
novelists to use the term explicitly, Hardy categorized seven of his best-known novels as 
“Novels of Character and Environment” for the Wessex edition of his works in 1912, and the 
richly-described regional landscapes of his most frequently read novels have led critics, since the 
novels’ first publication, to assert that Hardy’s novels are primarily concerned with the interface 
between the human individual and a determining nonhuman environment that dwarfs or erodes 
human agency. Yet while most critics take for granted that a quasi-Darwinian notion of 
environment is foundational to Hardy’s imagination, there is little consensus about the 
implications and emotional valence of the relationship between individual and environment in 
the Wessex novels.   
 Readings of the role of environment in Hardy’s fiction largely fall into one of two 
groups: those that see Hardy’s fiction as representing a Darwinian universe in which characters 
are at the mercy of a determining natural environment that is tragically hostile to human agency, 
and ecocritically-inflected readings that celebrate Hardy’s erasure of boundaries between the 
human and the natural as evidence of a proto-ecological sensibility in Hardy’s novels. At the 
heart of this bifurcation is both a conflicted conception of what “environment” means (both to 
Hardy and to the critic), as well as a differential privileging of either plot or description as the 
most significant formal aspect of Hardy’s writing. Critics who emphasize the hostile, 
deterministic aspects of the environments in Hardy’s novels tend to focus on plot, particularly on 
the small moments of blind material cause-and-effect that precipitate Hardy’s characters towards 
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disaster: the moment when Tess’s letter to Angel Clare slides under the rug, or when Eustacia 
Vye lingers a moment too long to answer Mrs. Yeobright’s knock on the door, unwittingly 
sending the older woman to her death on the sun-hot heath. The environment to which these 
characters are subject is the aggregate of material influences on the courses of their lives—a vast 
abstraction that condenses the physical conditions of the geography and communities they 
inhabit, as well as the mechanical forces of cause and effect governed by physical laws. The 
coincidences and inexorable obstacles that derail human intention are often effects of the 
material infrastructures amongst which they dwell: “the most primitive antagonist of 
consciousness is, on the simplest premise, the earth itself” (Van Ghent 201). The collision 
between human and environment unfolds along the temporal axis of plot and produces a sense of 
Hardy’s individuals as “so determined by overarching forces that they finally become 
indistinguishable from their surroundings” (Plotz, Portable, 122). 
For recent readers approaching Hardy’s novels from an ecocritical perspective, the 
environment of Hardy’s novels is to be celebrated and adulated rather than lamented, 
representing a harmonious or politically laudable sense of continuity between the human and the 
natural world. When Jonathan Bate, for example, claims that for certain characters in The 
Woodlanders “there is no division between human intercourse and local environment,” his use of 
the word “environment” approaches the term’s ecological sense—as a vital material surround 
that supports (human) life—while leaving behind the idea of environment as deterministic or 
mechanical pressure on human agency (“Culture” 554). Bate’s reading also embraces a 
spatialized rather than a temporalized sense of the term, focusing much more closely on the 
richly described arboreal setting of The Woodlanders than on its plot mechanics. In another 
ecologically-oriented reading, William Cohen argues that the descriptive apparatus of The 
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Woodlanders promotes a radically materialist understanding of the world in which humans are 
no longer meaningfully distinct from their surroundings, producing “a generalized breakdown of 
the differentiation between the natural and the cultural, the environment and the human” (17) and 
“offer[ing] a way of designating a subject without limiting subjectivity as a condition of the 
human” (12). Ecocritics like Cohen and Bate thus concur with earlier critics in observing that the 
Hardyan environment erodes human agency, but diverge from them in asserting that this erosion 
should be celebrated both as heralding a pleasurable and liberatory conjunction between human 
and nonhuman, and as exploding the idea that agency and subjectivity inhere exclusively in the 
human individual. 
 Perhaps because this latter critical perspective on environment in Hardy is focused on a 
spatialized and descriptive version of the concept, rather than a temporalized/narrative one, it 
overlaps considerably with the vast body of scholarship on the role of place and regionalism in 
Hardy’s fiction. The critical interest in Hardy as a regional writer is as old as Hardy’s writings 
themselves; his canonization in the early twentieth century was largely based on his reputation as 
the spokesman for English country life, as is attested by books such as Harold Grimsditch’s 1925 
Character and Environment in the Novels of Thomas Hardy, which focuses almost entirely on 
Hardy’s representation of Dorset country life and customs. While recent ecocriticism like that of 
Bate and Cohen follows this older tradition in celebrating Hardy’s sensuous, detail-oriented 
attention to rural life and locales, other recent work oriented towards Hardy’s self-positioning 
within English national culture insists that Hardy’s relationship to regionalism was more critical 
than celebratory. Tim Dolin, for example, contends that while Hardy's fiction often serves to fuel 
the touristic fantasy of “authentic” premodern locales untouched by modernity, parts of Hardy’s 
novels are also self-conscious about this fantasy, showing how the supposedly premodern rural 
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idyll is actually constituted by the capitalist phenomena of modern tourism and consumption. 
John Plotz has likewise argued that Hardy’s novels are less interested in representing a 
monolithic hostile environment or nostalgically celebrating the organic communities of regional 
locales, than in anatomizing the ways in which the limits and idiosyncrasies of individual 
perception prevents any landscape or locale from being communicable or shareable by a 
community in a meaningful way. 
 These critiques of Hardy’s alignment with a celebratory regionalism tend to run at cross-
purposes with ecologically-oriented interpretations of Hardy. While anti-regionalist critics are 
invested in critiquing as naive or ideological the notion that Hardy’s images of regional life are 
authentic mimetic representations of actually existing places and communities, ecocritics often 
want to preserve a sense of Hardy’s finely-attuned referentiality, since for them, the novels’ keen 
registration of an actually-existing material world outside the text is precisely what makes them 
ecologically and even politically instructive. This disagreement registers not only differing 
critical investments, but also a paradox that is intrinsic to Hardy’s writing: even as his descriptive 
prose lyrically celebrates a fine-grained attention to and tactile contact with details of the 
material world, his representation of the relationship between characters and their immediate 
environments is deeply conflicted about both the possibility and the value of living in 
unalienated communion with a stable set of organic surroundings. 
 In this chapter, I approach the question of environment in Hardy anew by focusing on the 
artificial, rather than the natural, environments of Hardy’s fiction. Although the rural landscapes, 
animals, and plants of Hardy’s Wessex novels are the parts of his fiction most frequently taken to 
constitute its “environment,” Hardy began his career as an architect and evinced a sustained 
interest in architecture throughout his life. The described environments of his novels include 
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many architectural structures, both in the novels whose plots revolve explicitly around architect 
characters and the restoration of churches and castles—Desperate Remedies, A Pair of Blue 
Eyes, A Laodicean and Jude the Obscure—as well as in the novels whose plots meander through 
the domestic and vernacular architecture of houses, cottages, and huts. At the same time, Hardy’s 
own critical writings on the novel as a genre envision the novel itself as a kind of artificial 
structure, capable of sheltering and enveloping a reader through the vivid descriptive realization 
of a fictional place. I focus on The Woodlanders, a novel unique both for its unusual descriptive 
techniques and for its inclusion of architecture as a major thematic element. It is also widely 
considered to be a paradigmatic example of Hardy’s ability to materialize before the reader a 
living, highly particularized local environment. In the opening section, I explore the way in 
which Hardy imagines the novel as an artificial environment that envelops the reader, abstracting 
her from her material surroundings. The many scenes in The Woodlanders in which characters 
are depicted as abstracted from the material world of Little Hintock, I suggest, reflect Hardy’s 
ambivalence about the worldmaking descriptive powers of the novel, especially the regional 
novel. In the second half of the chapter, I examine how architecture in The Woodlanders 
functions as a major element of the plot. The vernacular architecture of huts and cottages works 
as a critique of the picturesque ideals with which such structures were visually associated, and, 
more importantly, as a site where Hardy tests description’s capacity to materialize a fictional 
world for a reader.  
Envelopment, Abstraction, and Fictional Environments 
Late nineteenth-century novel critics, including Hardy himself, frequently imagined 
novel-reading as involving an orientation of abstraction or detachment from one’s physical 
environment. In his 1888 essay “The Profitable Reading of Fiction,” Hardy identifies as one of 
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fiction’s most laudable qualities its capacity temporarily to abstract or screen readers from their 
immediate surroundings. The value of this kind of escapism, he suggests, is that it provides relief 
from the strain of modern life and labour: “to get pleasure out of a book is a beneficial and 
profitable thing, if the pleasure be of a kind which . . . affords relaxation and relief when the 
mind is overstrained or sick of itself” (111). Hardy conceives this relief in spatialized yet 
immaterial terms, suggesting that “the prime remedy in such cases is change of scene, by which, 
change of the material scene is not necessarily implied. A sudden shifting of the mental 
perspective into a fictitious world, combined with rest, is well known to be often as efficacious 
for renovation as a corporeal journey afar” (111). The success of the fictional world in effecting 
such a “change of scene” depends for Hardy in part on the completeness with which it screens 
out the actual world, as well as on the contrast between the reader’s lived world and the 
represented one: “the shifting of scene should manifestly be as complete as if the reader had 
taken the hind seat on a witch’s broomstick. The town man finds what he seeks in the novels of 
the country, the countryman in novels of society, the indoor class generally in outdoor novels, 
the villager in novels of the mansion, the aristocrat in novels of the cottage” (111). In identifying 
the evocation of scenic contrast as a major desideratum of novel-reading, Hardy is clearly 
describing at least in part his relationship with his own editors and readership, one that often 
positioned Hardy as a purveyor of rural English authenticity to a mostly urban readership. Yet 
instead of merely advocating for a writer-reader relationship that closely resembles his own, 
Hardy theorizes the psychological, even therapeutic, value of scenic contrast in strikingly anti-
realist terms. Insisting that “the aim should be contrast,” Hardy observes, “directly the 
circumstances begin to resemble those of the reader, a personal connection, an interest other than 
an imaginative one, is set up, which results in an intellectual stir that is not in the present case to 
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be desired” (112). Hardy’s theory of therapeutic novel-reading asks both for a thickness of 
world-making description, as well as for a readerly passivity that submits itself to the authorial 
imagination—he asks that the author “be believed in slavishly, implicitly” (111).  
 Late-Victorian literary criticism frequently made a similar connection between thick 
description in novels and an environment that envelops or transports a passive reader. One 
typically ambivalent essay on this question is Edmund Yates’s 1880 “Descriptions in Novels,” 
which notes that novels of the late nineteenth century are more lavish in scenic description than 
their eighteenth-century counterparts, which were “too busy accounting for the behaviour of his 
hero and heroine to pay more than very slight attention to the mineral, vegetable, and 
atmospheric environment amidst which the behavior took place” (606). Yates tentatively 
attributes this rise of scenic description in the nineteenth century to two factors. First, he parallels 
Hardy in positing that the rise of description may reflect “a natural instinct whereby our 
overstrained mental apparatus seeks to achieve absolute relaxation” (607). The idea that 
description saves, rather than costs, the reader labour may seem counterintuitive, but Yates 
explains this by comparing description to elaborate scenery in drama: just as stage scenery spares 
the viewer the mental labour of imagining the characters’ surroundings, so too does description 
in novels replace the reader’s mental construction of an image with a readymade one. Second, in 
asking what we are to deduce from the fact that increased description means a proportional 
decline in “the portrayal of the actions and passions of the characters themselves,” he points out 
that “the conviction is gaining ground . . . that man is not detachable from his surroundings: he is 
part and parcel of the world he lives in in a more intimate sense than the ancients appear to have 
imagined; and to separate him therefrom . . . would be tantamount to depriving him of his best 
chance of being understood” (607).  Throughout the essay, Yates thus oscillates between 
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interpreting description in cultural terms as a modern labour-saving device, and in intellectual 
historical terms as a formal response to recent advances in biological thought. By linking 
description to the idea of environment, Yates imagines the novel as a genre responsible for 
anatomizing the relationship between characters and physical surroundings; by arguing for its 
capacity to relax the mind of the reader, he extends this environmental analogy to the 
relationship between reader and text as well, envisioning description as a virtual environment 
that a reader temporarily inhabits. 
 The idea that the novel acts as a kind of artificial environment resonates with Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope, which fuses the temporal and spatial characteristics of 
narrative texts into a single formal concept. Like an environment, the chronotope involves an 
“intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships,” operating along both a temporal 
axis of narrative cause-and-effect, and a spatial axis of relationship between individual characters 
and a described surround (84). Over the course of his essay, Bakhtin maps out and anatomizes a 
series of specific chronotopes that shape the history of Western literary genres—the road, the 
idyll, the provincial town, the castle, and many others—but he ultimately insists on the extreme 
portability of the chronotope concept: “each such chronotope can include within it an unlimited 
number of minor chronotopes . . . any motif may have a special chronotope of its own. . . . 
Chronotopes are mutually inclusive, they co-exist, they may be interwoven with, replace or 
oppose one another, contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex 
interrelationships” (252). While it is in some ways tantalizingly vague, a chronotope, like an 
environment, toggles mysteriously between the abstract and the material: it “function[s] as the 
primary means for materializing time in space, [and] emerges as a center for concretizing 
representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel. All the novel’s abstract elements—
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philosophical and social generalizations, ideas, analyses of cause and effect—gravitate toward 
the chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood, permitting the imaging power of art to do 
its work” (250). Like a chronotope, an environment in literature—especially in Hardy and the 
body of criticism his novels have generated—serves both as a conceptual shorthand for the 
deterministic, temporalized mechanisms of cause and effect, as well as a concrete, spatially 
realized material world in which the narrative unfolds and the characters live and breathe (Egdon 
Heath or the woodlands surrounding Little Hintock, for example). The Bakhtinian chronotope 
offers a language for articulating how the descriptive apparatus of Hardy’s novels perform the 
simultaneous function of (a) the mimesis or making-real of a physical place, and (b) the 
conceptual work of “philosophical and social generalizations, ideas, analyses of cause and 
effect,” as Bakhtin puts it. The mimetic and the symbolic are thus never fully separable when it 
comes to the chronotope, which is always performing both of these functions—the 
representational and the conceptual—simultaneously.   
The rich “sense of place” for which ecocritics and scholars invested in regionalism 
celebrate Hardy corresponds in many particulars to what Bakhtin identifies as the “idyllic 
chronotope,” which is defined by a deeply-rooted emphasis on local embeddedness and a 
cyclical sense of time: the idyllic chronotope, as Bakhtin has it, is characterized by 
an organic fastening-down, a grafting of life and its events to a place, to a familiar 
territory with all its nooks and crannies, its familiar mountains, valleys, fields, 
rivers and forests, and one’s own home. Idyllic life and its events are inseparable 
from this concrete, spatial corner of the world where the fathers and grandfathers 
lived. . . . This little spatial world is limited and sufficient unto itself, not linked in 
any intrinsic way with other places. . . . This unity of place in the life of 
generations weakens and renders less distinct all temporal boundaries between 
individual lives and between various phases of one and the same life. (225) 
 
The Bakhtinian idyll precisely describes so many of the worlds of Hardy’s novels: the woodlands 
of Little Hintock, Talbothays’ Dairy, even Egdon Heath. The deep material intimacy and 
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familiarity between individuals and their natural surroundings, undergirded by deeply-ingrained, 
customary knowledge of specific local environments, also resembles what ecocritic Greg 
Garrard, following Heidegger, has called “dwelling”: a state of existence that “implies the long-
term imbrication of humans in a landscape of memory, ancestry and death, of ritual, life and 
work” (108). For many ecocritics, the capacity to conjure for an alienated reader the rich 
plenitude of “dwelling,” of intimate and harmonious material continuity and interaction between 
the human and the nonhuman world, is the mark of a text with a laudable ecological sensibility. 
Even critics whose work predates the rise of ecocriticism, such as Elaine Scarry and Michael 
Irwin, identify material continuity and immersiveness as the most distinctive features of Hardy’s 
writing; Scarry identifies this feature with Hardy’s deep interest in depicting labor, while Irwin 
points to it as evidence of his preeminence as a regional writer.27 Elaine Auyoung makes a 
similar claim from the perspective of the phenomenology of reading, noting that Hardy’s 
descriptive techniques evoke a longing for a fusion or non-differentiation of the self from the 
novel’s represented world: the “irreducible fact of literary experience” that Hardyan description 
aggravates is “the sustained mental posture of trying to come into touch with persons and places 
that are only implied. . . . As vividly as a novelist may seem to ‘show’ the story he tells, that 
vividness is at every moment tethered to the inaccessibility of the referred-to storyworld” (561-
62). The vividness with which Hardy evokes and describes this “storyworld” of idyllic dwelling 
is almost enough to conceal the fact that this idyllic impulse is always on the wane and under 
threat: the cyclical seasons in The Woodlanders or Tess do not mitigate the tragic termination of 
Giles’s or Tess’s individual lives, the spatial regions of Hardy’s fiction are not isolated and self-
sufficient but entirely permeable to modern agricultural technologies and cosmopolitan intruders.  
                                                
27 See Scarry, “Work.” 
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But while Hardy’s reception celebrates his novels’ ability to descriptively “embed” a 
reader in a virtual organic environment that almost feels real, Hardy’s characters often inhabit 
states of abstraction or transport that sharply contrast against the deep material embeddedness 
critics have tended to associate with Hardy’s writing. The harmonious merging of self and 
environment that ecocritics celebrate in Hardy does occur occasionally in Hardy’s novels, but 
this merging is not always positive, and Hardy is equally if not more interested in states of 
abstraction or alienation from the physical world. These states of abstraction are sometimes 
directly associated with the activity of reading, as when Clym Yeobright fails to take note of his 
marriage’s precarity because he is focused on study (a metaphor that becomes literalized when 
his excessive reading physically blinds him to his surroundings). They also frequently take the 
form of an affective atmosphere that isolates or screens characters from their immediate material 
or social circumstances. In The Woodlanders, for example, the narrator frequently uses the term 
“environment” to describe not the ecstatic merging of character and organic surroundings, but 
rather the disjunction between a character’s mental preoccupations and his or her physical 
environs. Take, for example, this moment in which Mr. Melbury waits in Mrs. Charmond’s 
antechamber, hoping to persuade her to reject Fitzpiers’s advances so that Fitzpiers’s marriage to 
Grace will not be jeopardized: “Melbury sat with his hands resting on the familiar knobbed thorn 
walking-stick whose growing he had seen before he enjoyed its use. The scene to him was not 
the material environment of his person, but a tragic vision that travelled with him like an 
envelope. Through this vision the incidents of the moment gleamed confusedly here and there, as 
an outer landscape through the high-coloured scenes of a stained window” (207). Hardy’s 
narrator here carefully charts the gap between two different types of relationship with one’s 
environment: a relationship of deep material continuity, and a relationship of alienated 
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abstraction from one’s material surroundings. Introducing Melbury’s “knobbed thorn walking-
stick” as a synecdochic emblem of Melbury’s embeddedness in his woodland environment, the 
narrator points to its material origins in a tree “whose growing [Melbury] had seen before he 
enjoyed its use.” This reminder of embeddedness acts as a foil to Melbury’s current 
environmental orientation, in which the “material environment” to which he is usually so 
consciously and materially attuned gives way to the “tragic vision” of Grace’s failed marriage, 
which “travel[s] with him like an envelope” and obscures his material surroundings.  
 The Woodlanders abounds in similar moments of abstraction that afflict a wide range of 
the novel’s characters. They typically occur when a speculation about an impending or desired 
plot development spurs a character to forget his or her immediate surroundings, and they are 
usually described as moments in which a mental or imaginary “scene” interrupts perception and 
displaces the character’s physical environment. When Grace finds Giles in a hut in the woods 
near the end of the novel, she sees him with “his eyes on the roasting animal, his face so rapt that 
speculation could build nothing on it concerning his thoughts, more than that they were not on 
the scene before him” (270). Grace experiences such moments of abstraction more frequently 
than any other character. During a conversation with Giles, she falls into a reverie about her 
budding friendship with Mrs. Charmond, and “fall[s] into such an abstracted gaze at the mental 
image of Mrs. Charmond . . . that it almost conjured up a vision of that lady to Giles himself” 
(61). At his ill-starred dinner party, she drifts off again into thoughts about the women with 
whom she had recently attended school: “she was thinking, as she watched the gyrations, of a 
very different measure that she had been accustomed to tread with a bevy of sylph-like creatures 
in muslin in the music-room of a large house, most of whom were now moving in scenes widely 
removed from this, both as regarded place, and character” (70). After her friendship with Mrs. 
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Charmond cools, her thoughts drift once again to contrasting scenes: “[Grace] was thinking of 
something which had little connection with the scene before her—thinking of her friend, lost as 
soon as found, Mrs. Charmond; of her capricious conduct, and of the contrasting scenes she was 
possibly enjoying at that very moment in other climes” (124). In all of these moments, the 
narrator asks the reader to envision a physical scene surrounding Grace, as well as an alternate, 
immaterial scene that she temporarily inhabits mentally. 
 One of the most striking instances of environmental abstraction occurs towards the end of 
the novel, when Grace, under the false impression that her unhappy marriage to Fitzpiers can be 
annulled, permits Giles to kiss her. The narrator describes the moment in terms reminiscent of 
the scene where Mr. Melbury visits Mrs. Charmond’s home wrapped in a tragic envelope. In this 
scene, though, the emotional envelope that screens out Grace’s real situation is comedic rather 
than tragic: “She drew a catching breath and turned pale. The duologue had been affectionate 
comedy up to this point. The gloomy atmosphere of the past, and the still gloomy horizon of the 
present, had been for the interval forgotten. Now the whole environment came back, the due 
balance of shade among the light was restored” (253). By describing the array of circumstances 
that determine Grace’s shifting marital status as an “environment,” the narrator does something 
strange to the term, detaching it from the natural world and even from physical surroundings. 
Instead, “environment” here denotes something closer to an abstract aggregate of causes, 
including the particulars of Grace’s marriage to Fitzpiers, the details of the ill-understood new 
marriage law, and the painful family history between the Winterbornes and the Melburys. In both 
this scene and the examples discussed above, the narrator invokes the concept of environment to 
denote a reality from which a character is affectively detached, whether that reality consist of 
material objects or of abstract social causes. While the affective orientation of “environment” 
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varies in each case (Mr. Melbury experiences his emotional envelope as a “tragic vision,” while 
Grace’s is “affectionate comedy”), in both cases the narrator appeals to the idea of environment 
to highlight a state of detachment or temporary isolation from one’s social or physical 
surroundings, rather than material continuity or embeddedness within them.  
In this sense, the emotional envelopment of Hardy’s characters is novelistic. Like the 
hypothetical reader in Hardy’s essay, Hardy’s characters undergo a “shifting of the mental 
perspective into a fictitious world” that, like a novel, obscures the material surroundings that 
exert an often unbearable pressure on their bodily existence. The two different environmental 
orientations the narrator signals in these scenes—harmonious embeddedness and mental 
abstraction—also correspond to an opposition between description and plot. The described world 
at the characters’ fingertips fails to register because they are mentally enveloped in plot—in the 
intricate marriage-and-adultery narrative that structures the novel’s second half and forms the 
material of Melbury’s “tragic vision” and Grace’s “environment.” The novel’s descriptive 
scenery, the tangled, viscous thickness of the forest landscape which, Melbury’s walking-stick 
attests, has until now been his native element, loses its material immediacy for the characters.  
For even as the novel promises to purvey the experience of authentic embeddedness in a 
material environment—a promise that, according to many Victorian reviewers, The Woodlanders 
did indeed make good on, largely through its extraordinarily vivid descriptions of the Hintock 
woods—it does so only by subjecting the individual reader to the same process of abstraction 
from immediate surroundings that the novel’s alienated characters themselves suffer from. Tim 
Dolin indicates a related paradox when he points out that although Giles and Marty seem to be 
“‘at one with,’ or ‘in harmony with,’ or ‘a part of something we describe as ‘the landscape’ or as 
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‘Nature,’ we must remember that ‘these words and phrases can make sense . . . only to those 
whose experience is wide and therefore de-localized’” (552, quoting Barrell).  
More than just requiring a prior stock of de-localized experience to be recognized as 
authentic, though, The Woodlanders’s representation of local embeddedness in an environment 
requires the reader detach or partition herself from her own immediate environment. It is true, of 
course, that all reading experiences involve a detachment or withdrawal of attention from one’s 
immediate environment, but Hardy seems particularly concerned with this aspect of the reading 
experience, perhaps because his novels so often ironically celebrate precisely the attentiveness to 
environment that novel-reading curtails.28 David Sweeney Coombs has argued that reading is 
represented in Hardy’s fiction as “a narrowly focalized mode of perception” that “depends on the 
subject’s ability to block out a larger field of stimuli,” imposing a perceptual limitation that 
becomes literalized in Clym’s blindness from too much reading (944). This limitation on 
perception imposed by reading becomes even more vexed when the content of one’s reading 
material is a celebration of that attunement to a field of environing stimuli that the reading act 
itself precludes. The Woodlanders explores this paradox by juxtaposing vivid tactile descriptions 
of the natural environment it depicts with descriptions of characters enveloped in ethereal, 
abstracted states that partition them from that same environment. These states of quasi-material 
abstraction, sometimes but not always explicitly linked with acts of reading, apply to the novel’s 
natives as much as to its sophisticates, complicating any simple division within the novel 
between the environmentally-attuned naif and the alienated modern. 
                                                
28 The high value that Hardy places on the perceptual act of “noticing” environmental details is 
most clearly articulated in “Afterwards” (1917), an elegiac poem describing a man whose legacy 
is his habit of attending to the natural details and living creatures around him: each stanza returns 
to a variation on the phrase “He was a man who used to notice such things” (4).  
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Nowhere in The Woodlanders is the abstractive capacity of reading more directly 
explored than in the scene where the outsider Fitzpiers reads a book while alternately watching 
the Hintock timber laborers at work. The scene occurs in the early days of Fitzpiers’s and 
Grace’s acquaintance, prior to their engagement but after Fitzpiers has already found himself 
bewitched by the village maiden. Fitzpiers comes upon Mr. Melbury and a group of labourers 
barking oak trees in a clearing one day when, we are told, “book in hand, he went to a part of the 
wood where the trees were mainly oaks” (121). Fitzpiers casually divides his attention between 
the book in his hand and the idyllic scene of rural labour unfolding before his eyes: 
A little shed had been constructed on the spot, of thatched hurdles and boughs; 
and in front of it was a fire, over which a kettle sang. Fitzpiers sat down inside the 
shelter and went on with his reading, except when he looked up to observe the 
scene and the actors. The thought that he might settle here and become welded in 
with this sylvan life by marrying Grace Melbury crossed his mind for a moment. 
Why should he go further into the world than where he was? The secret of 
happiness lay in limiting the aspirations; these men’s thoughts were conterminous 
with the margin of the Hintock woodlands, and why should not his be likewise 
limited, a small practice among the people around him being the bound of his 
desires? (122-23) 
 
As Tim Dolin has observed, this passage undoes the sharp distinction between the authentic 
native and the inauthentic outsider by positioning Fitzpiers as the spectator of a drama, 
“induc[ing] us to think about work in Hardy . . . as a form of cultural production, a kind of 
performance” (550). Certainly, the passage positions Fitzpiers as a kind of proxy for a 
metropolitan reader: like Hardy’s readership, he appreciatively watches a performance of rural 
labour that is served up to him as a performance of authenticity, and this vision incites a series of 
thoughts about the desirability of seamless integration with a rural environment. Seemingly 
shoring up the extradiegetic parallel between Fitzpiers and a reader of one of Hardy’s novels, 
Fitzpiers is holding a book in his hands as he gazes at this spectacle of rural authenticity. 
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 Yet the book that Fitzpiers holds is not the source of his primitive fantasy, but rather a 
second object competing for his attention, part of an experience with which every reader is surely 
familiar: the alternating ebb and flow of attention as one is arrested, even transported, by the 
printed page, and then brought back to one’s material surroundings through a waning of interest 
in the text or an active solicitation from something in one’s environment. In his essay “The 
Space of the Novel,” Michel Butor describes thus the underexamined relationship between 
fictional spaces and the material spaces in which they are instantiated: 
When I read the description of a room in a novel, the furnishings which are before 
my eyes, but which I am not looking at, give way to the ones which emerge or 
transpire from the words on the printed page. 
This ‘volume,’ as we say, which I hold in my hand, sets free as a result of my 
attention evocations which assert themselves, haunt the place where I am, 
displacing me. 
This other place interests me, installs itself, only insofar as the place where I am 
fails to satisfy me. If I am bored there--it is reading which allows me to remain 
where I am in flesh and blood. The novel’s space, then, is a particularization of an 
‘elsewhere,’ complementary to the real space in which it is evoked. (32) 
 
Butor’s description of reading focuses on the process of immersion in a book—the way in which 
its represented space haunts the material space in which the reader finds himself—but Hardy’s 
description of Fitzpiers reading in the clearing dramatizes the reverse process, the return to a 
material environment from a temporary immersion in a virtual one.29 Yet although Fitzpiers 
                                                
29 J. Hillis Miller claims in Distance and Desire that Hardy was interested in the experiences of 
reading and writing as an alternation between a virtual and a material world similar to what 
Butor describes: “Though [Hardy] is in a real room and performing the physical act of covering 
paper with words, he is turned away from what is immediately before him and dwells in the 
imaginary realm his words create. His words fall lightly on the paper and change it into a means 
of access to a new world which is visible nowhere in the room. This new realm generated in an 
act which pays little attention to the room as a place in which to live. In the same way the reader 
of a novel, sunk in an armchair, is both within his immediate surroundings and outside them. 
Turning the pages of a book and following the words with attentive eyes is as real a form of 
behavior as any other, and yet the reader dwells apart, turned away in absence of mind to a place 
which exists only in the subtle pages of his book” (39). 
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experiences the migration of his attention from the printed page to his material surroundings as a 
movement from cultured detachment towards a more authentic connection with his local 
surroundings, the scene of reading nevertheless works on two contradictory levels. 
Intradiegetically, Fitzpiers is drawn out of his book by a desire for an authentic immersion in his 
immediate environment. From the reader’s perspective, however, the scene does precisely the 
opposite, inviting the reader of The Woodlanders to more deeply lose herself in the textual 
spectacle of labour that is occurring on the level of reality for Fitzpiers but of representation for 
Hardy’s reader. If Fitzpiers is the reader returned from his book to the world of the real, the 
actual reader of this same scene is Fitzpiers’s mirrored opposite: Butor’s displaced reader, whose 
real world “give[s] way” to the one “which emerge[s] or transpire[s] from the words on the 
printed page.” 
 In its representation of the relationships between characters and their environments, then, 
The Woodlanders departs from the deeply embedded “sense of place” for which Hardy has so 
often been celebrated in order to anatomize a range of more abstracted and distanced orientations 
towards environment. Recognizing the extent to which the novel itself acts as a kind of artificial 
environment that screens out a wider field of stimuli helps to correct the emphasis on material 
immediacy in critical discussions of the environment in Hardy. Instead, The Woodlanders shows 
how Hardy frequently appealed to the idea of environment to explore temporary and artificial 
states and experiences that interrupt the material continuity of self and environment. In the 
second half of this chapter, I focus on architecture in Hardy’s novels in order to show how Hardy 
often turns to architectural description as a test case for fiction’s ability to immerse and envelop a 
reader. 
Architecture, the Picturesque, and the Housing Plot of The Woodlanders 
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Hardy’s interest in architecture throughout his career is well-documented. Apprenticed to 
the architect John Hicks at the age of sixteen in 1856, Hardy worked with Hicks, and, following 
his death, with another architect, G.R. Crickmay, until 1871, when Desperate Remedies was 
published and his career as a novelist began in earnest (Life 31-86). Although he never again 
worked as a professional architect, Hardy maintained an interest in architectural matters 
throughout his life, on several occasions acting as a consultant for church restoration projects, 
and publishing many pieces of writing on architectural questions, most notably the essay 
“Memories of Church Restoration,” written for the Society for the Protection of Ancient 
Buildings, as late as 1906. While much of Hardy’s architectural work and writing focused on the 
restoration of Gothic churches, there is ample evidence that he was deeply interested in domestic 
and vernacular architecture as well. The drawings in his surviving “Architecture Notebook,” 
mostly undated but probably made throughout the last four decades of the nineteenth century, are 
evenly divided between sketches of church ornaments and architectural features, and floorplans 
of labourers’ cottages, along with written notes about the most practical systems for plumbing in 
labourers’ dwellings. In 1927, Hardy wrote a prefatory note on “The Ancient Cottages of 
England” for Stanley Baldwin’s The Preservation of Ancient Cottages: An Appeal, arguing that 
the traditional methods of constructing cottages from “mudwall” and thatch produced superior 
dwellings than did the modern practice of replacing old cottages with new brick ones. Hardy’s 
practical interest in vernacular architecture accounts for the prevalence of humble structures such 
as huts and cottages in his novels. 
The vernacular architecture of cottages and huts is particularly essential to The 
Woodlanders, both forming a vital part of the novel’s described environment and also driving its 
plot. Although the lush forest landscape of The Woodlanders is the physical surround with which 
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the novels’ characters most obviously interact, the events of the novel’s plot hinge much more 
vitally on the novel’s built environment: the houses, cottages, and make-shift shelters that 
constitute the human world of Little Hintock. Indeed, while Hardy’s narrator expends his 
descriptive powers on visualizing the dense material world of the woodlands, it is the 
woodlanders’ houses and cottages—particularly the sequence of ever-shrinking domiciles 
through which Giles Winterborne passes—that rise more frequently from the level of static, 
visual background to that of dynamic plot. If Grace Melbury’s abortive marriage plot is most 
frequently read as The Woodlanders’s narrative backbone, it is Giles’s housing plot—his 
progress through a diminishing series of labourers’ cottages, huts, and hovels—that provides the 
material scaffolding on which that marriage plot takes shape. 
The labourer’s cottage was at the center of two major interconnected debates in late 
nineteenth-century discourse, one social, the other aesthetic. Changing structures of 
landownership over the course of the nineteenth century led to a rise in interest in landowners’ 
duties to house the tenant labourers who lived on their land. In 1843, Alfred Austin’s report on 
the state of rural dwellings sparked a rejuvenation of concern about the condition of the 
agricultural poor, a demographic that had become increasingly invisible to the public eye due to 
the growing public concern for the conditions of the urban and industrial working classes. But 
Austin’s report, commissioned by Edwin Chadwick, renewed concern about agricultural poverty 
by playing on anxieties about the moral effect on women of poor families being confined to 
dwellings with so few rooms that members of both sexes had to sleep together in single rooms. 
As Karen Sayer observes, the cottage was blamed for the perceived immorality of the rural poor, 
especially women: “It is the cottage that removes the women's natural modesty; the cottage that 
forces the family to sleep together and break the rules of privacy and morality they know exist” 
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(66). In subsequent decades, the improvement of the dwellings of the rural poor became an 
intense focus of reform efforts, from societies such as the Model Cottage Society of Leeds and 
the Society for the Erection of Improved Dwellings, which aimed to help artisans build their own 
cottages, to design competitions sponsored by architectural journals such as The Builder, aiming 
to entice landowners into employing more humane designs for the labourers’ cottages on their 
estates (Sayer 52). Hardy’s own architectural notebook shows that he was interested in cottage 
reform, as it contains several of his own designs for labourers’ cottages with practical features 
like drainage, plumbing, and floor-plan arrangement carefully noted, as well as comments on the 
number rooms required for a labourer’s family (see Figure 1, Appendix).  
The cottage’s status as an emblem of the troubled class relationship between landowner 
and tenant labourer was closely linked to its position at the center of debates about the aesthetic 
category of the picturesque. The picturesque, which emerged as a significant aesthetic category 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with William Gilpin, Richard Payne Knight, 
and Uvedale Price as its most well-known theorists, was distinguished from the sublime and the 
beautiful by its combined emphasis on roughness and irregularity and on intricacy of detail. Like 
its two more popular aesthetic counterparts, theories of the picturesque often took landscapes as 
their paradigmatic examples, but unlike the sublime and the beautiful, they emphasized human 
presences and particularities within those landscapes. Ruined or decaying cottages and elderly 
rustics were deemed paradigmatic picturesque objects within a landscape because the marks of 
time’s passage that they recorded—the jaggedness of a delapidated wall, or the raggedness of 
clothing—showcased the attentiveness to intricate, irregular details that were essential to the 
entire aesthetic. As critics such as Timothy Costelloe and Kim Michasiw have noted, this close 
connection between the detailed quaintness on which picturesqueness depended and the 
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representation of the rural poor created an ambiguity within the politics of the picturesque 
aesthetic.30 On the one hand, it represented a democratization of aesthetics by extending its 
representational interests towards the lower classes. On the other hand, its aestheticization of 
rural poverty effectively exploited and sanitized the suffering of the poor for the aesthetic 
delectation of the middle and upper classes; in addition, by contributing to an emergent culture of 
middle-class tourism through its cultivation of a taste for picturesque landscapes, it paved the 
way for local communities and traditions to be absorbed and eradicated by a modern national 
culture (Harrison and Heydt-Stevenson, 6).  
 Descriptions of picturesque cottages often appear in Victorian fiction at moments when 
novels want to flash their realist credentials by critiquing the fantasies and representational 
assumptions of the picturesque aesthetic. Consider, for example, the moment in Middlemarch 
when Dorothea and Mr. Brooke visit the tumbledown cottage of Mr. Dagley on Mr. Brooke’s 
estate. The narrator digresses from the scene to lament “that softening influence of the fine arts 
which makes other people’s hardships picturesque,” and supplies an ironized ekphrastic 
description of the cottage, followed by a “real” description that focuses on the material poverty 
of its inhabitants. In Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South, a cottage makes a similar appearance. 
At the opening of the novel, the protagonist, Margaret Hale, takes pleasure in describing to 
outsiders the quaint, tumbledown “cottages . . . with roses growing all over them” of her rural 
village of Helstone (8). When another character questions her idyllic description, she retorts, “I 
am not making a picture. I am trying to describe Helstone as it really is” (8). However, when she 
returns to Helstone at the end of the novel, newly acclimatized to the industrial city, her growth 
                                                
30 See Costelloe; and Michasiw. 
 
   149 
as a socially perceptive character is registered by her renewed perception of these buildings, 
which she now recognizes as “roughly-built and decaying” (381). Descriptions of rural 
architecture thus often function as a test of realism’s referential claims, where characters and 
narrators must see through a veneer of visual conventions towards the social reality that lies 
beneath it. The picturesque cottage becomes an object on which English novelists perform what 
George Levine identifies as the most typical gestures of realist fiction, in which writers both 
“attempt to use language to get beyond language, to discover some nonverbal truth out there,” 
and “dismiss previous conventions of representation while, in effect, establishing new ones” 
(615-617). 
In placing a plot about vernacular architecture at the center of The Woodlanders, then, 
Hardy situates the novel in relation to a complex set of interconnected social and aesthetic 
debates about the ethical consequences of attaching aesthetic values to images of poverty and 
physical suffering. It is tempting to argue that Hardy’s representations of the architecture of rural 
poverty critiques the picturesque tradition, but by the 1880s realist novels such as Middlemarch 
and North and South had already been mounting this critique for decades. On the contrary, the 
extent to which many of Hardy’s novels appear actively to cultivate a fantasy of the pastoral idyll 
(“dwelling” in ecocritical terms) suggests that Hardy’s attitude towards the urban reader’s desire 
for “novels of the cottage,” as he describes it, cannot have been entirely critical. Hardy’s 
descriptions of architecture do two things: first, by elevating the cottage and the hut from the 
level of static description to that of plot, Hardy undoes the static picturesque idyll and situates it 
in history. Secondly, by imbuing his architectural descriptions with what I’m calling ontological 
ambiguity—describing his cottages and huts as structures that fluctuate between different states 
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of solidity and transparency—Hardy questions and  meditates on the ability of novelistic 
description to materialize fictional environments before the mind’s eye of the reader. 
From the beginning of The Woodlanders, the narrator makes explicit the dependence of 
Giles and Grace’s projected marriage on Giles’s property. Giles’s possession of his home is 
governed by a quasi-feudal, byzantine system of lifehold tenantry that is still practiced in Little 
Hintock: Giles’s ownership of his house and other property is tied by a generations-old contract 
to the life of another villager, Marty South’s father, upon whose death a number of laborers’ 
homes, including Giles’s, reverts to the occupant of the manor, who happens at the time to be the 
cosmopolitan Mrs. Charmond. At the opening of the novel, Giles believes that he has an 
opportunity to extend the contract to cover his own lifespan, a possibility that, we are told, 
“cheer[s] him much; for by those houses hung many things. Melbury’s doubt of the young man’s 
fitness to be the husband of Grace had been based not a little on the precariousness of his 
holdings in Little and Great Hintock” (91). Hardy’s narrator explicitly hinges the novel’s 
projected marriage plot on a housing contract, a conjunction the novel proceeds to underline 
rather than to attenuate.  
Although Giles’s cottage is a ghostly, only half-real presence in the described world of 
the novel, the narrator underlines over and over again its importance as a powerful material 
element of the novel’s plot. Both before and after the building’s demolition, the narrator employs 
it as a device on which to inscribe and lay bare the mechanics of The Woodlanders’s plot. This 
inscription of plot on an architectural structure is quite shockingly literal in the interval between 
Giles’s legal loss of the cottage due to Mr. South’s death, and the physical demolition of the 
cottage. The evening after he learns that Mrs. Charmond intends to demolish his home, Giles 
hears “a scraping on the wall outside his house” and goes outside to investigate: 
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As he turned the light flickered on the whitewashed rough-cast of the front, and 
he saw words written thereon in charcoal, which he read as follows: 
  ‘O Giles, you’ve lost your dwelling-place, 
  And therefore, Giles, you’ll lose your Grace.’ 
Giles went indoors. . . .  What filled his heart far more than curiosity about [the 
lines’] authorship was a terrible belief that they were turning out to be true, try to 
regain Grace as he might. They decided the question for him. (99) 
 
The causal mechanics of plot are here literally written on the wall of the house; the rhyming 
couplet that the author (Marty South, it is later revealed) has chosen yokes cause to effect with a 
sonic inevitability that mirrors the seeming inexorability of Giles’s situation. The inscription also 
links the novel’s two central plots—Giles’s housing plot and Grace’s marriage plot—with all the 
condensed, sequential efficiency that only a rhyming couplet can perfect. But the couplet’s 
internal anatomizing of loss’s cause and effect—Giles’s loss of his home as the direct effect of 
his loss of Grace as his future wife—belies the actual representation of plot’s unwinding in this 
scene, for the inscribed lines themselves become an actor in the intricate balancing of chances 
and mishaps. As the narrator notes, “they decided the question” for Giles, who upon reading 
them retires back into the cottage to write a note to Mr. Melbury renouncing his claim to Grace. 
The writing on the wall is thus in fact an active link in the chain of cause and effect it purports 
merely to describe. The cottage acts both as a vital link in the chain of Hardy’s plotting, and as a 
metafictional medium on which that plotting is openly inscribed. 
 As I discussed in the first section of this chapter, The Woodlanders devotes a great deal 
of attention to the point of mental and material contact between self and environment, exploring 
in particular situations in which characters are mentally abstracted from their physical 
surroundings so as to become a kind of immaterial phantom moving through them, or a body 
screened by a spectral envelope that prevents material contact with an environment. But this 
ghostly quality is not just a feature of consciousness, but also a recurring element of Hardy’s 
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architectural description. While the trees, foliage, and undergrowth that form the characters’ 
natural environment in The Woodlanders possess what Tim Dolin describes as “an excessive 
materiality,” forming a “dense medium . . . [that] is profoundly hostile to progress, . . . retarding 
movement, obscuring paths and landmarks,” the buildings that dot this landscape—huts, 
cottages, Georgian residences, even churches—oscillate between states of translucent, spectral 
ethereality and dense material solidity. Take, for example, a seemingly off-hand description of a 
cathedral that forms the background to Giles’s trip into Sherton-Abbas to pick up Grace from her 
finishing school: “He blushed a little, shook his head at her, and drove on ahead into the streets, 
the churches, the abbey, and other mediaeval buildings on this bright morning having the linear 
distinctness of architectural drawings, as if the original dream and vision of the conceiving 
master-mason were for a brief hour flashed down through the centuries to an unappreciative age. 
Giles saw their eloquent look on this day of transparency, but could not construe it” (33). 
The narrator’s description of the mediaeval buildings in this passage toggles oddly between 
solidity and spectrality. On the one hand, the buildings are vividly distinct, directly apparent to 
the eye through the perfectly transparent medium of the “bright morning.” On the other, this 
distinctness strangely dematerializes the buildings; by comparing the buildings to “architectural 
drawings,” the narrator sets them at a representational remove from reality, as if they are mere 
two-dimensional images of themselves rather than solid objects. He also sets them at a temporal 
distance, making them spectral by describing them as the apparition of a centuries-old “dream or 
vision.” The buildings are simultaneously more and less “real” than solid, mundane structures—
their spectral appearance both reveals with “eloquent look” the immediacy of the builder’s 
intention in a way that an ordinary, meaningless building does not, while also dematerializing 
them, elevating them to a plane above the mundane encounter between material bodies. 
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 In her recent study Dreaming by the Book, Elaine Scarry has noted Hardy’s propensity to 
represent objects and surfaces as a gradient between material solidity and gauzy transparency, 
contending that Hardy frequently juxtaposes transparent and opaque substances as a technique 
for aiding the reader’s powers of imaginative visualization. Since imaginary images are 
themselves insubstantial, Scarry contends, it is easier to imagine a gauzy or misty substance than 
a solid one: “imagined gauze more closely approximates actually perceived gauze than [an] 
imagined wall resembles an actually perceived wall” (22). For this reason, the most 
accomplished writers of realist fiction frequently establish the worlds in which their characters 
live by describing “the glide of the transparent over the surface of something underneath,” a 
technique that coaxes the reader to imagine solid materials by first inviting him or her to perform 
the much easier task of imagining something filmy and transparent (21-2). For Scarry, the 
interplay between solidity and transparency in Hardy’s descriptions serves primarily to instruct 
the reader’s mimetic imagination in the visualization of human bodies, ultimately performing an 
ethical function insofar as “the great philosophic issue underlying all his writings is the failure of 
persons to be able to imagine other persons in their full weight and solidity” (30). 
 While Scarry suggests that this interest in differentiating between various degrees of 
solidity is a ubiquitous feature of Hardy’s worldmaking, Hardy himself most frequently invokes 
the problem of solidity when he is describing or writing about architectural structures. In his 
remarkable 1906 lecture entitled “Memories of Church Restoration,” Hardy approaches the 
question of whether or not England’s Gothic churches should be restored by comparing the form 
of an architectural monument to a transparent ghost: 
We discern in a moment that it is in the boundary of a solid—its insubstantial 
superficies or mould—and not in the solid itself, that its right lies to exist as art. . . 
. Those limestones or sandstones have passed into its form; yet it is an idea 
independent of them—an aesthetic phantom without solidity, which might just as 
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suitably have chosen millions of other stones from the quarry whereon to display 
its beauties. Such perfect results of art . . . would be no less perfect if at this 
moment, by the wand of some magician, other similar materials could be conjured 
into their shapes, and the old substance made to vanish forever. This is, indeed, 
the actual process of organic nature herself, which is one of continuous 
substitution. She is always discarding the matter, while retaining the form. (213-
14) 
 
Hardy goes on to argue that the “aesthetic phantom” of the building’s form is at odds with what 
he calls the “human associations” that attach to the specific stones and planks of wood that 
constitute its material presence: the formally perfect church that the magician’s wand might 
conjure would result in a traumatic “rupture of continuity” by obliterating the “memories, 
history, fellowship, fraternities” that are embodied in the irreplaceable materials of the 
monument. In discussing such monuments, the language Hardy uses to describe buildings 
shuttles along a gradient between the phantasmic and the real, one moment etherealizing 
buildings as spectral, insubstantial forms, and the next caressing their texture and celebrating the 
material resistance offered by solid objects.31  
 In Hardy’s fiction, buildings possess a similar ontological ambivalence. This is true both 
on the level of plot—Giles’s cottage is demolished halfway through the novel, and he then 
moves through a series of dwellings that provide various levels of insufficient shelter from the 
elements—but also on the level of description. Whenever Hardy’s narrator describes one of 
Giles’s homes, he uses language that seems simultaneously to be tackling larger questions about 
presence and absence, about the relationship between the material and the immaterial. While, on 
the one hand, Giles’s housing plot serves, like cottage descriptions in earlier novels, as a 
reminder of the material hardships of people who live in picturesque houses, Hardy’s 
                                                
31 Benjamin Cannon notes that this phantasmic quality that Hardy attributes to architectural 
structures is also a comment on architecture’s role in maintaining the temporal continuity of 
human associations and memories. See Cannon, 201. 
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descriptions of Giles’s diminishing dwellings also etherealize and desubstantialize them in a way 
that exceeds the requirements of realistic description. Take, for example, a description early on 
of Giles’s first dwelling, a cottage located near the Melburys’ larger house. Due to the novel’s 
complex tangle of land ownership law, Giles’s ownership of his home is contingent on the life of 
an elderly neighbor who lies dying. He paces the yard outside his home, and as he does so, he 
senses his home losing solidity as his ownership of it grows more tenuous by the minute: 
“Winterborne walked up and down his garden . . . . The sense that the paths he was pacing, the 
cabbage plots, the appletrees, his dwelling, cider-cellar, wring-house, stables, weather-cock, 
were all slipping away over his head and beneath his feet as if they were painted on a magic 
lantern-slide, was curious” (83). Hardy’s comparison of Winterborne’s cottage to a magic 
lantern-slide is calculated to have a paradoxical effect on a reader. On the one hand, comparing 
the cottage to a scene painted on a slide desubstantializes the solid building, rendering it 
vaporous, thin, and transient. On the other hand, the comparison also reinforces the cottage’s 
vividness as an image. By conscripting a visual medium—the magic lantern—as an analogy for a 
verbal description, the description is made to glow with the light and colour associated with the 
visual technology, even as its unreality and fictitiousness is underscored by the comparison. The 
effect of this is to produce an image that is at once more vivid than most verbal descriptions, but 
also one that announces its own status as an image, as unreal. 
 This ontological ambivalence, the tendency of Giles’s cottage to oscillate between 
presence and absence, becomes vital to the novel’s plot several chapters later, when Mrs. 
Charmond meets the recently-married Fitzpiers for the first time, initiating their affair and 
plunging Grace’s marriage into unhappiness. Mrs. Charmond’s first meeting with the doctor is 
brought about when she sustains a minor injury by attempting to drive her carriage through the 
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empty lot where Giles’s cottage had recently stood, mistaking the empty space in the trees for the 
road. The narrator’s description of this error emphasizes the palpability of the cottage, even in its 
absence. Hardy’s narrator focalizes the description of the cottage’s site through the eyes of Giles, 
who witnesses the accident while reminiscing about his former home on the site of its 
demolition: “Even in the gloom he could trace where the different rooms had stood; could mark 
the shape of the kitchen chimney-corner, in which he had roasted apples and potatoes in his 
boyhood, cast his bullets, and burnt his initials on articles that did and did not belong to him” 
(167). The narration then shifts gradually out of Giles’s reverie into the unfolding of the present 
moment: 
It was on the evening under notice that, half sitting, half leaning against one of 
these inclined trunks, Winterborne became lost in his thoughts as usual, till one 
star after another had taken up a position in the piece of sky which now 
confronted him where his walls and chimneys had formerly raised their outlines. 
The house had jutted awkwardly into the road, and the opening caused by its 
absence was very distinct.  
In the silence the trot of horses and the spin of carriage-wheels became audible; 
the vehicle soon shaped itself against the blank sky, bearing down on him with the 
bend in the lane which here occurred, and of which the house had been the cause. 
. . . Presently there was a slight scrape, then a scream. . . . It appeared that [Mrs. 
Charmond] had been deceived by the removal of the house, imagining the gap 
caused by the demolition to be the opening of the road. (167-8) 
 
In an inverse repetition of the earlier scene in which the narrator describes Giles’s still-standing 
cottage etherealizing into a magic lantern slide, the narrator here describes the cottage’s ghostly 
presence even in its material absence. Giles’s memory can still spatially demarcate the shapes of 
its rooms, which are enriched into vividness by a thick overlay of sensory recollections. The 
visibility of the demolished building’s outlines against the sky grant it a spectral presence tied to 
Giles’s rich stock of place-bound memories. As the passage shifts out of Giles’s memory into the 
present moment, however, the cottage’s significance modulates out of the static, solitary 
memory-world of Giles’s subjective perception, and onto the objective, dynamic plane of plot on 
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which the novel’s characters interact and collide. Literalized as an accidental part of the road 
along which the novel’s plot travels, the building’s physical absence creates a newly perceptible 
“gap” that affects the plot as though it were a material presence, diverting Mrs. Charmond’s 
linear progress along the road, upending her carriage, and sending her with her slight injury into 
the arms of Dr. Fitzpiers. Hardy’s plotting of this scene promotes the cottage from an affectively 
charged object in the novel’s described world, to a crucial causal link in The Woodlanders’s plot. 
 By wedding rural architecture to the moving cogs of the novel’s plot, Hardy elevates a 
ubiquitous rural object that typically forms part of the static background of the regional novel to 
the dynamic level of narrative, rendering novelistic background and foreground 
indistinguishable: seemingly static, merely visual elements of the described world swiftly ascend 
to the level of narrative cause, motivating passions or touching off fatal coincidences before 
receding back into visual tableau. This isn’t quite the same as raising “setting” to the level of 
“character,” as commentators on The Return of the Native so frequently claim about Egdon 
Heath. But this toggling between flat description and active narrative element grants the world of 
The Woodlanders a degree of perspectival three-dimensionality that the character-driven 
conventions of earlier realist fiction frequently trades in for a more robustly developed 
impression of individual agency. 
 In the novel’s penultimate act, Giles’s housing plot takes center stage and the solidity and 
permeability of walls acquire tragic ramifications. Displaced from his demolished cottage, Giles 
removes initially to a “distant hut” in the forest, in which he lives alone until Grace seeks him 
out to find asylum from being reclaimed by her wayward but possessive husband. Overcome 
with chivalrous solicitude towards Grace despite being himself ill with typhoid fever, Giles 
vacates his one-roomed hut for her to avoid any appearance of impropriety, withdrawing to a 
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“wretched little shelter” nearby constructed of “four hurdles thatched with brake-fern” (273). 
After enduring several stormy nights in this self-imposed exile (the brutal inadequacy of his 
shelter, as well as his illness, unbeknownst to Grace until it’s too late), Giles dies of exposure, 
transforming for Grace “the whole wood . . . [into] a house of death, pervaded by loss to its 
uttermost length and breadth” (293).  
 Structured around a series of increasingly decentralized architectural displacements 
(cottage to hut to shelter of hurdles), Giles’s housing plot forms a dark counterpoint to the 
courtship plot, in which the domestic space of the home is the telos at which the protagonists 
ultimately arrive, rather than a starting point from which they are progressively exiled and 
marginalized. It also underlines the extent to which architecture mediates between natural 
environment and human culture, between the material interface of bodies and environments and 
the immaterial but no less consequential vicissitudes of human custom and social forms. As 
Audrey Jaffe has noted, architecture for Hardy “hovers . . . between materiality and metaphor” 
(394); his houses “hardly exist as domestic spaces but rather limn stark demarcations between 
inside and outside” (389). For Grace and Giles, the walls of the hut Giles cedes to Grace become 
a materialization of the two characters’ inability to think outside the social forms of marriage and 
sexual propriety. Giles’s tragic death is all the more tragic because, unlike the otherwise similar 
death of Mrs. Yeobright in The Return of the Native, the closed door that abandons him to the 
elements is more ideological than material. The solidity of the walls that exclude him are the 
material cause of Giles’s death, but only because they metaphorize the excessively rigid sexual 
mores to which the two characters defer (393). There is no physical barrier preventing Grace 
from letting Giles indoors and saving his life, nor is there one keeping Giles from requesting that 
she let him in; the tragically exclusive solidity of the building’s walls is entirely constituted by 
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the couple’s commitment to an unforgiving rule of chastity. In his description of Grace 
weathering the storm inside the hut, Hardy marvels at the way invisible phantasms acquire 
seeming materiality: he writes, “as the storm went on it was difficult to believe that no opaque 
body, but only an invisible colourless thing was trampling and climbing over the roof” (277). 
The capacity of the “invisible, colourless” storm to acquire a seemingly opaque body parallels 
the way Grace and Giles’s immaterial commitment to an abstract rule takes on the killing opacity 
of a solid wall. In the hands of the two characters, the materializing descriptive powers of the 
fabulist become instruments of death. 
 This malignant intertwining of nature and culture derives additional poignancy from the 
architectural status of the Victorian cottage as a type of dwelling that was often seen to bridge 
the divide between nature and civilization. As Pamela Nunn observes in an essay about the 
vogue for cottages in the second half of the nineteenth century, a “key element of [the cottage] 
vocabulary” was “the intimacy to the cottage’s embrace by nature—always read as comforting 
and not threatening, whether wild or cultivated” (194). A second element was the “taxonomy of 
class” suggested by the very ambiguity of the architectural name: “the term cottage indicates that 
there are far grander, but also more squalid and inadequate, homes. . . . [An] important aspect of 
this aspiration was an escape from the hierarchy of social class or an elevation within it” (Nunn 
190). While Giles initially seems to embody the ideal Victorian cottage-dweller Nunn 
anatomizes, frequently described from Grace’s perspective as an emblem of human harmony 
with the natural world right down to “the way the cottage showcases the quotidian industry and 
husbandry of its inhabitants” (Nunn 194), the final two dwellings through which he passes 
gradually dismantle the bucolic cottage ideal.  
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 Hardy’s narrator erodes the idyllic quality of Giles’s cottage dwelling by directly taking 
on the two central elements of the cottage ideal that Nunn identifies. The precision with which 
the narrator selects his terminology for each of Giles’s dwellings generates an architectural 
taxonomy that shows up the cottage ideal’s effort to elide or escape from class hierarchies. 
Giles’s first home is described both as a cottage and as a house; the dwelling to which he 
removes once his cottage is demolished is a “mysterious hut . . . on the other side of the 
woodland” (259). The narrator carefully describes this structure to establish both its inadequacy 
compared to Giles’s original home, as well as the seeming sexual impropriety of Giles and Grace 
sharing such a small dwelling: “[It was] a square cot of one storey only, sloping up on all sides to 
a chimney in the midst. It had formerly been the home of a charcoal-burner, in times when that 
fuel was still used in county-houses. . . . The room within was kitchen, parlour, and bed-chamber 
all in one: the natural sandstone floor was worn into hills and dales by long treading, so that none 
of the furniture stood level” (269). As J.B. Bullen notes, the cottages of charcoal-burners were 
“primitive in the extreme” and had undergone no significant structural change since the eighth 
century (128). Architectural historian Charles Frederick Innocent notes that these huts, either 
conical or oblong in shape, featured a central chimney and only a single room.32 The images he 
furnishes of these huts underline their primitive and “mysterious” appearance, and register the 
extreme disparity between the country cottage and the hut as categories of vernacular 
architecture.  
                                                
32 Interestingly, in the first serialized version of The Woodlanders, Hardy describes the hut as 
possessing two rooms; he altered it to one when the novel was published in book form. While it 
appears that he made the change to make more plausible Giles’s moral qualms about sharing the 
dwelling with Grace, it is also seems likely that the change was made to increase the 
architectural accuracy of the structure. 
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The description the narrator gives of the structure to which Giles betakes himself upon 
ceding the hut to Grace completes the taxonomy of rural architecture by identifying a base level 
of inadequacy for which Hardy struggles to find a term: “[Giles’s snug place without the hut 
proved to be a wretched little shelter of the roughest kind, formed of four hurdles thatched with 
brake-fern. . . . The rain, which had never ceased, now drew his attention by beginning to drop 
through the meagre screen which covered him” (273). The description’s highlighting of the 
shelter’s material flimsiness has the paradoxical effect of immersing the reader more fully in the 
unforgiving materiality of the novel’s dreary world. In a sense, the narrator’s evocation of 
Giles’s shelter inverts Scarry’s account of the way the shadows of cows on the farmhouse wall 
reinforce the reality of a fictional world. Instead of an intervening transient substance confirming 
the reassuring solidity of the wall behind it, it is the wall’s insufficient solidity—the fact that it is 
just a “meagre screen”—that confirms the all-too-real materiality of the invading raindrops, 
drawing both Giles’s and the reader’s attention to them. In both cases, though, the descriptive 
juxtaposition of more and less vivid material substances performs the function of ontologically 
reinforcing the reader’s sense of a fictional world’s reality. 
When Grace stumbles on Giles’s hideout in the following chapter, the narrator gives a 
second, focalized description of the structure that struggles still harder to classify it 
architecturally:  
The course was marked by a little path, which ended at a distance of about forty 
yards in a small erection of hurdles, not much larger than a shock of corn, such as 
were frequent in the woods and copses when the cutting season was going on. It 
was too slight even to be called a hovel, and was not high enough to stand upright 
in; appearing in short to be erected for the temporary shelter of fuel. The side 
towards Grace was open, and turning the light upon the interior she beheld what 
her prescient fear had pictured in snatches all the way thither. (281) 
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In this passage, picturesque description reaches its limit. Instead of the snug fit between dwelling 
and human body, so celebrated in Mitford’s rural sketches and other picturesque writing, the 
narrator holds up for our inspection a structure so contracted that it is “not high enough to stand 
upright in.” Although the structure’s materials and purpose are associated with local agricultural 
labour, this association is not idyllic, indicating a harmonious relationship between the human 
and organic world, instead reducing the human dweller to just so much expendable organic 
material: the structure under which Giles lies is intended “for the temporary shelter of fuel.” 
Giles’s final dwelling resists architectural classification, refusing to be integrated into the 
cottage’s “taxonomy of class” because it is, obstinately, “too slight even to be called a hovel.” 
By repudiating architectural categories in his description, the narrator conjures the structure’s 
inert materiality in a way that makes it feel much more particularized and even tactile than the 
novel’s other dwellings, which all fluctuate ethereally between material and metaphorical states.  
 While ecocritics have lauded The Woodlanders’s representation of “dwelling” by 
focusing on its arboreal descriptions and metaphors, examining the novel’s architecture reveals, 
if anything, a failure of the harmonious continuity between body and environment. Rather, the 
descriptive techniques Hardy’s novel applies to architecture undoes the stasis of picturesque 
dwelling by animating buildings into moving components of the novel’s plot. By describing 
these structures as images that oscillate along a gradient of solidity and transparency, Hardy also 
erodes the thickness of realist description and punctures the immersive, transportive reading 
experience that the regional novel ostensibly supports.   
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Chapter 4:   
Robert Louis Stevenson’s Islands and the Victorian Discourse of Circumstance 
 
Few nineteenth-century writers were more acutely attentive to the relationship between 
the bodily organism and its physical surroundings than was Robert Louis Stevenson. The 
Victorian obsession with the constitutional effects of an uncongenial climate has become a cliché 
of the period, but Stevenson was one of the few to truly live the cliché. A life-long invalid who 
suffered from an array of shadowy illnesses, including tuberculosis and malaria, Stevenson spent 
the greater part of his adult life travelling from his native Scotland across Europe, the United 
States, and eventually the South Pacific in search of a climate congenial to his health. His many 
travel books, including An Inland Voyage (1878) and Travels with a Donkey in Cevennes (1879), 
The Silverado Squatters (1883), and The Amateur Immigrant and Across the Plains (both written 
1879-1880), made a name for Stevenson as a writer of the outdoors before he ever set his hand to 
adventure fiction. Stevenson thus developed a conflicted reputation during his career as both a 
delicate, passive aesthete, over-sensitive to the very fluctuations of the weather, and a tirelessly 
energetic traveller, intrepidly venturing to places where few British writers had set foot.  
 While Stevenson’s writings, both fiction and non-fiction,  include very few descriptions 
of illness, he frequently goes out of his way to convey the delicious sensation of physical health. 
In the middle of The Wrecker (1892), a sprawlingly plotted novel of murder and commercial 
intrigue in the South Seas written during the first few years after Stevenson settled permanently 
in Samoa, the narrator pauses to deliver this description of his experience of the South Pacific 
climate, a description so vivid that it could only have been written by a person who knew what it 
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is like to be chronically unwell, to feel oneself continually assaulted by painful external stimuli. 
Sailing the Pacific in fair weather, the narrator muses, “I love to recall, and would that I could 
reproduce that life, the unforgettable”: 
The memory, which shows so wise a backwardness in registering pain, is besides 
an imperfect recorder of extended pleasures; and a long-continued well-being 
escapes . . . our petty methods of commemoration. On a part of our life’s map 
there lies a roseate, undecipherable haze, and that is all. . . . Day after day the air 
had the same indescribable liveliness and sweetness, soft and nimble, and cool as 
the cheek of health. Day after day the sun flamed; night after night the moon 
beaconed, or the stars paraded their regiment. I was aware of a spiritual change, 
or, perhaps, rather a molecular reconstitution. My bones were sweeter to me. I had 
come home to my own climate, and looked back with pity on those damp and 
wintry zones, miscalled the temperate. (190) 
 
To capture the subtle, ongoing sensation of health, Stevenson resorts to a discursive mode that 
falls somewhere between description and narration, descriptive phrases like “the air had [an] 
indescribable liveliness” or “the stars paraded their lustrous regiment” framed by the anaphoric 
temporal flow of “day after day . . . day after day.” Hailing the South Pacific as his “own 
climate,” Stevenson’s Scottish-American narrator inverts exile into homecoming, shifting 
between spiritual and scientific language—“a spiritual change” and “a molecular reconstitution” 
both describe the transformation he has experienced. The locus of this change is the 
phenomenological surface where the body and its surroundings meet. In noting that the ocean air 
is as “cool as the cheek of health,” Stevenson’s narrator remakes a literal description of the 
condition of his own body—it is presumably his own cheeks that are cool and healthy in this 
climate—into a simile describing the climate itself, transforming the ocean air into a kind of 
bodily surface that intimately meets his own. The arresting declaration “my bones were sweeter 
to me” likewise recasts the interior of the body into an object in intimate communion with, but 
not identical to, the self. It is as though consciousness is located on the haptic surface of the skin, 
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which communicates outwardly with the environment, and inwardly with the body’s interior, 
managing but also blurring the relationship between objective world and subjective sensation. 
 This phenomenological interface between the physical organism and its external 
environment is one of the most significant relationships in Robert Louis Stevenson’s fiction, 
particularly his adventure fiction. Critics have often noted adventure fiction’s generic and 
ideological investments in both legitimizing European imperial domination, and promulgating a 
heroic fantasy of white masculinity. Oliver S. Buckton has noted in a study of Stevenson that 
“the very concept of ‘adventure’ is implicated in contexts of imperial ambition” (18), while 
Martin Green argues, in an oft-cited study of the genre, that English adventure tales were “the 
energizing myth of English imperialism . . . . They charged England’s will with the energy to go 
out into the world and explore, conquer, and rule” (3). Yet critics have rarely remarked on 
adventure fiction’s treatment of, and even devotion to, the physical world, other than to observe 
that the adventure novel protagonist’s domination of an implicitly female and colonial natural 
world was one facet of the genre’s insidious imperial project. Stevenson certainly wrote about 
and within the context of British imperialism, and the masculinist ideological investments of 
adventure fiction are undeniable, these readings are not always adequate to the way Stevenson 
represents the relationship between the self and the physical world. Stevenson’s protagonists 
rarely occupy the positions of unchallenged physical dominance in his adventure novels; instead, 
they frequently cling tenuously to survival in the face of overwhelming natural forces that dwarf 
the body’s powers. Moreover, their contentions with the natural world, particularly in 
Stevenson’s early adventure fiction, often manifest less as a power struggle than as a 
collaboration or adaptation. The ability to navigate the ocean winds and currents, or to keep 
afloat in choppy seas, is less about subduing nature than about working together with it. In this 
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sense, the adventure protagonist’s bodily agency is not pitted against the external world so much 
as it operates alongside it.  
 This chapter builds on my previous three by examining an environmental term that was 
so ubiquitous for the Victorians as to be almost emptied of meaning: the concept of 
“circumstance” or “circumstances.” Unlike other ambient concepts I have discussed in this 
dissertation, such as “medium,” “conditions,” and “environment” itself, circumstance was not a 
specialized scientific concept (though it was used by scientists such as Darwin and Lamarck to 
denote environmental phenomena) but rather a thoroughly vernacular term. While it was 
frequently invoked by Victorian novelists as a catch-all term for the vagaries of chance and the 
deterministic pressure of external forces, both natural and social, Stevenson invoked 
circumstance as the keynote of the adventure genre, describing romance as “the poetry of 
circumstance” in his genre-defining 1883 essay “A Gossip on Romance.” In the first section of 
this chapter, I argue that in adopting circumstance as adventure’s central term, Stevenson revises 
what I am calling the Victorian discourse of circumstance, peeling the term away from the 
deterministic valence which was its primary association in late-nineteenth-century scientific and 
philosophical discussions. Instead, Stevenson reorients the idea of circumstance to signify the 
mutable, non-developmental and non-deterministic relationship between the surface of the body 
and that of the physical world. For Stevenson, this somatic interface between body and world is 
not reducible to imperial domination, in which the self victoriously subdues the inanimate world, 
nor to deterministic constraint in which the subject finds himself helplessly shaped and hemmed 
in by the “circumstance” of Victorian vernacular discourse. Rather, Stevenson’s descriptions of 
the relationship between his protagonists’ bodies and their physical surroundings evokes a 
felicitously limited agency characterized by an equable and fluid give-and-take between the body 
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and its environment. Through an examination of Stevenson’s most well-known adventure novel, 
Treasure Island, I show how even in situations of environmental peril, Stevenson appeals to an 
intimate physical affinity between an embodied self and the natural world, in which the limits 
that external phenomena place on the self are experienced as an enabling and even a creative, 
rather than a frustrating, constraint. 
 In the second section of this chapter, I turn to two of Stevenson’s South Pacific novels, 
The Wrecker (1892) and The Ebb-Tide (1894), both written near the end of his career, after he 
had settled in Samoa. I argue that both novels revise and complicate the model of limited agency 
Stevenson develops in his early adventure fiction by introducing biotic elements, such as flora, 
fauna, and pathogens, into the adventurer’s environment. In so doing, I suggest, these novels 
parallel the insights of early ecological science, which emerged in the final decade of the 
nineteenth century and for which the tropical island was a vital laboratory for observing the 
behavior of the living assemblages that would come to be known, in the early twentieth century, 
as ecosystems. The introduction of these biotic elements into the previously inanimate surrounds 
of Stevenson’s tropical island settings imbues the adventure novel with an ethical complexity 
that it had previously lacked in Stevenson’s hands, as the protagonist is now represented as a 
single unit within a network of living beings, whose actions have ramifications for many other 
sentient organisms. In both these novels, as well as in his non-fictional South Pacific writings 
from the same period, Stevenson uses scenes of violence against flora and fauna to echo and 
anticipate scenes of violence between human characters.  
Treasure Island, Limited Agency, and the Poetry of Circumstance 
“Circumstance” is a ubiquitous and deceptively simple term in Victorian discourse. 
While “environment” and “medium” both carry a specialized biological resonance in Victorian 
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texts, “circumstance” is intriguingly and frustratingly unspecialized, straddling scientific and 
vernacular language, and bearing different connotations in each context. Yet despite or perhaps 
because of its vagueness, of all the environmental terms Victorian writers used (and which I have 
thus far discussed in this dissertation), circumstance gained the most widespread traction in 
popular literature and discourse. Its widespread purchase can be seen in a random sampling of 
the surprisingly vast number of novels (now all forgotten) published near the end of the 
nineteenth century whose titles included the word “circumstance(s)”: Children of Circumstance 
(Mrs. Mannington Caffin, 1894), The Sport of Circumstance (1899, G.G. Chatterton), The Strong 
God Circumstance (Helen Shipton, 1900); The Chains of Circumstance (T.W. Speight, 1900); 
King Circumstance (Edwin Pugh, 1898); Creatures of Circumstance (Horace Hutchinson, 1891); 
Martyrs to Circumstance (Maria Theresa Longworth, 1861); A Slave of Circumstances: A Story 
of New York (Ernest Pierson, 1888); Superior to Circumstances (Emily Blackall, 1889). Nearly 
all of these titles emphasize the diminishment of individual agency in the face of all-determining 
or omnipotent external forces and situations, indicating the degree to which “circumstance” 
functioned in popular Victorian discourse as a catch-all term for causal forces outside the self—
whether physical surroundings or narrative situations—that erode the self’s autonomy.  
 The term “circumstance” or “circumstances” appears in scientific discourse more 
frequently in the early nineteenth century than in the century’s second half. As Trevor Pearce has 
shown, early Victorian scientists such as Charles Lyell and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck used the term 
“circumstances” to describe the “inanimate and animate conditions” influencing organisms’ 
development and survival (Pearce 243). Circumstance’s currency in scientific discourse appears 
to have waned with Comte and Spencer’s popularization of singular nouns such as 
“environment” and “medium” in the late 1850s. While some scientific writers continued to use a 
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plural term, “conditions” was increasingly favored over “circumstances” (this is Darwin’s 
preferred choice; he occasionally uses “circumstances” to describe specific examples of 
evolutionary change, but he almost invariably opts for the phrase “conditions of life” when 
making general theoretical assertions about evolutionary processes in On the Origin of Species). 
In this biological context, “circumstances” is nearly synonymous with “environment,” in that it is 
a primarily spatial term that denotes the material objects and substances that affect and interact 
with an individual organism. It is perhaps for this reason that the term was so easily and 
conveniently replaced in scientific terminology with singular terms, which, as Pearce notes, had 
the advantage of acting as a useful shorthand for an otherwise difficult-to-enumerate near-infinite 
set of environmental elements in the case of each organism under discussion. 
 But if circumstance’s traction in scientific writing had weakened by the late nineteenth 
century, the word was all the more prominent in popular discourse, where it accrued a 
complexity and ambiguity of meaning that it lacked in the more precise, technical writings of 
Lyell and Lamarck. As Doug Mao observes, circumstance was characterized in popular 
Victorian discourse by a spatiotemporal ambiguity, insofar as it could be invoked to describe 
either an array of surrounding objects and influences that shape an individual, or the chain of 
temporal incidents that lead up to and determine the outcome of an event. The term’s spatial 
valence, he suggests, creates a certain illusion of agency, insofar as “the project of experiential 
management suddenly seems more plausible” when “a vocabulary of unpredictable occurrences 
in time is replaced by a language of surrounding space” (39). In both its spatial and its temporal 
senses, though, “circumstance” represented all the external particulars of both history and 
location that, unattributable to any conscious intention, stood outside of and exerted pressure on 
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the self’s strivings for autonomy and self-determination: personal and family history, social and 
cultural milieu, the results of heredity, the vagaries of chance. 
 Perhaps because it provided such a convenient shorthand for problems of agency and the 
relationship of individual characters to plot and milieu, “circumstance” became a dominant term 
in late-Victorian critical efforts to theorize the novel form. Late-Victorian critics often 
distinguished between different types of novels by locating them along a spectrum between 
“novels of character” and “novels of circumstance,” where the “novel of character” focused its 
energies on exploring the psychology and moral agency of individual characters, while “novels 
of circumstance” tended to emphasize plot: temporal events that befell characters, rather than 
moral decisions they made. The popularity of the character/circumstance binary in late-
nineteenth-century literary criticism is visible in Wilkie Collins’s appeal to it in his preface to 
The Moonstone, in which he claims that while in his earlier novels, “the object proposed has 
been to trace the influence of circumstances upon character,” in The Moonstone he had “reversed 
the process” (7). E.S. Dallas’s 1878 study The Gay Science offers a more sustained 
schematization of this character/circumstance opposition, identifying the modern sensation 
novel, with its elaborate and suspenseful plotting, as an example of the “novel of circumstance,” 
and suggesting that such novels are a symptom of the waning of individual agency in modernity. 
He describes the distinction between the two types of novel thus: “In the novel of character man 
appears moulding circumstances to his will, directing the action for himself, supreme over 
incident and plot. In the opposite class of novel man is represented as made and ruled by 
circumstance; he is the victim of change and the puppet of intrigue” (294). Dallas’s distinction 
between novels of character and novels of circumstance neatly allocates power either to the 
individual or to circumstance, leaving little space in between. Dallas acknowledges this problem 
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by pointing out that, as much as novels may emphasize one or the other, the true state of affairs 
lies somewhere in the middle: “Is either of these views of life wholly true or wholly false?” he 
asks: “We may like one better than the other. We may like to see men generally represented as 
possessed of decided character, masters of their destiny, and superior to circumstance; but is this 
view of life a whit more true than that which pictures the mass of men endowed with faint 
characters, and as tossed hither and thither by the accidents of life, which we sometimes call fate 
and sometimes fortune?” (294). Dallas concludes that neither class of novel is more accurate in 
its depiction of human agency, insisting that both err in attributing too much power either to 
character or to circumstance, when the reality is that the truth lies somewhere between these two 
poles.  
 As the final decade of the century approached, the idea of circumstance became more 
closely associated with what nineteenth-century critics called “realism” than with the sensation 
novel. The idea of circumstance pointed less to suspenseful and exciting plotting, than to a 
depressing emphasis on the total erosion of human agency and aspirations by an indifferent and 
hostile surround of external forces and objects. The works of Emile Zola and other naturalist 
writers were paradigmatic of this view; Lilian Furst and Peter Skrine succinctly describe the 
movement as one for which “man is an animal whose course is determined by his heredity, by 
the effects of his environment and by the pressures of the moment. This terribly depressing 
conception robs man of all free will, all responsibility for his actions, which are merely the 
inescapable result of forces and conditions totally beyond his control” (18). The hyperbolic 
language that Furst and Skrine use—“all,” “inescapable,” “totally beyond control”—is 
characteristic of the way Victorian critics described naturalism, and indeed how naturalist novels 
often described themselves. In Jude the Obscure, for example, Sue Brideshead initially attributes 
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the death of her children to Providence, lamenting that “it is no use fighting against God,” to 
which Jude replies that their struggle is really “against man and senseless circumstance” (207). 
By the 1890s, the concept of circumstance as a force of causality in the novel had become 
synonymous with a tragic view of human agency as hopelessly circumscribed and eroded, and of 
the external world—whether the Darwinian natural world, or the modern urban milieu—as an 
indifferent entity that inexorably frustrates human intentions and aspirations. 
 Against this intellectual and literary background, it is surprising that, in his defense of 
adventure fiction in “A Gossip on Romance,” Robert Louis Stevenson chooses to call the genre 
“the poetry of circumstance.” Indeed, adventure fiction—particularly in its incarnation as late-
nineteenth-century imperial romance—is most often understood as a genre that grossly 
aggrandizes individual agency, particularly that of the white European male subject at the 
expense of non-European characters, societies, and landscapes. In Martin Green’s influential 
account of the genre, for example, “adventure tales . . . [were] the energizing myth of English 
imperialism . . . they charged England’s will with the energy to go out into the world and 
explore, conquer, and rule” (3), while John Kucich describes adventure fiction as a “one-against-
all omnipotent fantasy” that exalts the power of “stoic masculinity” against an imperial other (61, 
9). A conception of agency more different from that of the naturalist novel can hardly be 
imagined. Yet in his description of the genre in “A Gossip on Romance,” Stevenson imagines a 
model of human interaction with circumstance that squares neither with the exaggerated agency 
of the imperial subject, nor with the total passivity of the hapless Zola or Hardy protagonist. 
 Drawing on the character/circumstance distinction that critics such as Dallas had 
developed, Stevenson offers a spirited defense of adventure fiction against the prescriptive 
ethical and aesthetic standards of Victorian realism (“drama,” in Stevenson’s term). While 
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drama, Stevenson argues, tends to “reserve . . . admiration for the clink of teaspoons and the 
accents of the curate,” it places a relatively low value on “incident” (238); the crises and 
climaxes of a realist novel tend to hinge internally, “on the passionate slips and hesitations of the 
conscience,” rather than on externalities such as physical action and romantic setting (232). In 
place of this psychological focus on characters, Stevenson advocates for a type of fiction that 
celebrates circumstance, but what he describes is not the circumstance of the naturalist novel: 
Drama is the poetry of conduct, romance the poetry of circumstance. The pleasure 
we take in life is of two sorts—the active and the passive. Now we are conscious 
of a great command over our destiny; anon we are lifted up by circumstance, as 
by a breaking wave, and dashed we know not how into the future. Now we are 
pleased by our conduct, anon merely pleased by our surroundings. It would be 
hard to say which of these modes of satisfaction is the more effective, but the 
latter is surely the more constant. Conduct is three parts of life, they say; but I 
think they put it high. There is a vast deal in life and letters both which is not 
immoral, but simply a-moral; which either does not regard the human will at all, 
or deals with it in obvious and healthy relations; where the interest turns, not upon 
what a man shall choose to do, but on how he manages to do it; . . . on the 
problems of the body and of the practical intelligence, in clean, open-air 
adventure, the shock of arms or the diplomacy of life. (232) 
 
On the face of it, this passage appears to invoke Dallas’s distinction between the “novel of 
circumstance” and the “novel of character.” Like Dallas, Stevenson distinguishes between fiction 
that emphasizes the moral agency of its characters, and fiction that represents them as passive 
beings (“puppets,” as Dallas calls them) under the shaping influence of external forces and 
events. While Dallas views this passive subjection to circumstances as an unpalatable 
exaggeration of the truth, however, Stevenson embraces it as a positive pleasure. He does this, I 
want to suggest, by jettisoning psychology’s agonistic relationship with external forces and 
reimagining “circumstance” as a zone of pleasurable contact between the body and the physical 
world. By bringing the genre of adventure fiction into dialogue with the Victorian discourse of 
circumstance, Stevenson modifies both, tempering circumstance’s inexorable determinism with 
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adventure’s optimistic celebration of agency and producing an unusual generic amalgam of 
power and vulnerability. 
 Published in 1883, the year after Stevenson wrote “A Gossip on Romance,” Treasure 
Island embodies the “poetry of circumstance” that Stevenson describes more fully than any of 
his other novels. The novel tells the story of the young protagonist, Jim Hawkins, who finds an 
island treasure map in his family’s inn and persuades a local squire and doctor to join him in a 
voyage to retrieve the treasure. Once they arrive at the mysterious island, however, the 
charismatic ship’s cook, Long John Silver, and a substantial fraction of the crew are revealed to 
be pirates, and mutiny against Jim and his allies. The remainder of the tale unfolds on and around 
the island, as the treasure map changes hands between crew and mutineers, Long John Silver’s 
allegiances shift multiple times, and the treasure turns out to have been moved from its original 
hiding place and hidden by a marooned inhabitant of the island. In the end, the mutineers are 
defeated and Jim and his allies return home with the treasure, Long John Silver having ultimately 
allied himself pragmatically with the winning side.  
 Stevenson revises and modifies the nineteenth-century discourse of circumstance in 
Treasure Island in two major ways. The first is to use the term to designate a healthy equilibrium 
between human agency and the power of external elements, rather than the tragic attrition of 
individual agency in the face of environment. Although the novel’s ostensible conflict unfolds 
between Jim and the mutineers, many of the novel’s most memorable scenes center on Jim’s 
bodily contentions with natural elements, especially the ocean. Rather than being bound by “the 
chains of circumstance” or finding himself a “martyr to circumstance,” Jim enacts what 
Stevenson calls a “poetry of circumstance” in which the human body finds in the external world 
a worthy opponent, rather than a merciless tyrant. While the early part of the novel’s plot, as well 
   175 
as its resolution, revolves around the conflict between Jim Hawkins, his allies, and the mutineers, 
the novel includes a lengthy middle section entitled “My Sea Adventure,” dealing with Jim’s 
solitary contentions with the ocean itself. Sneaking away from his island-bound allies at night to 
try to reclaim the mutinied Hispaniola, Jim locates a primitive coracle built by a marooned 
inhabitant of the island and sets out towards the ship alone. The section subordinates the question 
of whether or not Jim’s actions are strategically or morally correct in order to dwell instead in 
great detail on his grappling with physical elements, “the interest turn[ing], not upon what a man 
shall choose to do, but on how he manages to do it.” Throughout the section, Jim’s successful 
navigation of the ocean is attributed less to rational mastery and omnipotence, than to a 
combination of fortuitous circumstance and a practical, trial-and-error intelligence that is 
primarily physical. The physical environment that Jim navigates is disclosed narratively more 
than descriptively, each detail a material fact with which Jim must bodily reckon. Consider, for 
example, the way the narrator conveys the surface of the ocean upon which Jim’s coracle is 
borne: 
I found each wave, instead of the big, smooth glossy mountain it looks from 
shore, or from a vessel’s deck, was for all the world like any range of hills on the 
dry land, full of peaks and smooth places and valleys. The coracle, left to herself, 
turning from side to side, threaded, so to speak, her way through these lower 
parts, and avoided the steep slopes and higher, toppling summits of the wave. 
‘Well, now,’ thought I to myself, ‘it is plain I must lie where I am, and not disturb 
the balance; but it is plain, also, that I can put the paddle over the side, and from 
time to time, in smooth places, give her a shove or two towards land.’ No sooner 
thought upon than done. There I lay on my elbows, in the most trying attitude, and 
every now and again gave a weak stroke or two to turn her head to shore. (127-8) 
 
In this passage, description is entirely in service of what, in “A Gossip on Romance,” Stevenson 
calls “the practical intelligence.” Rather than offering a description of the sea as pictorial 
backdrop to Jim’s undertakings, Stevenson’s first-person narrator provides a careful topography 
of the shifting three-dimensional space that Jim is actively navigating, the drama of the passage 
   176 
hinging on the physical interactions between the weight of Jim’s body, the buoyancy of the 
vessel, and the changing shapes of the waves. Jim’s narration of his thought process mimes the 
fine-grained psychological deliberations of a character in a realist novel choosing between two 
courses of action, but the object of deliberation here is not a set of moral alternatives, but rather 
the detailed, resolutely material relationship between body and physical environment.  
 What results is a complex representation of Jim’s agency as only partially autonomous. 
While Jim’s ingenuity in devising a way to turn the coracle’s ungovernable movement to his 
advantage underlines the success of his practical intelligence, the language with which the 
narrator describes the “trying attitude” in which the hero must travel highlights Jim’s passivity 
rather than his heroic action: he “l[ies] on his elbows,” entrusting his body to the seemingly 
haphazard movements of vessel and waves, “every now and again [giving] a weak stroke.” Jim 
manages to survive the chaotic terrain of his aqueous environment through negative rather than 
positive means, not conquering the world around him but rather making sure “not [to] disturb the 
balance.” A more active display of Jim’s practical intelligence comes a few pages later, when 
both Jim’s coracle and the unmoored Hispaniola are drifting haphazardly in an ocean current, 
and Jim must leap from boat to ship: 
Round she [the Hispaniola] came, till she was broadside on to me—round still till 
she had covered a half, and then two-thirds, and then three-quarters of the 
distance that separated us. I could see the waves boiling white under her forefoot. 
Immensely tall she looked to me from my low station in the coracle. And then, of 
a sudden, I began to comprehend. I had scarce time to think—scarce time to act 
and save myself. I was on the summit of one swell when the schooner came 
stooping over the next. The bowsprit was over my head. I sprang to my feet, and 
leaped, stamping the coracle under water. (130) 
 
This passage combines description and narration with masterful efficiency to convey the shifting 
relationship between multiple bodies in chaotic motion on a fluid medium. Evoking spatial 
relationships with breathtakingly economical precision in the space of five short sentences, Jim 
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narrates a Zeno’s paradox in motion (“she covered a half, and then two thirds, and then three-
quarters of the distance”), his inarticulate recognition that he is about to be run down by the ship, 
and his decision—within the vanishing time-space between one ocean wave and the next—to 
leap for his life. The drama of the passage hinges entirely on the spatial positioning of material 
bodies (ship, boat, human body) in relationship to one another—“circumstance” in its most 
brutal etymological sense. The protagonist’s agency is not that of the triumphant strategist 
manipulating the world around him, but the kinetic desperation of the physical organism carving 
out a niche for survival within the same onslaught of physical forces that are always on the verge 
of overwhelming it. 
 Even the novel’s scenes of violent action and physical combat—a staple of the adventure 
genre—betray a similar conception of individual agency as limited by, rather than dominant 
over, the physical world. Jim’s most violent act in Treasure Island, his killing of the mutineer 
Israel Hands aboard the Hispaniola, is narrated as an act over which he has almost no control. 
Like the preceding scene in which Jim leaps from the coracle onto the ship, the scene of Jim’s 
fight with Hands is narrated with a minute attention to spatial relations between bodies. Seated in 
the cross-tree of the Hispaniola’s mast, Jim points his pistol at Hands, who approaches him 
across the deck with a dagger. Hands gives the impression of surrendering, before precipitating 
the two men into violence by hurling the dagger at Jim: “I felt a blow and then a sharp pang, and 
there I was pinned by the shoulder to the mast. In the horrid pain and surprise of the moment—I 
scarce can say it was by my own volition, and I am sure it was without a conscious aim—both 
my pistols went off, and both escaped out of my hands” (142). The bullets fired without volition 
from Jim’s pistols strike and kill Hands, who plummets into the sea, leaving Jim in control of the 
schooner. As Stefanie Markovits has noted, such scenes of “brisk, unmeditated and effective 
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action” are repeated throughout Treasure Island, developing a model of bodily agency 
independent of psychological deliberation and decision (176). But this violent scene in particular 
suggests something more, showing that even Jim’s most consequential actions are mere physical 
reactions to environmental cues. The narration of this moment outlines a sequence of material 
events—a blow, a sharp pang, the pinning of Jim’s shoulder to the mast, followed by the 
surprised discharge of his pistols—that, through their causal sequence, bypass any psychological 
moment of inward decision. Even in killing Hands, Jim pulls the trigger not in a moment of 
decisive action, but involuntarily from a position of physical constraint, his arm pinned to the 
wood behind him. That the material circumstances unfolding around and through his body 
fortuitously lead to his victory over Hands is a matter of physical coincidence, not an effect of 
bodily instinct, or even “practical intelligence.”  
Critics have recently noted the peculiar balance of agency in Stevenson’s fiction, though 
they have not situated it in the context of the discourse of circumstance. Cannon Schmitt, for 
example, suggests that the love for the physical world evinced in Stevenson’s novels produces a 
paradoxical model of agency that simultaneously asserts “that the individual can be more 
powerful or canny than the forces the world deploys,” and acknowledges that “those forces are 
always and everywhere more powerful than the individual” (69). While adventure fiction’s 
celebration of the individual’s mobility and success against external obstacles may appear, as 
Green and Kucich argue, unambiguously to endorse imperialist domination, Margaret Cohen has 
more recently argued that adventure fiction is more morally ambiguous than it initially appears. 
Noting that Western modernity is read by both its proponents and its detractors as either a 
laudable or insidious triumph of human agency—as either “a project of progress and 
perfectability” or the “human domination of nature, which wreaks catastrophe”—Cohen suggests 
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that modern “adventure complex” offers “between progress and domination a third term,” 
“yok[ing] together emotion, discourse, narrative practice, and intelligence” (661). Part of the 
reason adventure fiction attains such complexity, Cohen notes, is its emphasis on the body. 
Rather than pitting abstract rationality against a submissive and malleable physical world, the 
adventure complex unfolds entirely on a physical plane, the protagonist’s body subject to 
external forces, challenges, and obstacles even as it deploys what Stevenson calls its “practical 
intelligence” to navigate them. What emerges is less a triumphant narrative of Western 
domination than the story of a battle between equals, with temporary survival rather than 
domination as the prize.  
 The second, closely related way in which Treasure Island modifies the Victorian 
discourse of circumstance is to shift its emphasis away from narratives of development and 
towards narratives of encounter. As Doug Mao has shown, a large part of circumstance’s 
purchase in late Victorian discussions of determinism was owing not just to the idea that humans 
are vulnerable to vast external forces, but also to the notion that individuals are products of 
circumstance.33 Circumstance was thus understood narratively as well as spatially, as a 
conceptual shorthand for the external factors that, over time, determine individual development 
and make the self—especially, as Mao notes, the juvenile or adolescent self—what it is, often at 
cross-purposes with the self’s own desires for self-determination. While the protagonists of 
Stevenson’s adventure novels are almost always adolescents, they are more often in a state of 
arrested development than undergoing a traditional, progressive Bildung. Robert Kiely observes 
that even Stevenson’s “adult heroes . . . think of themselves as children not quite at home in the 
adult world,” and that “neither their personality nor their gender has been fully developed” (35). 
                                                
33 See Mao, 15, 78-9. 
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Schmitt similarly aligns Stevenson’s fiction with “characters [who] do not cross over into 
adulthood so much as hover on its threshold” (56). Insofar as they undergo any development, 
Schmitt argues, it is only the development of a technical competence that enables them to 
navigate the physical world of wind and waves, not the psychological maturation of the 
conventional Bildungsroman; it thus remains always “open-ended, inconclusive,” signifying 
“Stevenson’s refusal of the model of personhood on offer in the traditional Bildungsroman” (74). 
But if Stevenson’s adolescent characters are relatively static in a developmental sense, they are 
certainly not static bodily or geographically: the kinetic processes of bodily motion and travel 
take the place of maturational change, and it is on this—and a correlative reimagining of the 
relationship between individual bodies, narrative events, and geographical locations—that 
Stevenson’s redefinition of the Victorian idea of circumstance partially turns. 
 In “A Gossip on Romance,” Stevenson argues that the romance genre is characterized by 
a specific conceptualization of setting as a kind of platonic accompaniment for specific types of 
plots. If for realist writers such as Eliot, descriptions of landscapes and locations bear a 
developmental relationship to character (where physical locations are significant primarily as the 
formative milieux that have shaped characters dynamically into what they are), for Stevenson 
place is associated with plot more than with character, and in a fixed rather than a dynamic way. 
In his essay, Stevenson describes setting as an element of fiction that is important primarily for 
its “fitness” as a scene for specific types of actions and events. “The right kind of thing should 
fall out in the right kind of place,” he writes; “the right kind of thing should follow; and not only 
the characters talk aptly and think naturally, but all the circumstances in a tale answer one to 
another like notes in music” (236-37). He supplies a series of examples of “circumstances” and 
actions that thus answer one to another: 
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The sight of a pleasant arbour puts it in our mind to sit there. One place suggests 
work, another idleness, a third early rising and long rambles in the dew. The 
effect of night, of any flowing water, of lighted cities, of the peep of day, of ships, 
of the open ocean, calls up in the mind an army of anonymous desires and 
pleasures. Something, we feel, should happen; we know not what, yet we proceed 
in quest of it. . . . It is thus that tracts of young fir, and low rocks that reach into 
deep soundings, particularly torture and delight me. (233) 
 
The concept of “circumstances” here designates a kind of formalist or platonic appropriateness 
between place and event, rather than the relentless unfolding of cause and effect, the vagaries of 
chance, or the inexorable environmental pressure, that the term usually indicates in realist and 
naturalist fiction. It points to a state of affairs where narrative and description, action and setting, 
merge and achieve a seamless generic congruence. The described background of the adventure 
novel thus participates in, and even generates, plot, providing a formal topography of physical 
affordance and constraint against and within which the hero’s body performs a complex 
choreography. 
 In Treasure Island, the narrator’s descriptions of the island landscape carry this sense of 
non-developmental motion over complex formal surface. The island’s topography is almost 
always described from the shifting perspective of bodily mobility rather than pictorial stasis, as 
in this account Jim gives of traversing a section of the island with his allies in their pursuit of the 
treasure: “At the first outset, heavy, miry ground and a matted, marish vegetation, greatly 
delayed our progress; but by little and little the hill began to steepen and become stony under 
foot, and the wood to change its character and to grow in a more open order” (173). Integrating 
narrative and description into a temporally unfolding sequence, Stevenson recasts the island’s 
landscape into a three-dimensional topography which characters use their physical acumen to 
navigate. Though Stevenson describes a biotic environment for the first time here, the surface of 
the island is evoked (like the surface of the ocean) primarily as an assemblage of fixed forms and 
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textures through which the characters’ bodies move, the “heavy, miry ground” and “matted, 
marish vegetation . . . delay[ing] our progress.” The “progress” the landscape impedes is not the 
developmental or psychological progress of the Bildungsroman, but rather sheer physical kinesis 
across a material surface, narrative in a form so reduced that it is almost description. As the 
passage proceeds, the narrator dwells upon the characters’ sensation of contact with this 
landscape, diverting focus away from more abstract narrative motivations:  
A heavy-scented broom and many flowering shrubs had almost taken the place of 
grass. Thickets of green nutmeg trees were dotted here and there with the red 
columns and the broad shadow of the pines; and the first mingled their spice with 
the aroma of the others. The air, besides, was fresh and stirring, and this, under 
the sheer sunbeams, was a wonderful refreshment to the senses.  
Stevenson’s evocation of sensory pleasure in the contact zone between the body and the natural 
world is less interested in conjuring a geographical location in its real-world specificity, than in 
aestheticizing and formalizing this contact zone into a general phenomenological sense that “the 
circumstances . . . . answer one to another like notes in music,” a sensation appropriate to 
“problems of the body and of the practical intelligence.” 
 Critics such as Louisa Gairn and Cannon Schmitt have identified an environmentalist 
potential in Stevenson’s emphasis on bodily contact with natural surroundings. Gairn observes 
that for Stevenson, “health and nature are bound up with a love for adventure—a love which he 
returns to almost obsessively in his writings, and which is itself in many ways the product of the 
sickroom. The feeling for nature which Stevenson is concerned with is not . . . the abstract 
experience gained by a contemplation of scenery, as the delight in the moving body, a direct and 
youthful relationship with the natural world” (40-41). Cannon Schmitt suggests that Stevenson’s 
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adventure fiction attests to “the necessity not simply of attention or commitment to the 
checkerboard of forces that make up the world but of love for it” (65). This pleasure in the 
body’s physical contact with the elements of nature—what Stevenson calls “the poetry of 
circumstance”—is the hallmark of a limited agency that neither fantasizes about total mastery 
nor feels itself crushed by a deterministic cosmos. In his later fiction, however, Stevenson turns 
both to a more realistic mode, and to the biotic environments of South Pacific islands. This 
change, as I will show, worked significant changes upon the conception of agency that we see in 
his early adventure fiction. 
Tropical Islands and Biotic Environments in the South Pacific Writings 
 The tropical island occupies a special place in the intertwined histories of ecology and 
environmentalist consciousness. In his groundbreaking study Green Imperialism, environmental 
historian Richard Grove argues that the tropical island under European imperial rule was the 
birthplace of environmental thought. The tropical island provided the conditions for the 
development of conservationist ideas because, as Grove argues, conservationist ideology “was 
based . . . upon the highly empirical and geographically circumscribed observations of 
environmental processes which the experience of tropical island environments made possible” 
(6). The rapidity of ecological change in isolated island environments granted colonists an 
experiential awareness of the mutability of natural environments, the powerful and irreversible 
effects on native flora of deforestation and agriculture, and the encroaching possibility of 
extinction. As Grove points out, “the island easily became . . . an easily conceived allegory of a 
whole world. Contemporary observations of the ecological demise of islands were easily 
converted into premonitions of environmental destruction on a more global scale” (9). In this 
imperial context, environmental historian Peder Anker has shown, ecological theories and 
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practices first arose as a means of managing natural resources and native populations; indeed, 
George Arthur Tansley, the early ecologist who coined the term “ecosystem” in 1935, served for 
several years as the chairman of the British Empire Vegetation Committee, tasked with 
discerning and communicating the means by which the British empire could best manage its 
living natural resources in the colonies. Thus, as Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George Handley put 
it, “the environmental sciences that tell us that we can no longer afford to ignore our human 
impact on the globe are an ironic by-product of a global consciousness derived from a history of 
imperial exploitation of nature” (12).  
 Stevenson’s own experience of tropical islands began in June of 1888, when he sailed 
with his American wife, Fanny Osbourne, and stepson, Lloyd Osbourne, from San Francisco to 
the Marquesas, then under French rule. Never again to return to Europe, he spent the six years 
from 1888 until his death in 1894 in the South Pacific, travelling from the Marquesas to Tahiti, 
Hawaii, and the Gilbert Islands, before finally settling in 1889 on Upolu, an island in Samoa, 
where he purchased a tract of land called Vailima outside the city of Apia (Calder 282-84). 
During these years, Stevenson became a keen observer of the effects of European imperialist 
depredations on Polynesian societies and landscapes, as well as of the types of characters and 
personalities that South Pacific life attracted and produced. While he continued to write fiction, 
he also produced a significant body of non-fiction, including A Footnote to History, an account 
of Samoa’s rebellion against German imperial rule that sided heavily with Samoan sovereignty, 
and In the South Seas, an ambitious work that combined anthropology, politics, and natural 
history in an effort to convey to British readers an awareness of the distinctness of different 
Polynesian societies and the political and cultural difficulties they faced under the shadow of 
European imperialism.  
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 Nearly all of Stevenson’s late fiction and non-fiction explores island environments, but 
the islands of novels like The Wrecker and non-fiction books like In the South Seas are very 
different from Treasure Island in that they are all the site of complex living communities, and of 
specific cultural and biological histories. This is particularly evident in the contrast between the 
titular treasure of Treasure Island—a chest full of pirate gold—and the valuable “treasures” that 
propel the plots of Stevenson’s south seas fiction, most of which are biologically-produced 
resources extracted from colonized islands and valuable by virtue of their relationship to shifting 
market forces and trade networks: a safe full of illegally-fished pearls (The Ebb-Tide); a trade 
monopoly on an island nation’s copra (dried coconut meat) supply (The Beach of Falesa); the 
illicit profit from a cargo of copra opportunistically sold far above market price to a beached 
trader desperate to satisfy a contract (The Wrecker). In these texts, Stevenson departs from the 
abiotic cleanliness of his early adventure fiction in order to associate the South Pacific, and 
European presence within the region, with imagery of biological invasion and interspecies 
violence. This milieu of biological violence and invasion complicates and revises the adventure 
novel’s delicate economy of agency. While in Treasure Island the human body seeks out its own 
felicitous limitations in a playful antagonism with abiotic natural elements, in Stevenson’s late 
fiction this equilibrium gives way to an oscillation between extremes, in which the body finds 
itself either existentially overwhelmed by the biotic world, or else the agent of unwarranted 
violence against other living bodies.  
 Stevenson rarely expresses his newfound attention to the biotic environment in the tones 
of wondering appreciation that we might expect from a writer who likely grew up reading 
Gilbert White. Instead, the writings Stevenson produced during his South Pacific years more 
often evoke a marked revulsion towards biological life, a horror of the capacity of living 
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populations to perpetuate themselves and to colonize previously uninhabited regions. This is 
evident even in writings that are not explicitly about the South Pacific. Take, for example, a 
passage from the 1892 essay “Pulvis et Umbra,” a strange piece that begins with a meditation on 
the horrible prodigy of biological life, and closes with the conclusion that creation is nevertheless 
an ordered system that promotes a divinely-instilled ethic of love and virtue. The vision of the 
living cosmos that Stevenson lays out in the essay’s first half conveys a sense of disgust that the 
conclusion’s theological bromides fail fully to contain: 
We behold space sown with rotatory islands, suns and worlds and the shards and 
wrecks of systems: some, like the sun, still blazing; some rotting, like the earth; 
others, like the moon, stable in desolation. All of these [islands] we take to be 
made of something we call matter: a thing which no analysis can help us to 
conceive; to whose incredible properties no familiarity can reconcile our minds. 
This stuff, when not purified by the lustration of fire, rots uncleanly into 
something we call life; seized through all its atoms with a pediculous malady; 
swelling into tumours that become independent, sometimes even (by an abhorrent 
prodigy) locomotory; one splitting into millions, millions cohering into one, as the 
malady proceeds through varying stages. (269) 
 
Although Stevenson is ostensibly describing the far reaches of outer space and the cosmos, his 
metaphorical vocabulary suggests the South Pacific as much as the Milky Way. Planets are 
described as an archipelago of “rotatory islands” strung across an empty space littered with 
“shards and wrecks of systems”—an image that recalls the archipelagoes scattered across a sea 
otherwise empty but for the ominous debris of shipwrecks. Stevenson’s description of biological 
life takes Herbert Spencer’s definition of biological development as “an advance from 
homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure” and transforms it into the stuff of horror, 
inverting the usual terms for living processes—growth, development, complexity—and renaming 
them as forms of contagion and decomposition, a foul aberration from matter’s natural abiotic 
state (“Progress” 39). As Stevenson’s account of cosmic horror proceeds, the sense of revulsion 
only intensifies. Calling life a “vital putrescence of the dust,” Stevenson invites his reader to note 
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how “the profusion of worms in a piece of ancient turf, or the air of a marsh darkened with 
insects, will sometimes check our breathing so that we aspire for cleaner places” (269). This is 
Darwin’s tangled bank reimagined as an object of horror rather than wonder, the intricate 
interdependence and profusion of living and reproducing organisms a horrible rather than a 
marvellous prodigy. 
 It is within the circumscribed space of the tropical island that this horror of biological life 
becomes most concentrated for Stevenson. In a chapter describing the geological and ecological 
formation of coral atolls in In the South Seas, Stevenson marvels at these islands’ “profusion of 
vitality” in terms that echo the more general cosmic horror of “Pulvis et Umbra”: “the rock 
underfoot is mined with [life],” he writes; “I have broken off . . . great lumps of ancient 
weathered rock that rang under my blows like iron, and the fracture has been full of pendent 
worms as long as my hand . . . set as close as three or even four to the square inch” (144). “It 
adds a touch of horror,” he adds, “to the thought of this precarious annular gangway in the sea, 
that even what there is of it is not of honest rock, but organic, part alive, part putrescent; even the 
clean sea and the bright fish about it poisoned, the most stubborn boulder burrowed in by 
worms” (145). In these passages, the horror of the biotic is not just disgust at biological 
profusion, but rather the horror of finding living organisms where one expects the purity of 
abiotic forms. The cleanliness of the abiotic elements of the environment—water, sand, rock—is 
tainted by the insidious encroachment of the biotic, revealed in all its horrifying profusion 
beneath seemingly non-living, inert surfaces.  
 It is tempting to read this visceral horror of the biological, emerging as it does in a 
metaphorical context that invokes the South Pacific archipelago, as the expression of a  
colonist’s dismay at the profuse fecundity and intractable resistance of a tropical landscape. 
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Indeed, in the Vailima Letters, written to Stevenson’s friend Sidney Colvin during the former’s 
residence in Samoa, Stevenson gives a vivid and affect-laden account of his own physical efforts 
to maintain his own gardens and property against the encroaching Samoan forest. At first, his 
account of his struggles with the unknown vegetation echoes the horror of living things 
expressed in “Pulvis et Umbra,” attributing to the tropical plants an almost supernatural 
invincibility and malign intent. “My long, silent contests in the forest have had a strange effect 
on me,” he confides to Colvin: “The unconcealed vitality of these vegetables, their exuberant 
number and strength, the attempts—I can use no other word—of lianas to entrap and capture the 
intruder, the awful silence, the knowledge that all my efforts are only like the performance of an 
actor, the thing of a moment, and the wood will silently and swiftly heal them up with fresh 
effervescence . . . weighs on the imagination” (46). Sensing in the Samoan plants an alien agency 
that overwhelms his own, Stevenson describes himself as a vulnerable creature whose attempts 
to clear ground are a futile performance in the face of an encroaching, almost pulsating surround 
imagined in gothic rather than pastoral terms. This attribution of a malign vitality to a non-
Western natural environment draws on the familiar colonial trope that casts the colonizer as the 
(perhaps ineffectual) domesticator of an unruly wilderness. 
 But as Stevenson’s description proceeds, this dualistic antagonism differentiates into an 
articulation of a more complex relationship between human and non-human life. For within 
Stevenson’s dread of this alien vitality gradually emerges a horror at his own violence against the 
forest vegetation, which gives rise to a growing sense that he himself is the alien in this 
landscape. What results is a complex amalgam of disgust, solicitude, fear, guilt, satisfaction, and 
even tenderness, as Stevenson alternately expresses his revulsion at the alien forest, recriminates 
his own acts of destruction, and takes a grim satisfaction in a job well done. “I wonder if any one 
   189 
had ever the same attitude to Nature as I hold?” he asks: “This business fascinates me like a tune 
or a passion; yet all the while I thrill with a strong distaste. The horror of the thing, objective and 
subjective, is always present to my mind; the horror of creeping things, a superstitious horror of 
the void and the powers about me, the horror of my own devastation and continual murders” 
(106). But this horror is accompanied by a visceral empathy for the plants he uproots: “the life of 
the plants comes through my finger-tips, and their struggles go to my heart like supplications. I 
feel myself blood-boltered; then I look back on my cleared grass, and count myself an ally in a 
fair quarrel, and make stout my heart” (106-7).  
 This shift from horror to empathy for vegetal life becomes further complicated as 
Stevenson distinguishes between different types of plants, both native and invasive. The plant 
species that figures most prominently as the gardener’s foe in the Vailima Letters is the tuitui, or 
sensitive plant, a tenacious invasive species that “a fool brought . . . to this island in a pot, and 
used to lecture and sentimentalize over the tender thing” (46). Stevenson notes wryly: “the tender 
thing has now taken charge of this island, and men fight with it, with torn hands, for bread and 
life” (46). Stevenson devotes a natural historian’s attention to the tuitui in the Letters, performing 
experiments to determine how long its leaves take to reopen after being touched, and forming 
proto-ecological hypotheses about the evolutionary adaptations that make it so difficult to 
eradicate. “I give my advice thus to a young plant,” he jokes in irritation, “have a strong root, a 
weak stem, and an indigestible seed; so you will outlast the eternal city, and your progeny will 
clothe mountains, and the irascible planter will blaspheme in vain” (53). As the focus of 
Stevenson’s ire shifts from the Samoan jungle as a whole to the sensitive plant in particular, the 
tuitui becomes a kind of double for Stevenson the European settler, two invasive species 
squaring off over the same small island territory. The dualistic organism-environment 
   190 
relationship of Stevenson’s early adventure fiction, in which the human body stands opposed to 
an environment of cleanly defined abiotic forms, is replaced by a more complexly ecological 
arrangement in which Stevenson finds himself allied with some species while at war with others, 
not always certain where the distinctions lie between native and foreigner, invaded and invader.  
 While these non-fictional writings foreground a Stevenson unsettled and decentered by 
an unfamiliar living environment that both threatens and is threatened by his activities, 
Stevenson’s fictions of this period appear much more concerned with the South Pacific as a 
space dominated by human trade and technology than as an otherworldly frontier between the 
human and the nonhuman. As Rosalind Williams has recently argued, novels such as The 
Wrecker and The Ebb-Tide, with their ocean-spanning plots hinging on vast global networks of 
trade and transportation, demonstrate Stevenson’s movement away from the belief that “human 
history [takes] place against the ground of non-human nature” and towards the recognition that 
“human activities [had come] to dominate nearly everything that happened on the planet” (8). 
Yet for all their celebration and anatomization of what Williams terms “human empire,” these 
novels do not succeed in erasing their non-human backgrounds completely, and this background 
often erupts in disturbing scenes of violence in island environments that echo Stevenson’s 
complex affective relationship to the forests of Vailima. 
The most noteworthy example is The Wrecker, a novel that Williams accurately describes 
as “a lumpy but tasty mush of picaresque coming-of-age story, adventure tale, and mystery plot” 
(310). The Wrecker features a byzantine narrative structure, combining Kunstlerroman, seafaring 
adventure, and detective novel into a plot whose twists and turns are too complex to summarize 
in full. Its central mystery, however, follows Loudon Dodd, an American art-student-turned-
businessman who joins forces with Jim Pinkerton, a San Francisco merchant, to bid on the cargo 
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of a wreck called the Flying Scud on Midway Atoll. The Flying Scud’s surviving captain bids far 
more than an ordinary wreck would be worth, leading Pinkerton and Dodd to suspect that it 
contains a secret cargo of smuggled opium. On a gamble, they outbid the captain to the tune of 
ten thousand dollars, hoping for a hefty return on the investment, and then race across the Pacific 
to Midway Atoll in a ship called the Norah Creina to claim their prize. The wreck of the Flying 
Scud turns out to be empty, however, and the rest of the novel follows Dodd’s efforts to track 
down the surviving crewmates and learn why the Flying Scud’s captain was so eager to keep the 
ship in his own possession. The mystery is eventually revealed to be a crime scene rather than a 
treasure: the Flying Scud’s original crew are the victims of a massacre carried out by a crew of 
castaways from a wrecked ship called the Currency Lass. After being rescued from Midway 
Atoll by the Flying Scud’s original crew, a castaway has mistakenly killed one of the 
crewmembers in the heat of an argument, and the castaways then murdered the rest of the 
original crew and assumed their identities to conceal the crime. The captain of the Flying Scud 
had bid extravagantly on the wreck not to retain possession of a valuable cargo, but to prevent 
evidence of the crime scene from surfacing. 
While the revelation of these murders is the novel’s climax, The Wrecker also features 
another massacre, likewise set at Midway Atoll, at the narrative midpoint of the novel. Upon 
arriving at Midway Atoll and discovering that the Flying Scud contains only rice, Dodd orders 
his crew to dismantle the wreck and cut open all the sacks of rice in search of hidden opium. As 
the crewmen slit open sack after sack and empty the rice on the deck, the thousands of sea-birds 
that are the sole inhabitants of the island descend upon the scene in vividly realized chaos: 
About the wreck, thus transformed into an overflowing granary, the sea-fowl 
swarmed in myriads and with surprising insolence. The sight of so much food 
confounded them; they deafened us with their shrill tongues, swooped in our 
midst, dashed in our faces, and snatched the grain from between our fingers. The 
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men—their hands bleeding from these assaults—turned savagely on the offensive, 
drove their knives into the birds, drew them out crimsoned, and turned again to 
dig among the rice, unmindful of the gawking creatures that struggled and died 
among their feet. We made a singular picture—the hovering and diving birds; the 
bodies of the dead discolouring the rice with blood; the scuppers vomiting 
breadstuff; the men, frenzied by the gold hunt, toiling, slaying, and shouting 
aloud; over all the lofty intricacy of rigging and the radiant heaven of the Pacific. 
Every man there toiled in immediate hope of fifty dollars, and I of fifty thousand. 
Small wonder if we waded callously in blood and food. (237-8) 
 
The narrator’s language in describing this violent scene captures the ambivalent sensation of 
combined revulsion and guilt vis-à-vis the biotic environment that Stevenson articulates in his 
Vailima Letters. The sea-birds are described as a fecund biotic mass that inspires revulsion as 
much as awe. In an earlier chapter, Dodd notes that the sea-birds of Midway Atoll are 
“innumerable as maggots . . . a vortex of winged life [that] . . . whirled continually through itself, 
and would now and again burst asunder and scatter as wide as the lagoon: so that I was reminded 
of what I had read of nebular convulsions” (206). But once this vortex of life resolves into 
individual bodies in close encounter, revulsion gives way to a spectacle of visceral violence and 
guilt. The narrator selects terms to describe the various bodies and objects in this scene in such a 
way as to erode the distinction between human and nonhuman bodies, living and inanimate 
objects. Initially described as “gawking creatures,” as the birds are killed they pass into a more 
generic vocabulary: the “bodies of the dead discolouring rice with blood” might refer to the 
bodies of humans as much as to those of birds. Avoiding any genitive or possessive terms to 
attribute the terms “blood” and “food” to either the birds or the sailors, Stevenson’s narrator lays 
emphasis on the appetitive, fluid life of both: the rice is food to both humans and birds, and the 
blood that discolors it is that of the murdered seabirds mingled with drops from the sailors’ 
bleeding hands. The scene thus produces a primal sense of close biological entanglement and 
violence: it draws attention to the basic kinship between human and bird as vulnerable and 
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appetitive bodies, while also shattering this sense of kinship with the visceral description of the 
sailors’ knives plunging into the birds’ bodies. 
 That this scene of murder turns out to be pointless—the opium that the sailors seek in the 
rice sacks never materializes—links the scene closely to the novel’s other scene of massacre, 
when the crew of the Currency Lass, rescued from their maroon on Midway by the Flying Scud, 
attempt to negotiate their passage back to San Francisco without forfeiting the chest of cash that 
they have with them. This scene also takes place over food, and the bloodshed begins when, over 
a shared meal, Captain Trent of the Flying Scud demands the Currency Lass’s cash in return for 
rescue. A member of the Currency Lass crew hurls a knife at Trent in an access of irritation, and 
it “str[ikes] him in the jugular” by chance (392). Echoing the earlier Midway massacre, the blood 
of the accidental victim mixes with food: “he fell forward, and his blood flowed among the 
dishes and on the cloth” (392). The dinner then becomes the massacre, as other crew members of 
the Flying Scud retaliate and the marooned crew proceeds to murder the ship’s entire crew to 
destroy the witnesses of the original accidental crime. The massacre echoes the massacre of sea-
birds in several particulars: the knife as primary weapon, the mingling of blood with food, the 
Midway location, the desire for cash precipitating accidental or senseless violence. 
 The parallels between the animal and the human massacres here create a sense of 
biological equivalence between them, suggesting that the novel’s human violence ought to be 
read against a background of violence against other forms of life as well. The “poetry of 
circumstance” chronicling a single adventure protagonist’s playful contentions with an abiotic 
environment has given way to a more complex narrative, descriptive, and ethical template in 
which the protagonist’s agency is embroiled in a network of interactions with both living and 
non-living environments.  
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 But it is in The Ebb-Tide (1894), Stevenson’s last completed work of fiction, that this 
biologization of the human becomes most urgent and pronounced. The novel combines the 
adventure-tale mode of Stevenson’s early successes with a more somberly realist meditation on 
Pacific imperialism, taking as its canvas both the expansive yet densely interconnected “island 
world” of the Pacific, and (harking back to Treasure Island) the hermetic bounded space of the 
mysterious, uncharted isle. Originally received with mixed reviews by a reading public that 
preferred Stevenson as a spinner of adventurous yarns, The Ebb-Tide has recently enjoyed a 
renewal of critical interest as a critique of English imperialism in the Pacific. Roslyn Jolly, for 
example, has celebrated Stevenson’s “thematic breakthrough of turning adventure motifs—ships 
and islands, colonial outposts, beaches and prisons and oceans—into emblems of an existential 
struggle between power and alienation” (85), while Philip Steer identifies the novel as a 
“romance of uneven development” whose seemingly disjointed structure “offer[s] a critical 
account of the spatiality produced in [the South Pacific] by western trade and investment” (344). 
I want to suggest that The Ebb-Tide is additionally distinctive for the way it reduces its 
characters to biological organisms, aligning them with the prolific and malign vitality that 
Stevenson so often describes in his non-fiction writings from this period. 
 The Ebb-Tide tells the story of three British derelicts in the South Seas: a cockney clerk 
named Huish, a sea-captain named John Davis, and the protagonist, Robert Herrick, a Cambridge 
drop-out, all unemployed and living on the shore of the Tahitian town of Papeete. By a stroke of 
luck, they gain employment sailing a ship with a cargo of champagne bound for Sydney, the 
original crew having succumbed to an epidemic of small-pox. Planning to steal the schooner for 
themselves and sell its cargo in Peru, they steer the ship off-course. The piratical scheme 
devolves into chaos as Huish and Davis turn out to be alcoholics and drink a considerable 
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amount of the champagne cargo, only to discover that the remaining bottles are filled with water: 
the original crew had been planning to sink it and commit insurance fraud. At a loss, the three 
land on an uncharted island and become entangled in a feud with a charismatic evangelical 
missionary named Attwater, who has subdued the island’s native population and amassed a 
hoard of pearls fished illegally from the island’s lagoon. Huish and Davis scheme to murder 
Attwater to take his pearls, and Herrick, simultaneously repulsed and fascinated by the Kurtz-
like figure, vacillates over which side of the feud to take. In the novella’s violent and (literally) 
explosive conclusion, Huish sets out to murder Attwater with a bottle of vitriol, but Attwater 
shoots the bottle as Huish is in the act of hurling it, causing the acid to spill over and kill him. 
The novel’s ending provides little closure, as both Davis and Herrick remain indefinitely on the 
island, apparent converts to Attwater’s charismatic evangelicalism. 
 From its opening lines, The Ebb-Tide imagines European imperialism as a biological 
contagion that infects the “island world” of the South Pacific. Individual characters are described 
as taxonomizable biological specimens that each react differently to the micro-evironment in 
which they find themselves: “Throughout the island world of the Pacific, scattered men of many 
European races and from almost every grade of society carry activity and disseminate disease. 
Some prosper, some vegetate. Some have mounted the steps of thrones and owned islands and 
navies. . . . And there are still others, less pliable, less capable, less fortunate, perhaps less base, 
who continue, even in these isles of plenty, to lack bread” (122). This first sentence conjures an 
open space (a totalized “island world”) in which circulation and mobility—of men, disease, and 
of what Stevenson vaguely calls “activity”—across distances and between locations, individuals, 
and communities is hazardously free and unconstrained. Environment is not hermetic, but rather 
expansive and diffusive, simultaneously vast and disparate, and densely communicative and 
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interconnected. Stevenson’s identification of the island world’s wandering population as “men of 
many European races” both diversifies “European” into many categories, and makes white 
Europeanness visible as an invasive population occupying a space in which they are aliens. The 
narrator’s language emulates the detachment of a natural historian, distinguishing taxonomically 
between individuals who “prosper” and those who “vegetate,” casting “island world of the 
Pacific” as a complex system of actors and biological forces whose entanglements the narrator 
promises to anatomize. 
 When Herrick and his crew make landfall on Attwater’s mysterious atoll, the narrator 
describes the island in terms that at first appear to cast the island as a tropical Eden, located 
outside of temporal and historical flux. Stevenson’s descriptive techniques here differ 
significantly from those he employs in earlier works such as Treasure Island, departing from the 
fresh literalness of Stevenson’s first novel in favor of a more densely symbolic descriptive idiom. 
Whereas Treasure Island offers a literal topography of physical obstacles on which the narrator 
tests his physical mettle, the unnamed atoll of The Ebb-Tide is described in richly figurative and 
allusive terms: 
The isle—the undiscovered, the scarce-believed in—now lay before them and 
close aboard; and Herrick thought that never in his dreams had he beheld anything 
more strange and delicate. The beach was excellently white, the continuous 
barrier of trees inimitably green; the land perhaps ten feet high, the trees thirty 
more. Every here and there, as the schooner coasted northward, the wood was 
intermitted; and he could see clear over the inconsiderable strip of land (as a man 
looks over a wall) to the lagoon within—and clear over that again to where the far 
side of the atoll prolonged its penciling of trees against the morning sky. He 
tortured himself to find analogies. The isle was like the rim of a great vessel 
sunken in the waters; it was like the embankment of an annular railway grown 
upon with wood: so slender it seemed amidst the outrageous breakers, so frail and 
pretty, he would scarce have wondered to see it sink and disappear without a 
sound, and the waves close smoothly over its descent. (187-7) 
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Herrick’s mobile point of view aboard the moving ship enables the description to provide a 
three-dimensional image of the island, as Herrick’s eye catches glimpses of the lagoon and the 
opposite side of the circular atoll through breaks in the trees on shore. The adverbs and 
adjectives that the narrator appends to the island all identify the description to Herrick’s outsider 
perspective: the “excellently white” beach, the “inimitably green” trees convey the outsider’s 
awe, betraying that this miniscule world is “undiscovered” and “scarce-believed in” only by 
Herrick himself. But as the description progresses, its language becomes more figurative, and as 
it does so the emphasis on the island’s pristine, Edenic qualities gives way to a series of 
analogies comparing the island to various artifacts of human life and civilization. The atoll’s 
strip of land is first compared to a “wall” that a man can look over, and then to more grandiose 
structures: “the rim of a great vessel sunken in the waters” and “the embankment of an annular 
railway grown upon with wood.” Both these striking analogies invoke an emblem of Western 
mobility and modernity—a vast trading vessel, a railway—in a post-apocalyptic state of ruin, 
submerged within a natural medium: the ship is all but “sunken in the waters,” the railway 
overgrown with forest. These analogies temporalize the mysterious island, situating both it and 
the artifacts of Western civilization to which it is compared within a historical continuum of 
ecological and cultural succession. It is as though the tables have turned since the novel’s 
opening, and the cultural contagion of European imperialism is now metaphorically subjected to 
the same biological threat that it has itself imposed on Polynesian spaces and cultures.  
 The desire for the abiotic, atemporal environments of Stevenson’s early adventure fiction 
reasserts itself in several scenes in The Ebb-Tide, but even in these moments it carries a darker, 
less playful resonance than any environmental attitude in Treasure Island. In one of Herrick’s 
rare moments of bravery, he establishes himself as a would-be hero when the ship runs into a 
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storm, and his struggle for the ship’s survival (as the ship’s only sober crewmate) evokes an 
exultation in the abiotic environment similar to what we see in Treasure Island: “The squall 
shouted aloud and fell, in a solid mass of wind and rain commingled, on the Farallone; and she 
stooped under the blow, and lay like a thing dead. From the mind of Herrick reason fled; he 
clung in the weather rigging, exulting; he was done with life, and he gloried in the release; he 
gloried in the wild noises of the wind and the choking onslaught of the rain; he gloried to die so, 
and now, amid this coil of the elements” (172). Like Treasure Island, The Ebb-Tide conjures a 
celebration of the self as a physical body grappling with natural forces, abandoning 
psychological drama to highlight instead the physical drama of the “solid mass of wind and 
rain,” the “coil of elements” that enwrap and buffet the body. Yet whereas in the earlier novel 
this confrontation between self and world organizes itself around the body’s heroic gamble for 
survival, in The Ebb-Tide this celebration of the body’s agency gives way to an ecstatic nihilism, 
a desire for the body’s biological vitality to be overwhelmed and extinguished by abiotic forces 
rather than to maintain an equilibrium of agency with them.  
 This ecstatic orientation towards environment is still more visible in a later scene that 
takes place in the “Quartette” portion of the novella, in which Herrick attempts to evade the 
complex human dramas of Attwater’s island by drowning himself in the sea. Stevenson brings 
back the idea of “circumstance” in his narration of Herrick’s dilemma, but uses it to refer to 
human drama rather than the interface between the self and the physical world. In the painful 
dinner scene before his suicide attempt, Herrick dines with his two companions and Attwater, 
struggling with a sense of overwhelmed agency much less ecstatic than his self-abandonment on 
the ship during the storm: “Herrick accepted all that was offered him, ate and drank without 
tasting, and heard without comprehension. His mind was singly occupied in contemplating the 
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horror of the circumstances in which he sat” (212). In the following scene, Herrick seeks 
oblivion in a suicide attempt that foregrounds the paradoxes of agency with which the novella 
wrestles. Swimming out into the lagoon intending to voluntarily sink beneath the waves, Herrick 
realizes that his will, in a complex way, is not his own: 
To stop swimming: there was no mystery in that, if he could do it. Could he? And 
he could not. He knew it instantly. He was aware instantly of an opposition in his 
members, unanimous and invincible, clinging to life with a single and fixed 
resolve, finger by finger, sinew by sinew; something that was at once he and not 
he—at once within and without him; the shutting of some miniature valve in his 
brain, which a single manly thought should suffice to open—and the grasp of an 
external fate ineluctable as gravity. To any man there may come at times a 
consciousness that there blows, through all the articulations of his body, the wind 
of a spirit not wholly his; that his mind rebels; that another girds him and carries 
him whither he would not. It came now to Herrick, with the authority of a 
revelation. (228) 
 
As in the earlier storm scene, Herrick’s situation raises questions about individual agency in the 
face of forces that obstruct the will. Moreover, this episode follows through on the earlier scene’s 
intimation that Herrick desires self-dissolution; his oceanic environment, unlike Jim Hawkins’s, 
beckons him towards death rather than survival, and conveys a sense of the individual as caught 
up in forces beyond his control. Yet instead of arraying the “circumstances” of the natural world 
against Herrick’s physical organism in a neat duality, Stevenson’s narrator undoes the very 
opposition between self and world. Instead of pleasurable or agonistic contact between the body 
and the external world, this passage registers a blurring of the body’s very boundaries. Herrick’s 
inability to kill himself hinges on a cause that the narrator rephrases multiple times in both 
physical and spiritual terms: “something that was at once he and not he,” “some miniature valve 
in his brain,” “the wind of a spirit not wholly his” that “blows through all the articulations of his 
body.” If Stevenson’s early fiction typically imagines the confrontation between body and 
environment as two halves of an opposition, Herrick’s suicide scene sees environment joining 
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forces with—indeed, even invading—the physical body to thwart the will of the mind or spirit. 
But even this reading (physical world against the mind) doesn’t quite work, because the narrator 
also attributes Herrick’s failure of will to his mind, physicalizing it by reducing his mental 
processes to a “miniature valve in the brain.” In Stevenson’s dizzying dissection of different 
kinds of causality—the evaporating will, the mental reflex, “the grasp of an external fate,” the 
recoil of the body’s “members”—the self as a coherent agent becomes fleeting and ephemeral, 
reducible neither to mind, nor body, nor brain, but somehow migrating between all three.  
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